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Abstract 
After the rapid success of microcredit and, to a lesser extent, microsavings in the past 
decades, microinsurance has been the third financial service to enter emerging financial 
markets in the developing world. Microinsurance could provide high welfare gains, given 
that low-income people often lack efficient strategies to manage and cope with risks, such 
as death, illness, old age, droughts or floods. In light of the low coverage of public security 
systems in many developing countries, it is seen as a promising innovation that could offer 
better protection for low-income people. However, little is known about the factors that 
constrain or facilitate demand to translate into uptake of microinsurance and on the product 
characteristics and business practices that create value for them. This thesis applies 
quantitative econometric and qualitative methods – based on own household and individual 
survey data as well as focus group discussions – to investigate participation patterns and 
perceived value in micro life insurance in Ghana.  
The results reveal, first, that household uptake of micro life insurance does not entirely 
follow the predictions made by standard insurance theories. Informal trust-building 
mechanisms and subjective risk perceptions turn out to play an important role in the 
context of information asymmetries and limited experience with formal insurance. 
Furthermore, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between micro life insurance and 
other formal financial services available in the rural and semi-urban study areas in Ghana. 
At the same time, microinsurance does not substitute informal financial services. Given 
that households are burdened with a number of other risks besides death and old age, more 
universal strategies, such as risk sharing within social networks, do not lose their 
significance.  
Second, the perceived value of microinsurance consists not only of the expected or 
experienced benefits and costs, but also of quality, emotional and social dimensions. 
Perceptions of high or low value are driven by large discrepancies between expectations 
and experiences, clients’ knowledge about insurance, their interaction with peers, and the 
availability and effectiveness of alternative risk management options.  
Third, there are gender-specific patterns of market participation between and within 
households that are intertwined with the household type and regionally varying 
sociocultural conditions. Households headed by single women are less likely than other 
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households to purchase micro life insurance, which could be a sign of gender 
discrimination in the market. However, results on the intra-household level show that 
women in couples are, in fact, more likely to purchase micro life insurance compared to 
their husbands. This is found especially in regions dominated by matrilineal societies, in 
which husbands typically have less control over household decision-making. Results at the 
intra-household level suggest that the wives’ bargaining power has little influence on their 
husbands’ decisions to purchase insurance, but increases uptake by the wives themselves. 
Overall, the results suggest that spousal preferences on insurance differ and that women are 
an important target group for the provision of micro life insurance. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
“I don’t do any government work, I don’t have any social security, my social 
security is the Anidaso group [micro life insurance scheme]. In future, I will 
lay hands on it, even if I don’t lay hands on it, my children or my wife will lay 
their hands on it and they will stand on it to build their lives.” (Self-employed 
mason from the Central Region in Ghana)  
“He will not join the insurance because his brother [peer] has gone to join and 
it has not helped him. If it wasn’t by God’s grace that he sold his own property, 
the illness would have killed his child. If someone sees something like that, then 
his mind begins to waver for fear of joining.” (Farmer from the Central Region 
in Ghana) 
These statements made by participants of focus group discussions during field work in 
Ghana’s Central Region illustrate aspects of the potential and the challenges of 
microinsurance. Taking a demand-side perspective, this thesis analyzes the determinants of 
uptake and the value perceived in microinsurance in the context of the broader financial 
risk management framework of households and individuals. Besides the analysis of 
decision-making on microinsurance on the aggregate household level, the thesis also 
investigates the insurance behavior of women and men at the intra-household level. The 
empirical analysis focuses on the example of micro life insurance in relation to other types 
of insurance and financial services provided by formal and informal financial institutions 
in the southern part of Ghana. 
Low-income people often lack efficient strategies to manage and cope with risk. The 
welfare implications of uninsured risk go well beyond the short-term costs that low-income 
people face in the event of a shock. There is a growing understanding that many of the 
strategies applied by these people in response to risk involve high costs in the longer term, 
which increase vulnerability to falling into poverty and impede the ability to grow out of 
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poverty (e.g. Carter et al. 2007; Dercon 2005;  Dercon et al. 2008; Jalan and Ravaillon 
2004; Townsend 1995). Recognizing the crucial link between risk, growth opportunities 
and welfare improvements, the World Development Report 2014 will be dedicated to the 
examination of “how improving risk management can lead to larger gains in development 
and poverty reduction” (World Bank 2012). In this context, microinsurance could provide 
high welfare gains by helping low-income people to smooth consumption in a more 
efficient way. This is why the provision of microfinancial services in general, and 
microinsurance in particular, is seen as a promising innovation to protect low-income 
people against risk and is now regarded as an integral part of social protection and poverty 
reduction strategies  
Much of the global concern about risks has lately been centred on the so-called “triple F” 
crisis including the financial crisis, the food crisis and the fuel crisis (Addison et al. 2011; 
Chen and Ravaillon 2009). Yet, it has been questioned whether these global events have 
led to a substantial difference in the overall risk poor people have to deal with (Banerjee 
and Duflo 2011). Of course, global hazards may exacerbate the vulnerability of poor 
people towards risk and may place an additional burden on them. Nonetheless, the most 
frequent and stressful risks that are still affecting the daily lives of low-income people in 
the developing world are rather such hazards as death or illness of a major breadwinner in 
the household, funerals, property loss, old age poverty and risks in agriculture, such as 
droughts and floods (Bhattamishra and Barrett 2010; Chantarat et al. 2013; Cohen and 
Sebstad 2005; Cohen et al. 2005; Collins et al. 2009; Dercon et al. 2008).  
In most developing countries, governments fail to assist low-income people in coping with 
these risks by providing functioning public social security systems and safety nets. In 
subsaharan Africa (SSA), less than 10 percent of the population are covered by some form 
of social security and these are mostly civil servants and formal wage workers (ILO 2010). 
In most parts of SSA, however, 70 percent and more of the workforce is rather employed 
in the informal sector (World Bank 2011a).  
For a long time formal financial services were regarded as inappropriate for low-income 
people and not considered as a means to fill in the social security gap. Yet, the rapid and 
successful increase of microloans and, to a lesser extent, savings accounts in the last three 
decades has led to a rethink. Microinsurance has been the last of the so-called finance 
trinity (the other two being credit and savings) to enter the spotlight in recent years. The 
3 
most popular definition of microinsurance was provided by the first Microinsurance 
Compendium and describes it as: 
“the protection of low-income people against specific perils in exchange for 
regular premium payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk 
involved. This definition is essentially the same as one might use for regular 
insurance except for the clearly prescribed target market: low income people. 
(…) How poor do people have to be for their insurance protection to be 
considered micro? The answer varies by country, but generally microinsurance 
is for persons ignored by mainstream commercial and social insurance 
schemes, persons who have not had access to appropriate products.” 
(Churchill 2006: 12–13).  
Hence, a key difference between microinsurance and other insurance is that it is made 
accessible to the low-income market and thus to people who have an irregular income flow 
and often no previous experience with insurance or other formal financial services. There 
is a focus on the provision of microinsurance to low-income people in developing 
countries. Yet, in principle this definition applies to the low-income population anywhere 
in the world. The definition of microinsurance in respect of its target group has been 
criticized to remain on a rather vague level. While there is some agreement that low-
income people are not only those that are poor today, but also those that are at risk of 
becoming poor in the future, there is no universal and clearly distinct classification of this 
group. Thus, operational definitions also include product parameters, such as premium 
caps, or types of institutions apart from formal insurers that are allowed to provide it, such 
as community-based organizations (Churchill and Matul 2012). 
Today, microinsurance is available for many of those most pressing risks for the low-
income population mentioned above. In the order of frequency products include life 
insurance1, health insurance, agricultural index insurance, disaster insurance and property 
insurance (Matul et al. 2010; Roth et al. 2007). Outreach of microinsurance has rapidly 
increased from 78 million lives insured in 2006 to nearly 500 million lives insured in 2011 
(Churchill and Matul 2012). However, in many countries, this still amounts to less than 5 
percent of the population (Roth et al. 2007).  
1 Life insurance products include basic products such as (involuntary) credit life and funeral insurance as well 
as more sophisticated types of permanent and term life insurance.  
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There is an increasing interest in microinsurance among policymakers and market players 
that is in line with the focus of market-based development policies to increase financial 
inclusion of low-income people in globally linked markets (Prahalad 2005). Yet, creating a 
“culture of insurance” may take generations (Churchill and Matul 2012: 18) and depends 
greatly on the client’s capability of adapting to changes in the financial sector and on the 
context of their risk management framework. The aim of this thesis is to gain a better 
understanding of the decision-making behavior and perspectives of potential 
microinsurance clients in the context of an emerging formal insurance and financial market 
on the basis of empirical evidence. This will also be crucial for the expansion of 
microinsurance such that it makes a real difference to the quality and extent of the 
protection of low-income people’s livelihoods. 
1.2 Embedding in the literature and research questions 
1.2.1 Basic facts from standard insurance theory 
The standard economic approach to analyzing risk and the demand for insurance is based 
on expected utility theory and the concept of risk aversion (von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1944). This theoretical framework assumes that people are risk averse and exhibit 
diminishing marginal utility with respect to wealth. They purchase insurance because they 
prefer the certainty of paying small premiums to secure future income streams to the risk 
of suffering a large financial loss when a shock occurs (Mossin 1968). Thus, risk averse 
individuals have a concave utility function and purchase full insurance coverage at an 
actuarially fair price. From a slightly different perspective, it has also been argued that by 
purchasing insurance individuals transfer resources from low marginal utility of current 
income states to future income states where marginal utility is high (Arrow 1971; Debreu 
1959; Karni 2006; Nyman 2001). A central element of this theoretical work is that with 
decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing wealth, the willingness to pay for 
insurance – that is, the maximum amount paid to exchange the prospect of risk against a 
certain level of wealth – also decreases (Arrow 1971; Mossin 1968; Pratt 1964).   
In reality, actuarially fair insurance does not exist as administration costs and the risk 
premium of shareholders have to be added on the premiums (policy loading factor). All 
other things constant, the optimal demand for insurance is then lower and, relative to their 
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personal risk preferences, people will only partially insure (Doherty and Schlesinger 1983; 
Mossin 1968). Nevertheless, based on the assumption of an inverse relationship between 
risk aversion and wealth, one would have to assume that low-income people, who are the 
target group of microinsurance, have a particularly high demand for insurance given higher 
levels of risk aversion and lower levels of wealth (de Bock and Gelade 2012; Guiso and 
Jappelli 1998). 
In line with the above outlined expected utility framework, standard theoretical models of 
life insurance assume that consumers – and their households – maximize the weighted sum 
of their own lifetime utility from consumption and that of bequests by reducing uncertainty 
in their income streams due to the possibility of a premature death of a primary income 
earner. Whereas many insurance products are merely directed at the ex-ante management 
of a certain risk, the motivations of life insurance may be more complex. Life insurance 
can be regarded as a financial tool for controlling both intertemporal and interpersonal 
transfers (Villeneuve 2001). By minimizing the financial loss of the deceased on the family 
(term life insurance) it serves bequest or reallocation motives towards dependents or a 
spouse (Babiarz et al. 2012; Hussels et al. 2005; Sauter 2012; Zietz 2003). Yet, savings 
motives (permanent life insurance) related to the lifecycle, the purchase of large items like 
a house, or the intention to use it as collateral for securing credit are also common reasons 
for purchasing life insurance. Thus life insurance is also referred to as a financial asset 
(Babbel and Ohtsuka 1989; Browning and Lusardi 1996; Euwals et al. 2004; Lyons et al. 
2008; Outreville 1996; Pissaridis 1980).  
The fact that these motivations of life insurance are quite universal is one reason that 
explains its prevalence in the microinsurance business. Furthermore, life insurance is easier 
to provide than many other types of insurance. Due to the clear-cut nature of the loss event, 
life insurance is uncomplicated to price, mostly resistant to fraud and moral hazard and not 
dependent on the existence and efficient functioning of additional complex infrastructure, 
such as hospitals or rain gauge systems. Moreover, it is easy to link to other microfinance 
products and to distribute via the delivery channels of microfinance institutions that have 
already built up good client relations with the target group (Roth et al. 2007). 
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1.2.2 The case of microinsurance: Is there a difference? 
Standard theories and empirical examinations of insurance consumption have focused 
almost entirely on the situation in developed countries. However, conditions of insurance 
and financial markets in developing countries are different. These are typically incomplete 
and characterized by asymmetric information. Suppliers of microinsurance face high 
transaction costs, actuarial difficulties due to imperfect information on the riskiness of their 
target group, and often a lack of efficient systems of insurance distribution and 
management. Thus, they usually face difficulties in achieving scale and fail to become 
accessible and affordable especially for poorer people in the target market that have a 
demand for insurance  (Claessens 2006; Dionne et al. 2000).  Connected to this, the low-
income population has limited experience with formal insurance. In many countries, 
microinsurance products have been offered for less than a decade. The acceptance of the 
concept of insurance may be low. If people expect failure of the insurance to pay out in 
case of a loss then people might not act according to standard predictions on risk 
preferences and wealth. Expectations of payout failure may arise, for example, when 
people have witnessed defaults, distrust the insurer or simply when a contract does not 
cover enough of the potential loss (de Bock and Gelade 2012; Dercon et al. 2011; Doherty 
and Schlesinger 1983).  It might also be that people are incapable of objectively assessing 
the probabilities of risks and that the experiences of past shocks influence their perceptions 
of risks, which could result in a biased judgement on the necessity of insurance (de Bock 
and Gelade 2012; Böhm and Brun 2008; Rogers 1997; Slovic et al. 1982).  
Today, there is only a small but growing body of evidence on the participation in 
microinsurance. Conditional on the availability of microinsurance for the target population, 
by and large these studies find a surprisingly low uptake of microinsurance (see the studies 
surveyed in de Bock and Gelade 2012: 2). Even more surprising is the result of several of 
these studies that risk aversion tends to reduce, instead of increase, the uptake of 
microinsurance (Clarke and Kalani 2012; Cole et al. 2013; Giné et al. 2008; Ito and Kono 
2010). Interestingly, much of the evidence on microinsurance uptake so far contradicts the 
standard prediction that poorer and more risk averse people are more inclined to purchase 
insurance to avoid the risk of a loss. Aside of supply side failures noted above, this lends 
support to the hypothesis that demand side failures in the market result in patterns of 
participation in microinsurance markets that are different from those observed in 
conventional insurance markets. Rather, much of the recent evidence on microinsurance 
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uptake points out that factors related to uncertainty, trust and familiarity with the insurer 
and the product are crucial for the purchase decision (Cai et al. 2009; Dercon et al. 2011; 
Giné et al. 2008; Morsink and Geurts 2011). While also likely to be important factors, 
much less is known about the role of shock experience and people’s subjective perceptions 
of risk for the participation in microinsurance. Furthermore, the majority of the evidence 
on the demand-side of microinsurance markets has been concerned with the demand for 
health insurance (e.g. Chankova et al. 2008; Dror et al. 2006; Ito and Kono 2010; 
Schneider and Diop 2004), and agriculture related index insurance (e.g. Clarke and Kalani 
2012; Cole et al. 2013; Giné et al. 2008; Sakurai and Reardon 1997). Despite the fact that 
life insurance is most commonly provided, empirical studies on this type of microinsurance 
are almost lacking. 
Additionally, the fact that uptake remains behind the expectations suggests that existing 
microinsurance products are not always perceived as valuable by the target group of low-
income people (Magnoni and Zimmerman 2011; Matul et al. 2011; McCord et al. 2012b). 
There is vast research on the perceived value of goods and services in the context of 
industrialized countries provided by the marketing literature. Though, this has been largely 
overlooked by the microinsurance literature on client value, which is mainly based on 
contributions from practitioners. This marketing literature shows that value is always based 
on subjective and evaluative judgments and involves more than just the weighting of the 
benefits of products against their costs. It is now widely agreed that client value is best 
described as a multidimensional concept that involves many cognitive, personal and 
affective perceptions that go beyond just the functional value of a product (Holbrook 1996; 
Sánchez-Fernandez and Iniesta-Bonillo 2007; Zeithaml 1988). However, empirical studies 
on client value of microinsurance are basically lacking.    
In sum, compared to the vast literature on insurance consumption in developed countries 
we still know little about the factors that constrain or facilitate demand to translate into 
uptake of insurance products in developing countries and on the product characteristics and 
business practices that create value for low-income people. To add knowledge on those 
factors that are relevant for the participation in microinsurance markets based on standard 
insurance theory and beyond, the principal research question of this thesis is: 
(1) What determines participation in microinsurance markets of households and the 
individuals therein?  
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In particular, the following sub-questions are derived from this question: 
(1a) Which subjective factors play a role? 
(1b) What constitutes value from the perspective of clients?  
In addressing these questions, the analysis pays attention to the fact that patterns in 
microinsurance market participation could be different to those in conventional insurance 
markets. Focusing on the case of micro life insurance, the analysis thus includes factors 
that are usually not considered in standard models of life insurance consumption, but are 
likely to play a role in the setting of microinsurance. Thereby, it places specific emphasis 
on trust-building factors and the subjective perception of risk. In the analysis of client 
value the thesis takes a multidimensional approach and explores the various dimensions 
that are perceived as valuable in microinsurance by (potential) clients. 
1.2.3 Microinsurance and alternative ways to smooth income and 
consumption 
Of course, microinsurance is not the only option for low-income people to deal with risk. 
Rather, people have invented and used a diversity of alternative strategies to prepare 
against risk (ex ante) and cope with shocks (ex post) (Dercon 2002; Holzmann and 
Jorgensen 1999; Zimmerman and Carter 2003). Many of these strategies are applied on an 
informal level, such as arrangements of mutual assistance within families or communities 
(Fafchamps and Lund 2003). Yet, there are also risk management options provided on the 
commercial level, such as investment in and selling of financial assets or borrowing; and 
on the public level, such as mandated/state provided insurance for old age or employment 
related risks (Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999). To the extent that these strategies are 
accessible and efficient in dealing with a risk covered by microinsurance, people may have 
less incentive to buy formal insurance coverage (Arnott and Stiglitz 1991). Even if these 
strategies are not fully efficient, people may have become habituated to their traditional 
ways of managing with an insurable risk and there might be complex social obligations 
involved that are not easily abandoned (McCord et al. 2012b). 
Yet, as mentioned above, research has shown that existing – mostly informal – risk 
management strategies applied by low income people to insure consumption against 
income fluctuations are neither always efficient, nor equally accessible by all households 
(Alderman and Paxon 1992; Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Kazianga and Udry 2006; 
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Townsend 1995). Retaining savings and assets to self-insure or moving into more 
diversified and less risky portfolios reduce the exposure to risk typically result in foregone 
mean returns to employment activities (Carter and Barrett 2006; Dercon 2002; Dercon et 
al. 2008; Morduch 1995; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Townsend 1995). This rather 
speaks in favor of a complementary, if not substituting role of microinsurance to existing 
risk management strategies, as it could help people to overcome their inability to deal with 
the uncertainty of future expenses and smooth consumption sufficiently over time.  
Furthermore, several financial strategies may be used simultanously serving the same or 
similar motives. The purchase of life insurance, which also functions as a financial asset, is 
thus not necessarily separable from other portfolio decisions (Chen et al. 2006; Lin and 
Grace 2007; Mayers and Smith 1983).2 As Browning and Lusardi (1996: 1798) put it: 
“households that save for retirement (the life-cycle motive) will also build up financial 
reserves that can be used to buffer pre-retirement income or consumption shocks (the 
precautionary motive)”. Adding to this line of argumentation, the literature on the adaption 
of innovation has pointed out that early adopters of a new technology are likely to be those 
accustomed to similar technologies (Rogers 2003). Applied to the case of microinsurance, 
such technologies could be other financial services or even informal strategies geared 
towards risk pooling. People who use such mechanisms prior to the invention of 
microinsurance might then have an informational advantage, which rather promotes its 
uptake.  
In short, it is largely unknown – and is also likely to depend on the empirical context – 
whether microinsurance is rather a substitute or complement to existing income and 
consumption smoothing activities. This leads to the second research question this thesis 
addresses: 
(2) How does the participation in microinsurance relate to the availability and the use 
of alternative risk management strategies?  
The thesis provides answers to this question particularly with regard to the relation of 
microinsurance with other formal and informal financial services. The analysis further 
takes into account such factors as remittances and transfers provided by informal networks 
and the availability of public social security. It also compares evidence on micro life 
2 An overview over the theoretical and empirical literature on household financing and portfolio allocation 
decisions is provided by Campbell  (2006).  
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insurance with that on other types of insurance, such as health insurance. Thereby the 
thesis takes a more holistic approach compared to other empirical contributions on 
conventional insurance as well as microinsurance, which typically analyze insurance 
behavior in an isolated way. 
1.2.4 Microinsurance and gender 
It has been commonly observed throughout the world that women’s wealth is lower than 
men’s and widows are often at risk of being poor during retirement (Bajtelsmit et al. 1999; 
Razavi 1999; Schmidt and Sevak 2006). In this context, the investment and wealth 
management practices of women significantly differ from those of men (Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff 1991; Guérin 2011; Hinz et al. 1997; Johnson 2004; Lyons et al. 2008). Women 
are found to be more risk averse, to face different risks, and to command over less efficient 
strategies to respond to risks than men (Banthia et al. 2009; Ezemenari et al. 2002; 
Leeuwen 2005). Especially in low-income countries, they are often the primary caregiver 
and resource manager in the family, which makes them disproportionally bear the 
consequences of a household’s inability to smooth consumption (Banthia et al. 2009; 
Ezemenari et al. 2002; Kabeer 2008). These factors suggest that women have a potentially 
higher demand for microinsurance than men.  
However, research on gender and microfinance has pointed out that there may be gender-
specific imperfections in financial markets of developing countries (Fletschner 2009; 
Guérin 2011; Johnson 2004; Mayoux 2011). Working against the presumably higher 
demand for insurance among women, these might be more excluded from accessing 
microinsurance due to formal and informal gender-biased rules in society and in financial 
institutions. In this regard, the opportunities to obtain insurance as well as the design of 
insurance may be heavily influenced by gender differences in family and social roles, or 
economic status, which could be one explanation for the observed differences in the 
financial protection of women and men (Banthia et al. 2009; Miles and Parker 1997). 
Related to these gender differences in social and economic roles, the one study on both 
spouses’ purchase of conventional life insurance in the United States finds that the 
response of life insurance holdings to the key motives of income and household production 
differs for husbands and wives (Gandolfi and Miners 1996).  
11 
In addition to the issue of gender differences in the demand for and the access to insurance, 
it might be that risk coping within the household is not always a joint endeavour. There is 
now a large literature on intra-household dynamics that opposes the assumption of standard 
unitary models that households are places of common preferences. This literature shows 
that household members may have conflicting interests and bargain over respective 
decision outcomes.3 In this regard, in couple households women’s ability to obtain 
insurance is also likely to be related to intra-household power relations and financial 
management. Hence, there may be ambiguous gender effects related to the supply as well 
as the demand side of microinsurance that are likely to result in gender-specific patterns of 
market participation at the inter-household as well as the intra-household level. However, 
gender-specific insurance purchasing behavior has neither received much attention in the 
microinsurance literature nor in the conventional insurance literature. Even less attention 
has been paid to the intra-household dimension of decision-making on the purchase of 
insurance. Thus, the third research question addressed by this thesis is: 
(3) Are there differences between men and women (husbands and wives) in their 
decisions to participate in microinsurance markets? 
The typical approach to microinsurance equates the interest of the individual – as reflected 
by the purchase of individual insurance policies – to that of the household as a whole 
(Leeuwen 2005). Going beyond the inter-household comparison, the analysis is the first to 
investigate microinsurance uptake on the individual level of husbands and wives within 
couple households. Apart from adding knowledge on the question of whether men and 
women are more or less inclined to purchase insurance and whether their decisions respond 
to different factors, it also asks how these decisions relate back to intra-household 
dynamics.  
1.3 Insurance and financial markets in Ghana 
The insurance and financial market in Ghana is dominated by three main types of 
institutions: (1) formal institutions, such as government insurance schemes, parastatal 
insurance companies, private insurance companies, licensed brokers and agents, 
commercial banks, rural and community banks (RCBs) and savings and loans companies, 
(2) semiformal institutions, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), cooperatives, 
3 Comprehensive reviews of this literature are provided by Chiappori and Donni (2011) and Doss (1996). 
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and mutual health organizations and (3) informal institutions, such as Susu collectors (see 
below), funeral societies and other informal groups.  
In the rural and semi-urban areas outside the capital area of Accra, RCBs stand out as the 
largest financial player in terms of geographical coverage, depth of outreach and number of 
financial products. They are profit-oriented unit banks owned by community members and 
play a much greater role than semiformal and mostly non-profit oriented NGOs and 
cooperatives, which is unusual when compared with many other African countries. A 
number of 127 RCBs were operating at the end of 2010. From 2000 until 2008, the total 
number of recorded depositors increased by 14 percent to 2.8 million and the number of 
borrowers increased by an impressive 27 percent to 680,000.4 RCBs offer standard 
commercial as well as microfinancial savings products and loans to individuals or groups 
(Basu et al. 2004; Nair and Fissha 2010; Steel and Andah 2008). Other commercial banks 
are active mainly in the district capitals. In total, commercial banking services of any kind 
(including those of RCBs) are used by about 35 percent of the adult population (World 
Bank 2011b). The informal financial sector has also remained very important in Ghana, 
especially in rural areas. It covers a range of activities known as Susu, which are performed 
by individual savings collectors, rotating savings and credit associations, and savings and 
credit “clubs” run by an operator. Susu allows individuals to save outside the banking 
system and enables them to invest in their business activities, or to finance child education, 
funerals or other ventures where lump sums are needed. In 2003, there were over 4,000 
collectors and enterprises nationwide (Steel and Andah 2008). Some RCBs and 
commercial banks have made attempts to adopt the savings mobilization methods 
established in the informal sector and developed linkages with Susu collectors to expand 
their services (Ibid.).  
The insurance sector has started to develop quite rapidly over the past decade. The public 
insurance schemes include the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), 
which provides old age coverage, as well as the broader public National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS). Whereas SSNIT covers only about 11 percent of the working population 
mainly employed in the formal sector (Boon 2007), approximately 34 percent of the total 
Ghanaian population are active enrollees in the NHIS (NHIA 2010). Being one of the very 
first attempts by a subsaharan African country to implement a universal health insurance 
4 The adult population in Ghana, comprising of people above the age of 18, stands at 13.6 million in 2010 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2011).  
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program for its population, the NHIS was launched in 2004 and replaced the cash-and-
carry healthcare system. NHIS targets the population as a whole, including the poorest 
income segments, and annual premiums are very low. Hence, the national health insurance 
reaches out to the target market of microinsurance as well.  
Aside of the public insurance schemes, the national market penetration of commercial 
insurance products is not more than two percent and does not extend much beyond the 
capital area of Accra (Finmark Trust 2011). However, a range of actors have now started to 
enter the so-called “bottom line” of the insurance market, including some commercial 
insurers and insurance intermediates. This renders Ghana a particularly suitable case for 
the study of microinsurance market participation relative to other countries in SSA. Today, 
approximately 20 microinsurance products, which are mostly life or funeral insurance, are 
provided by 15 regulated insurance providers and cover about 1.2 million people (Munich 
Re Foundation 2012). On the regulatory side, and exceptional for the region, the National 
Insurance Commission in Ghana is highly committed to facilitating the development and 
expansion of the microinsurance market (Matul et al. 2010). Apart from South Africa, 
Ghana is the second country in SSA that is underway to pass a new Insurance Act that 
includes a legal regulation of microinsurance (Gruijters 2012). However, the outreach 
undertaken by microinsurance providers has only recently begun to scale up and is still 
mostly limited to Greater Accra and other large cities, such as Kumasi and Takoradi.  
The Gemini Life Insurance Company (GLICO) was the first in the private sector to offer a 
voluntary microinsurance product and was long the largest player in the market, especially 
beyond the capital area. Together with RCBs and other microfinance institutions, GLICO 
offers a micro life insurance called the Anidaso Policy, which is explained in more detail in 
the following chapters.5 During the fieldwork period of this thesis from 2008-2009, 
GLICO cooperated with 26 RCBs all over the southern regions of the country for the sale 
and distribution of the policy. The number of Anidaso clients was about 15,000 in total and 
ranged from around 200 to over 1,000 per RCB. The policy is directed at covering funeral 
and other immediate costs after death of the policyholder and offers an optional investment 
plan. Both types of coverage are highly relevant for the low-income population, given the 
low coverage of the SSNIT and usually substantial funeral costs going along with the ritual 
norms to be followed (Arhin 1994; Geest 2006; Mazzucato et al. 2006).  
5 “Anidaso” translates into “hope” in the Twi language, which is widely spoken in the capital area. 
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1.4 Data and approach 
The core approach used in this thesis is the empirical analysis of micro-level household 
survey data. This is complemented by the analysis of qualitative data obtained from focus 
group discussions. I collected these data in cooperation with the Institute of Statistical, 
Social and Economic Research (ISSER) of the University of Legon within a project on risk 
management and the demand for microinsurance of low-income households. This project 
was conducted by the GIGA Institute of African Affairs under the supervision of Susan 
Steiner from 2006 – 2010. At the start of this thesis, virtually no empirical data were 
available on the demand-side of microinsurance in SSA. Two different surveys were 
conducted during the project with households that had purchased micro life insurance and 
a control group of non-microinsured households. In an ex ante selection process, GLICO 
had been identified to be the only known insurance provider offering voluntary 
microinsurance beyond health insurance to a meaningful number of low-income 
households in SSA at that time.6 I conducted all fieldwork in the survey areas together with 
local teams from ISSER that spoke the relevant local languages. 
The first quantitative household survey was undertaken as a pilot study from January until 
February 2008. The survey took place in two neighbouring small towns (Brakwa and 
Benin) of the Asikuma/Odoben/Brakwa district of the Central Region. The overall sample 
consisted of microinsured households (87), which were oversampled to facilitate statistical 
analysis, other insured (110) and non-insured households (154) making up a total of 351 
interviewed households. All households were listed in a sampling frame and randomly 
selected from their respective stratum. This survey will be further discussed in Chapter 2. 
The second and larger survey took place from January until March 2009. The survey 
contains 1,030 households randomly selected across 17 small towns and medium-sized 
towns in the service areas of three RCBs operating and distributing the microinsurance. To 
ensure regional variation, the three service areas were located in a) the Agona West 
Municipal District in the Central Region, b) the Akuapim North District in the Eastern 
Region and c) the South Tongu District in the Volta Region (see Figure 1). Again, 
microinsured households were oversampled and represented a third of all households in the 
sample (321). This survey and the sampling strategy will be further discussed in Chapter 3. 
6 It is important to note that information on microinsurance providers and products was highly fragmentary at 
the beginning of the project, and still is. It may well be that there existed more voluntary microinsurance 
products besides GLICO’s Anidaso policy that we were not aware of. 
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Both surveys used a similar survey questionnaire that I developed together with Susan 
Steiner.7 This questionnaire covered household demography, land and other assets, 
migration and remittances, as well as income and economic activities of household 
members. Respondents were asked about their household’s experiences of shocks and 
applied risk managements strategies and their use of insurance and informal and formal 
financial services. A special feature of the second survey questionnaire was to separate 
some of the modules for spouses in couple households, who then answered the same 
questions individually. These included the questions on the use of insurance and other 
financial services as well as risk perceptions, attitudes and integration into social networks.  
It is important to note that using survey data, though a common approach in studying 
participation in financial and insurance markets, entails some disadvantages over other 
methods in terms of the causal conclusions that can be reached. As an alternative way of 
data collection, randomized experiments are clearly advantageous regarding the 
researcher’s control for selection into participation and are now increasingly conducted. 
However, due to time and resource constraints, such data could not be collected for this 
thesis. Aside of the internal validity, external validity could be a concern due to the data 
being collected only in three regions of one country. Yet there are reasons to believe that 
scope for generalization goes beyond the local areas of the two surveys. Firstly, the 
selection of the service areas of rural banks and the small and medium-sized towns therein 
was done randomly across all service areas of the provider that were not entirely urban. 
Thus results should be at least representative for those (semi-urban) service areas of RCBs 
operating in southern Ghana offering the micro life insurance. Secondly, the selected towns 
are typical examples of the towns in the southern Ghanaian districts in terms of their 
economic characteristics, infrastructure and size. Around 50-60 percent of their population 
is, on average, engaged in agricultural activities, and most other activities are focused in 
(informal) small-scale industrial businesses and petty trading. It is thus conceivable that 
many of the results of this thesis based on the survey data could be replicated in similar 
semi-urban contexts in Ghana as well as in other parts of subsaharan Africa. 
In between the two surveys, together with two moderators from ISSER I conducted four 
focus group discussions in the Asikuma/Odoben/Brakwa district of the Central Region in 
October 2008 to explore the evaluation and perceived value of insurance in the context of 
people’s risk management framework. Focus group discussions are seen as one particularly 
7 Furthermore, Mirko Bendig contributed to the design of the questionnaire used in the first survey. 
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suitable tool for the analysis of perceptions, attitudes, opinions and interactions (Kleiber 
2004; Morgan 1997; Wilkinson 1998). While the discussion is structured by a guideline, 
there is no predetermined set of answers (as is the case in standardized household surveys 
and experiments) and any topic that appears relevant to the participants is allowed to come 
up during the discussions. This is advantageous especially when researching into an area 
that has not been studied extensively before. The disadvantage of this approach lies in its 
potentially low external validity. Further qualitative as well as quantitative evidence will 
be needed to reveal a complete picture of all factors that influence perceived value of 
microinsurance as well as their relative importance in different empirical contexts. The 
conduction and the analysis of the focus group discussions will be explained in detail in 
Chapter 5.  
1.5 Structure and overview 
Following this introduction, there are four independent chapters in this thesis.  
Chapter 2 analyzes households’ decisions to take up micro life insurance in a joint 
framework with their decision to use other formal and informal financial services. Using 
household survey data from two neighbouring small towns in the Central Region of Ghana, 
a multivariate probit model is applied to investigate the uptake of insurance, savings and 
loans simultaneously. Thereby, the analysis takes into account that households tend to use 
more than one financial service and there may be interconnections between these. The 
results suggest that the use of microinsurance and other formal financial services is 
mutually reinforcing. At the same time, the results do not suggest a substitution effect of 
microinsurance on informal financial services (crowding out). Given many more risks that 
households have to deal with besides death and old age, more universal strategies, such as 
risk sharing within social networks, do not lose their significance. In line with previous 
results on other types of insurance, risk averse households are less likely, instead of more 
likely to purchase insurance, suggesting that households consider it a risky choice. The 
chapter contributes to the discussion on the demand-side determinants of households’ 
participation in microinsurance in three ways. First, different to previous contributions, the 
analysis explicitly takes into account that microinsurance does not enter a vacuum but joins 
a range of alternative informal and formal financial mechanisms used by households to 
diversify risk and cope with shocks. Second, whereas earlier studies have concentrated on 
agriculture, weather index, or health insurance, the study in this chapter was the first to 
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provide evidence on the participation in micro life insurance. Third, while others are now 
following, it was the first quantitative evidence on voluntary microinsurance uptake from a 
subsaharan African country. This chapter is based on joint work with Susan Steiner and 
Mirko Bendig and was published in The Journal of Risk and Insurance.8 
Using household survey data from the larger survey conducted in three different regions, 
Chapter 3 investigates how the uptake and the extent of coverage of micro life insurance 
respond to trust-building factors and the subjective perception of risk. Furthermore, the 
analysis compares the predictors of micro life insurance to those of other available 
insurance types, especially the NHIS. The results of probit and tobit models show that 
beyond standard factors such as wealth and a bequest motive towards children, insurance 
participation and coverage increase with households’ familiarity with the specific provider 
and their social network integration. Unlike the case with national health insurance and 
other types of insurance, participation in micro life insurance is negatively related to the 
subjective risk perception of the household head. This confirms the evidence on the 
different sample from the Central Region used in Chapter 2. The effect of risk pessimism is 
stronger the poorer the households are. This suggests that households operating in a 
context of incomplete information and limited experience with the microinsurance product 
and the providing institutions may (rationally) decide that purchasing an insurance policy 
that is new on the market is too risky an endeavour if they have only very limited funds to 
spend. The chapter contributes to the literature on microinsurance participation by showing 
that subjective factors that are usually not considered in standard models of insurance 
consumption can play a significant role in the setting of microinsurance markets, which are 
characterized by information asymmetries and market failures. 
Chapter 4 provides insights into the gender dimension of microinsurance participation 
from an inter- as well as an intrahousehold perspective. Financial vulnerabilities associated 
with risks, such as death, old age, or illness, have been found to differ between women and 
men. Preferences on life insurance, but also access to it may thus be gendered. 
Furthermore, household members might not always pool risk and insure one another to the 
extent that individual demand for insurance is fully satisfied. Rather, insurance uptake is 
likely to be related to intra-household power relations and financial management. Yet, 
research on gender and the role of intra-household dimensions in microinsurance is 
8 Giesbert, L., Steiner, S. and Bendig, M.(2011) Participation in Micro Life Insurance and the Use of Other 
Financial Services in Ghana, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78, 1, 7-35. 
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virtually lacking. Results indicate that, first, women’s participation in micro life insurance 
is not uniform across different household types. Households headed by a (single) woman 
are less likely to purchase micro life insurance compared to couple households and single 
men households. However within couple households, wives are more likely to purchase 
micro life insurance than husbands. Second, the evidence at the intra-household level 
shows differences in husbands’ and wives’ uptake of micro life insurance related to 
differences in employment, risk perceptions and gendered responsibilities within the 
household. A reallocation motive in favour of the spouse seems to be of little relevance for 
both spouses. Third, while the data does not provide strictly exogenous parameters to 
identify spouses’ bargaining power, initial evidence suggests it may play a role especially 
for the wife’s ability to purchase insurance for herself. The chapter complements earlier 
research on microinsurance by providing a disaggregated view on the behaviour of women 
and men in the market both on the inter-household as well as the intra-household level. The 
intra-household analysis is facilitated by a unique feature of the survey data from southern 
Ghana, which includes individual information on the use of financial services (including 
insurance) as well as risk attitudes and perceptions of spouses obtained from separate 
interviews. The analysis shows what we can learn from extending the unitary approach to 
households to an approach that addresses intra-household issues. However, further research 
based on exogenous variation of bargaining power will be necessary to obtain conclusive 
evidence on the role of intrahousehold decision-making for the insurance behaviour of 
couples. This chapter is based on joint work with Tilman Brück. 
Finally, Chapter 5 employs a qualitative approach to achieve a systematic and detailed 
understanding of the value that clients perceive in microinsurance. Building on focus group 
discussions, the chapter explores which dimensions constitute value for the target group of 
micro life insurance and which context factors help to explain why people form the value 
judgments they do. Using a multidimensional approach, the chapter shows that client value 
is based on the perceived quality, costs, and consumption outcome, as well as the 
emotional and social value of micro life insurance. In their value judgements, focus group 
participants particularly emphasize the quality of the customer service provision, the 
(expected) payout benefits, and positive emotions inspired by insurance coverage. The 
evaluation of the value of the microinsurance under study is mixed. Large discrepancies 
between expectations and real experiences reduce the value perceived in the insurance 
product. Perceptions of high or low value are mainly driven by factors such as clients’ 
knowledge about insurance, their interaction with peers, and the availability and 
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effectiveness of alternative risk management options. The chapter contributes to the 
literature in two ways. First, it shows what academics as well as practitioners interested in 
microinsurance can learn from the marketing literature with regard to how to think about 
client value. Second, as a starting point for further investigations, it develops a conceptual 
sketch of the dimensions of client value and provides insights into the contextual factors 
that explain how perceptions of value come about. This chapter is based on joint work with 
Susan Steiner. 
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1.6 Appendix 
Figure 1: Map of Ghana 
 
Source: United Nation, Department of Peacekeeping Operation, Cartographic Section, 2005. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Participation in micro life insurance and the use of other financial 
services  
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a profound transition in the understanding of microfinance.9 
Academics as well as practitioners have come to realize that “low-income households can 
profit through access to a broader set of financial services than just credit” (Armendáriz 
and Morduch 2005: 147). Microcredit long dominated the microfinance market, but many 
financial institutions have now established deposit accounts – to the extent that the number 
of deposit accounts is more than double the number of outstanding loans in subsaharan 
Africa today (Lafourcade et al. 2005) – and microinsurance has entered the market in many 
developing countries. However, since it is a relatively young phenomenon, the spread of 
microinsurance is still limited. A recent study shows that only about 2.6 percent of the 
African population living under US$2 per day are currently covered (Matul et al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, microinsurance is generally seen and promoted as an important financial 
service for low-income people in developing countries, offering (at least partial) protection 
in the event of serious shocks, such as death, illness, or natural catastrophes, given the 
absence of accessible and functioning conventional insurance markets and public social 
security systems.10  
While microcredit and, to a lesser extent, microsavings, have been studied quite 
extensively, microinsurance has so far received only limited attention in the academic 
literature. In particular, not much is known about why uptake of microinsurance is still 
low, even though this is one of the most crucial questions to answer if greater coverage is 
9 This chapter is a slightly updated version of Giesbert, Lena, Susan Steiner, and Mirko Bendig (Ibid.). 
10 See, for instance, the detailed contributions in Churchill (2006) on the challenges and potentials of 
microinsurance. 
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to be achieved. A few recent studies that have studied the determinants of households’ 
participation in the microinsurance market point to the importance of basis risk, household 
wealth, credit constraints, risk aversion, trust, social networks, hyperbolic preferences, and 
particular marketing methods (Cai et al. 2009; Cole et al. 2013; Giné et al. 2008; Ito and 
Kono 2010; Thornton et al. 2010; Wang and Rosenman 2007). 
This chapter hypothesizes that households’ participation in microinsurance may 
additionally be related to the use of other financial services, i.e. loans and savings products, 
and that this may also help to explain low insurance uptake. One can think of different 
ways in which insurance, loans and savings may be interrelated. On the one hand, it could 
be that the three services are substitutes for each other. Microinsurance does not enter a 
vacuum but joins a range of alternative mechanisms, including financial services, which 
households use in order to share risks and to deal with shocks. To the extent that these 
mechanisms are, or at least appear to be, efficient strategies, households may tend to 
continue applying them, which may in turn explain low uptake of microinsurance.  
As the literature has shown, household savings often serve an insurance purpose. Such a 
precautionary motive for savings is in contrast to an accumulation motive, and it is higher 
when income is uncertain and credit constraints are taken into account (Besley 1995; 
Browning and Lusardi 1996; Deaton 1990; Eswaran and Kotwal 1989; Giles and Yoo 
2007; Lee and Sawada 2007; Skinner 1988; Zeldes 1989). Credit also often takes on 
insurance functions if it is used for consumption instead of investment (Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1989; Zeller 2001). There is a vast literature on risk sharing, including the 
exchange of loans between members of an extended family or a community in emergency 
cases, which many authors refer to as informal insurance (Alderman and Paxon 1992; 
Dercon 2002; Morduch 1995; Platteau 1997; Townsend 1995). However, credit as 
insurance is not a feature of the informal financial market alone; it is well applicable to 
loans on the formal financial market. It is plausible that savings and loans are particularly 
strongly used as substitutes for insurance when no insurance market exists, as in many 
developing countries, but there is no reason to expect the motivation for precautionary 
savings and emergency loans to vanish with the expansion of formal insurance.11  
On the other hand, it could be that the uses of insurance, loans and savings reinforce each 
other, at least if we think of insurance as being distributed via financial institutions that 
11 For example, Lee and Sawada (2007) show that US households, which can be assumed to have access to 
insurance markets in principle, save for precautionary motives to a non-negligible extent.  
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also provide the respective other services. First, users of one service may simply have an 
informational advantage over non-users in the sense that they either learn about additional 
services “by accident” when visiting their respective financial institutions or are 
deliberately approached and informed by bank staff. Second, users may have a higher level 
of financial literacy than non-users, that is, a better understanding of how financial services 
function, and may therefore better recognize the advantages of using another service as 
well. And third, savings as well as insurance may serve as a kind of collateral for loans, 
especially among poorer households for which other (asset-based) forms of collateral are 
unavailable. In all cases, households using at least one service can be assumed to be more 
likely to start using an additional service than households using no service at all. The fact 
that a non-negligible share of households in developing countries does not have access to 
the formal financial market may in fact explain low uptake of microinsurance. 
It is the objective of this chapter to contribute to the discussion on the demand-side 
determinants of households’ participation in microinsurance. The approach taken here 
differs from previous studies in two ways. First, the analysis takes explicitly into account 
that households tend to use more than one financial service and that there may be 
interconnections between these. It is not a trivial task to consider the uptake of 
microinsurance and the use of other financial services in an empirical estimation. There is 
scope for endogeneity, as unobserved heterogeneity may actually influence households’ 
decisions of uptake of all of the services. Additionally, there may be problems of reverse 
causality as households without insurance may tend to save more, or take up more loans, in 
order to deal with future, or past, shocks. Therefore, and in order to capture potential joint 
underlying decision-making processes, the analysis addresses the choices of 
microinsurance, formal savings, informal savings, formal loans, and informal loans 
simultaneously in a reduced-form multivariate probit model. Such a framework takes into 
account that the relative probability of uptake of a financial service is influenced by the 
existence of other alternatives. Second, this chapter investigates the uptake of 
microinsurance in the context of a subsaharan African country and studies the example of 
life insurance.  Earlier studies have concentrated on agriculture, weather index, or health 
insurance in other parts of the developing world.  
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on cross-sectional data from a survey of 350 
Ghanaian households, some of which have purchased a micro life insurance (packaged 
with a hospitalization benefit, accident coverage and an optional savings scheme). The 
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survey was conducted by the authors in two neighboring small towns (Brakwa and Benin) 
in the Asikuma/Odoben/Brakwa district of the Ghanaian Central Region in February 2008 
in the context of a research project on the uptake of insurance in subsaharan Africa.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2.2 presents the 
particular microinsurance relevant to this chapter. Section 2.3 provides a theoretical 
framework for households’ decisions to take up microinsurance. Section 2.4 describes the 
source of data, including sample selection and external validity. Section 2.5 introduces the 
outcome and explanatory variables. The estimation strategy is presented in Section 2.6, and 
the estimation results are shown and interpreted in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 serves as a 
conclusion. 
2.2 Design and distribution of the Anidaso microinsurance policy  
The microinsurance under study here is called Anidaso policy (“anidaso” translates into 
“hope” in Twi) and is provided by the commercial Gemini Life Insurance Company 
(GLICO). The Anidaso policy was developed with initial support of CARE International 
but GLICO does not receive subsidies of any kind for this insurance today. The policy 
offers term life insurance up to age 65, accident benefits, and hospitalization benefits (a 
contribution to the costs of the number of overnight stays in hospital) for the policyholder, 
the spouse, and up to four children. Contributions towards a so-called investment plan, 
which serves as a savings scheme and pays the accumulated amount at the maturity of the 
term, can be added on a voluntary basis. During fieldwork it became obvious that most 
policyholders are actually unaware of the accident and hospitalization benefits and 
consider the Anidaso policy to be a pure life insurance or, a savings device (for 
retirement).12 The policy is specifically targeted at low-income people in both urban and 
rural areas.  
For the sale and distribution of the policy, GLICO started to cooperate in early 2004 with 
six rural and community banks (RCBs).13 It currently collaborates with 20 RCBs, five 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) and one savings and loan company in six regions of 
12 The fact that GLICO has hitherto only received claims upon death of policyholders but no claims in 
relation with any of the additional policy components underlines our impression that policyholders consider 
the Anidaso policy to be a pure life insurance.  
13 In general, RCBs are unit banks owned by members of the community. While they do not exclusively 
target low-income people, their business is by and large microfinance orientated because the majority of the 
population in their service areas can be classified as low-income (Basu et al. 2004; Steel and Andah 2008). 
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southern Ghana. The number of Anidaso policyholders per financial institution ranges from 
around 200 to over 1,000, and the total number of policyholders had reached 15,000 by 
December 2008. In each of the partnering financial institutions, GLICO assigns one 
Personal Insurance Advisor (PIA), who is in charge of marketing the Anidaso policy and 
mediating all running operations between the bank and the insurance company. In addition, 
there is usually a team of a minimum of two sales agents that joins forces with the PIA in 
the marketing process. The PIA and the sales agents are typically recruited locally, but they 
are trained at GLICO’s headquarters.  
GLICO’s marketing strategy includes approaching group and opinion leaders in the 
communities, who are then mobilized to spread the word about the product and to help 
organize marketing meetings. Furthermore, PIAs and sales agents attend group meetings of 
microfinance groups or other (financial) self-help groups, accompany rural banks’ mobile 
bankers14, make individual door-to-door marketing rounds and approach visitors at the 
bank. Less frequently, GLICO holds large and widely announced product launches at 
community centres and bank offices. Interested individuals can usually apply on the spot.  
There are no clearly defined eligibility criteria for policyholders except that they have to be 
adults below the age of 65 and that they have, or are willing to open up, an account with 
the local financial institution. This latter condition is necessary because the insurance 
premiums are directly deducted from policyholders’ accounts; or from group accounts (if 
policyholders are organized in groups).15 No detailed health check or information on the 
health condition of applicants or other household members is required.16 The monthly 
premiums start at 2 Ghana Cedi and may be as high as 10–15 Ghana Cedi if the savings 
component is chosen.17  
14 These operate in the same (but formalized) way as so-called Susu collectors in the informal financial 
sector, on which more information is provided below. 
15 Financial groups are very common in Ghana. In the formal financial market, they usually have a joint 
savings account and accumulate savings from their members in order to qualify for a loan. In the case a loan 
was granted, the group handles the collection of repayments, acts as a mediator between the loan officers and 
the individual group members, and bears responsibility for recovery. Yet, direct lending to individuals with a 
credible history as a member of a group or, in cases where a group approach is not suitable, is also common 
(Steel and Andah 2008). 
16 In fact, this feature of the policy is used for promotion purposes in the Anidaso policy information flyer. 
17 In the sample of 87 Anidaso policyholders, the mean monthly premium is 3.95 Ghana Cedi and the median 
is 3.10 Ghana Cedi. The exchange rate at the time of our survey (February 2008) was 1.00 Ghana Cedi = 
1.05 US Dollar.  
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2.3 Theoretical framework for insurance participation 
In their pioneering study on participation in an index-based, agricultural microinsurance, 
Giné et al. (2008) present a simple neoclassical benchmark model of households’ decisions 
to take up insurance, which they complement with important insights from behavioral 
economics. This model has guided the analysis in Cole et al. (2013) and also forms the 
basis of thetheoretical framework in this chapter. To match the insurance example studied 
here some of their predictions are modified and expectations are added to include insights 
from asymmetric information models on insurance consumption. As noted above, the 
Anidaso policy is not purely a life insurance but includes accident and hospitalization 
benefits. Yet, since these additional benefits turned out to be not as important as the life 
coverage to policyholders (or are altogether unknown by the policyholders), the Anidaso 
policy is treated as if it did not include them at all.  
The benchmark model of Giné et al. (2008) refers to a full information setting and predicts 
that households’ uptake of insurance is increasing in risk aversion, in the expected 
insurance payout relative to the cost of insurance (in other words, the subjective probability 
of risk), and in the size of risk exposure (or, the objective probability of risk); and it is 
decreasing in basis risk, i.e. the correlation between insurance payout and the risk to be 
insured. Applying the benchmark model to our case, all of these predictions persist with 
the exception of basis risk, which is not an issue here, as the Anidaso policy is not an 
index-based insurance. Yet, it is a life insurance, and hence, a bequest motive which is 
commonly included in standard models of participation in life insurance markets (Fischer 
1973; Hakansson 1969; Lewis 1989; Yaari 1965) may be considered. A bequest motive 
can be expected to increase noticeably when individuals marry or have offspring. Over the 
lifetime of the consumer, the subjective weighting function for bequests is assumed to take 
on a hump shape, as the importance of bequests is greatest when the consumer dies at 
prime age.  
It is important to note that the bequest motive is directly applicable only to death-based life 
insurance, i.e. term and whole life insurance. The determinants of uptake of life insurance 
that pays if the insured survives, however, may be somewhat different. Hence, some 
authors take the motive for saving for retirement into account (Pissaridis 1980). In practice, 
many insurance contracts actually serve both bequest and savings motives simultaneously. 
Empirical evidence has shown that death-based and survival-based life insurance are not 
27 
necessarily substitute goods, or in other words, both motives may co-exist (Babbel and 
Ohtsuka 1989; Outreville 1996).  
In principle, the Anidaso policy is a term life insurance as it pays a determined amount to 
the insured’s family if the insured dies within the policy term. However, due to the 
(voluntary) savings component, it is not a pure form of term life insurance but may be 
rather considered a universal life insurance (Black and Skipper 2000). Therefore, insurance 
participation can be generally expected to be higher when there is a strong motive for a 
bequest to be left to remaining household members. For those people who choose the 
savings component, savings motives are likely to play a role as well. It would be plausible 
to assume a change in preferences over time regarding the utility from expected 
consumption versus the utility from bequest, i.e. the bequest motive diminishes with 
increasing age, while the saving-for-retirement motive becomes more important.  
Following their benchmark specification, Giné et al. (2008) augment their simple model 
with credit constraints so as to account for the fact that the degree of liquidity may play a 
key role in the decision to participate in insurance. Yet, the relationship between financial 
constraints and households’ willingness to pay for insurance is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it could be that liquidity-constrained households are more likely to purchase 
insurance because they have less ability to deal with the consequences of shocks than 
households that are not liquidity-constrained. This option was theoretically laid out by 
Gollier (2003) who explains that self-insurance in the form of reducing savings or 
borrowing is a substitute to costly formal insurance. He summarizes that “only liquidity 
constrained households would purchase a generous insurance coverage” (Ibid.: 21). On the 
other hand, in the specific setting of Giné et al. (2008) insurance is purchased at the same 
time as agricultural inputs are bought. Hence, credit-constrained households may prefer to 
use all available funds for inputs, and the authors consider this option more likely than the 
first. While the Anidaso policy is not directly linked to production decisions, one may still 
consider the possibility that limited cash would rather be invested in income-generating 
activities than in insurance to secure (a minimum) future income. In sum, the expected 
relationship remains ambiguous and the direction of the association has to be established 
empirically.  
In the light of standard predictions about consumers’ insurance-purchasing behavior such 
as the ones cited here, experiences in the real world have often revealed remaining puzzles. 
As a potential explanation for insurance participation in developing countries that deviates 
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from the conventional model, Giné et al. (Ibid.) consider households’ trust in the supplier 
and households’ understanding of an insurance policy. Even though the authors do not 
formally model such behavioral factors, they introduce hypotheses on their relevance for 
insurance uptake decisions.18 Specifically, they predict that trust in the vendor, information 
gleaned from social networks, and greater cognitive ability make insurance purchase more 
likely. They show that allowing for these factors helps explain deviations from the 
benchmark model. Other authors have confirmed the enormous relevance of trust and 
familiarity with the product and the supplier (Cai et al. 2009; Cole et al. 2013; Giné et al. 
2008; Thornton et al. 2010), and similar results in are expected in the case studied here. 
As another potential explanation for observed deviations from the standard model, a 
number of studies have included adverse selection and moral hazard in models of 
insurance-purchasing behaviour (Abbring et al. 2003; Chiappori 2000; Dionne et al. 2000; 
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Winter 2000). Different to the case of the rainfall insurance 
studied by Giné et al. (2008) and Cole et al. (2013), the life insurance market can be 
considered a “prime example of a market saddled with the inefficiency associated with 
adverse selection” (Cawley and Philipson 1999: 827).19 Thus, the assumption of full 
information will be relaxed. In line with asymmetric information models (e.g. Rothschild 
and Stiglitz 1976), it is expected that – given equal premiums and benefits of the policy – 
households with a higher riskiness (i.e. those with a higher exposure to the insurable risk) 
tend to purchase the Anidaso policy more than households with a lower riskiness. Since it 
is rather unlikely that insured households behave less carefully and provoke the risk 
covered under the insurance (i.e. death), moral hazard, however, is not supposed to present 
an essential problem.  
As noted above, it is further hypothesized that there is an association, which may be either 
positive or negative, between the uptake of microinsurance and the use of other financial 
services. As already outlined, this association is not straightforward: Savings and credit 
may either be substitutes for microinsurance, or their use may reinforce the uptake of 
18 Within behavioral finance, trust has often been considered in models of stock market participation. For 
example, Guiso et al. (2008) show that the perception of risk in stock markets is not only a function of the 
objective characteristics of the stock but also of the consumer’s subjective probability to be cheated. From a 
slightly different perspective, Hong et al. (2004) propose that social interaction enhances trust in stock 
markets in the sense that “social” consumers find it more attractive to invest in stocks when more of their 
peers participate. 
19 In the analysis of indexed-based insurance by Giné et al. (2008) and Cole et al. (2013), information 
asymmetry does not play a major role because rainfall patterns that are relevant for index-based payouts are 
public information and rainfall measurement instruments are protected from manipulation by farmers. 
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microinsurance. In order to better understand and analyze this matter, it may in fact be 
necessary to distinguish between savings and loans from formal sources and those from 
informal sources.20 In the case studied here, the mutually reinforcing effect of savings and 
credit on the one hand and insurance on the other relates to services provided in the formal 
financial sector, as the Anidaso policy is solely provided by formal financial institutions. 
Substitution between savings and insurance as well as between credit and insurance is 
generally possible for services from both formal and informal institutions. Households may 
have a precautionary motive in mind, no matter whether they deposit their savings in banks 
or collect them with informal savings groups or at home. In general, loans may be used in 
order to deal with the consequences of shocks regardless of where they come from. Yet, in 
reality it may be more difficult to obtain a loan for such a purpose from the formal sector 
than from social networks, such as extended families. In sum, it is expected that the the 
uptake of microinsurance is negatively related to the use of informal savings and informal 
loans, and positively to the use of formal loans, while the relationship between formal 
savings and microinsurance remains inconclusive.  
2.4 Source of data 
The data for the empirical analysis comes from a survey of 350 households in the Central 
Region of Ghana. Previous studies on households’ participation in microinsurance in 
developing countries have either followed the same approach and used household survey 
data (Giné et al. 2008; Ito and Kono 2010; Wang and Rosenman 2007), or have conducted 
randomized experiments (Cai et al. 2009; Cole et al. 2013; Giné and Yang 2009; Thornton 
et al. 2010). Though the second way of data collection is clearly advantageous in terms of 
the researchers’ control for selection into participation, such experiments could not be run 
due to time and resource constraints. Nevertheless, one can assume that external validity is 
given at least to a certain extent, as explained in the following description of survey 
sampling.   
In a first step, the Anidaso policy was chosen, as GLICO had been identified as the only 
known insurance provider in subsaharan Africa offering voluntary life insurance to low-
20 In the remainder of the chapter, the terms formal/informal services and services provided on the 
formal/informal financial market are used interchangeably.  
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income households.21 In a second step, the specific survey area, Brakwa and Benin, were 
selected from the service areas of all 26 financial institutions that distribute the policy.22 In 
doing so, only small to medium-sized towns in semi-urban or rural areas23 were considered 
in order to make sure that there would be a high share of low-income people in the overall 
population, assuming that people in rural areas are on average poorer than people in urban 
areas.24 Attention was paid to a relatively high density of bank clients holding an insurance 
contract and to the easy accessibility of the area. Out of five possible survey sites, Brakwa 
and Benin were randomly chosen. Hence, the results should be at least representative for 
these five semi-urban locations in the South of Ghana where microinsurance is available.  
While it is acknowledged that external validity is not fully given, the scope for 
generalization is believed to go beyond the local area of the survey itself. There is little 
reason to assume that GLICO executes non-random program placement and chooses the 
cooperating institutions on the basis of particular characteristics. From discussions with 
GLICO staff, it is possible to conclude that in principle the insurer would distribute its 
microinsurance policy through any formal financial institution that is both interested in 
doing so and has the ability to deduct the premiums from policyholders’ accounts. In the 
South of Ghana, there are financial institutions (by and large in the form of RCBs or MFIs) 
in every district capital and also in many other towns that could generally distribute the 
policy. Nevertheless, there remains some lack of clarity as to why the particular financial 
institutions were selected to offer Anidaso and not others. Yet, this selection could simply 
be a matter of the recent emergence of the Anidaso policy and the need to “start 
somewhere”.  
21 This selection was done in the year 2007. At that time, all other providers on which information could be 
found had an insufficient number of clients, offered only compulsory (mostly credit life) insurance, or 
provided health or heavily subsidized agricultural insurance. However, since information on microinsurance 
providers and products is fragmentary, it may well be that voluntary microinsurance products besides 
GLICO’s Anidaso policy existed that on which no public information was available. Due to the dynamic 
nature of the market, there are many more voluntary life insurance products today. 
22 GLICO has collaborated with the Brakwa rural and community bank since 2005. The bank has its 
headquarters in the town of Brakwa and a branch office in the district capital Asikuma, which also offers the 
policy. Both offices are frequented by the population in the survey area. 
23 Out of the 26 financial institutions, 11 were located in an urban setting.  
24 In 2000, the poverty headcount in the Asikuma/Odoben/Brakwa district amounted to 57.6 percent on 
average with 42.1 percent in urban areas and 64.8 percent in rural areas. Rural poverty is high in this 
particular district: The poverty headcount in rural areas in the Central Region as a whole is 46.5 percent. 
These numbers are based on data from the 2000 census (Coulombe 2008). The IMF (2006) also presents 
poverty estimates for the district. The poverty headcount is 62 percent in total here, 35 percent in urban areas 
and 74 percent in rural areas. 
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Furthermore, Brakwa and Benin are typical towns of the South of Ghana, and the 
Asikuma/Odoben/Brakwa district in which they are located is an average mostly rural 
district with a rural population of 68 percent. The district is a highly agrarian, local 
economy with over 60 percent of the population being engaged in farm activities, mostly at 
the subsistence level and to a small extent in cash-crop cultivation (for example, cocoa) 
(Republic of Ghana 2007). Activities outside farming are focused in small-scale industrial 
businesses and petty trading. Therefore, it is assumed that the findings of this chapter could 
be replicated in any location in the South of Ghana and similar contexts in subsaharan 
Africa, except for cities and truly remote areas. However, in order to determine to what 
extent this assumption is true, further empirical research, including data collection in other 
locations, is needed.  
In Brakwa and Benin, all households were listed to apply stratified random sampling. 
Households were stratified according to their insurance membership status. It is important 
to note that the Anidaso policy is not the only insurance available in the area. Donewell, a 
commercial insurance company, provides life, accident and car insurance, and there is the 
public National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). The NHIS was launched in 2004 and 
replaced the cash-and-carry healthcare system. It provides medical care at public hospitals, 
recognized private hospitals, and health centers for contributors and their dependents. 
Premiums are graded by income, and particular groups, such as the elderly, indigent people 
and pregnant women are covered free of charge. The NHIS is well received, particularly in 
rural areas, where a majority of people had hitherto gone without health services as a result 
of lacking resources and insurance alternatives.  
In the sampling process, the first stratum was formed by households that were not insured 
at all, the second by households that were insured by the Anidaso policy (and potentially 
by other insurance as well), and the third by households that were not insured by Anidaso 
but by other insurance policies. Households within each stratum were chosen through 
random sampling, except for the microinsured stratum, in which all households were 
interviewed. The varying sampling probabilities are controlled for by including appropriate 
weights in the estimations below. A total of 351 households were interviewed, of which 
154 were not insured, 87 were Anidaso insured, and 87 were otherwise insured. The survey 
questionnaire contained detailed sections on demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the household, household assets, the occurrence of shocks, risk 
management strategies, household attitudes towards risk, and household financial 
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knowledge. Further, information was gathered on the embedding of households in different 
financial institutions and the usage of loans, savings products, and insurance. One 
household did not complete the entire questionnaire, which reduces the number of 
observations in our analysis to 350 households. 
With regard to households’ use of credit and savings, households were found to rely on a 
range of services, both formal and informal. The most frequented formal financial 
institution is the Brakwa RCB, which offers opportunities for savings and loans (and of 
course the Anidaso policy), on either an individual or a group basis. Another formal 
institution in the survey area, but much less used, is the Ghana Commercial Bank, which 
has a branch in Asikuma that offers various types of savings products and loans. The 
survey data show that at least one MFI and one cooperative are active in the survey area as 
well. The financial services provided by them are included as formal services in the following 
estimations. 
In terms of informal financial institutions, there were moneylenders, credit groups, and the 
Susu system. Susu institutions include individual savings collectors, rotating savings and 
credit associations, and savings and credit “clubs” run by an operator.25 Furthermore, 
mutual lending between relatives and other social networks is very common. Eligibility 
criteria are naturally not defined in these informal activities; however, research has 
demonstrated that a number of social factors, such as social visibility, reputation and social 
integration, are of considerable relevance, particularly in order to access informal loans 
(Ayalew 2003; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007; Schindler 2010; Vanderpuye-Orgle and 
Barrett 2009). 
2.5 Definition of variables  
In the below estimations, there are five categories of financial services that households use. 
These categories indicate whether or not households used insurance, formal savings 
options, informal savings options, formal credit, or informal credit in the five pre-survey 
years. The insurance category is confined to the Anidaso policy.26 The formal savings 
25 In 2003, there were over 4,000 collectors nationwide, collecting the equivalent of an average of US$15 per 
month from approximately 200,000 clients (Steel and Andah 2008).  
26 As a robustness check, the insurance category has been extended to also include NHIS insurance and the 
few other insurance policies available in the area. In the sample, 21 households have some private insurance 
other than Anidaso and 132 have NHIS. In the total population, the respective shares are 4.68 percent and 
26.19 percent. 
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category includes savings accounts, current accounts (which are often used for the purpose 
of savings), and other savings products offered by the formal financial institutions active in the 
two towns, mainly the Brakwa RCB.27 Informal savings are savings made within informal 
schemes, including within the Susu system, in self-help groups, and at home. The formal 
credit category includes all loans taken up from formal institutions. The informal credit 
category entails loans from informal credit schemes, self-help groups, friends, family 
members and moneylenders. Of the 350 households analyzed, 87 use the Anidaso 
insurance policy, 168 use formal savings, 175 use informal savings, 84 use formal credit, 
and 124 use informal credit (Table 1). The use of these services need not be exclusive; on 
the contrary, many of the households use several of these services simultaneously.  
Table 1: Use of financial services 
Services used 
Number of households in 
the sample (total = 350) 
Estimated number of 
households in the survey 
area (total = 2,042) 
Estimated 
proportion in the 
survey area (%) 
Anidaso policy 87 92 4.51 
Formal savings 168 707 34.61 
Informal savings 175 1,000 48.97 
Formal credit 84 327 16.02 
Informal credit 124 732 35.87 
Note: Households in the sample are weighted according to their sampling probabilities. This explains the discrepancy between the 
proportion of households in the sample and the estimated proportion in the survey area. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Since the analysis primarily aims at examining patterns of insurance uptake, the theoretical 
framework on insurance participation provides the main guidance for the definition of the 
explanatory variables to be included. It is assumed that the determinants of the use of loans 
and savings options are similar to those of the use of insurance.28 While this may seem to 
be an arbitrary assumption at first sight, it actually turns out to be a valid one when looking 
at the empirical literature on borrowing and savings behavior in developing countries 
(Barslund and Tarp 2008; Deaton 1990; Jabbar et al. 2002; Kiiza and Pederson 2002; 
Muradoglu and Taskin 1996; Pal 2002; Pitt and Khandker 2002; Swain 2002). Where this 
27 Users of savings options are only those households which can be identified as having intentionally decided 
to use such a product for the genuine purpose of saving or for safe storage of money. This is important 
because some households were found to be “pseudo-savers” in the sense that they had opened a savings or 
current account as a precondition for receiving a loan or purchasing insurance and had since not made use of 
their account for savings purposes. These households are excluded from the category of savings users. 
28 This is not to say that the effect of certain determinants is necessarily of the same magnitude and not even 
of the same sign for credit, savings, and insurance uptake. 
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literature offers additional guidance for the empirical specification, relevant variables are 
incorporated. It is assumed here that potential determinants of participation in savings and 
borrowing may influence the uptake of insurance as well. Table 2 provides descriptive 
statistics for the explanatory variables and Table 4 in the Appendix summarizes the 
definition of these.29 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Stand. error Minimum Maximum 
Willingness to take riska 0.38 0.030 0 1 
Illnessa 0.47 0.029 0 1 
Vaccination a 0.53 0.030 0 1 
Risk perceptiona 0.07 0.060 -1.158 1.929 
Death experience 0.43 0.030 0 1 
Illness experience 0.36 0.029 0 1 
Other shock experience 0.15 0.021 0 1 
Agea 47.01 0.941 17 92 
Age squareda 2,479.54 95.736 289 8464 
Share of dependents 0.53 0.017 0 1 
Marrieda 0.61 0.030 0 1 
Benin 0.20 0.023 0 1 
Female head a 0.43 0.030 0 1 
Schoolinga 6.51 0.317 0 23 
Employee/employer a 0.14 0.020 0 1 
Assets -0.17 0.052 -1.196 2.794 
Land (ln) 0.55 0.035 0 2.83 
Remittances 0.28 0.027 0 1 
Notes: a = measured for the household head. Source: Authors’ calculation.  
Risk aversion is measured by a rough proxy based on the following question in our 
questionnaire “How do you see yourself? Are you rather willing or unwilling to take 
risks?”. Respondents were asked to rank themselves from “0” (unwilling to take risks) to 
“5” (willing to take risks). Being aware that this question is rather a measure of risk 
attitude than of risk aversion, it is still used it as a risk aversion proxy as it has been shown 
to be a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior (Dohmen et al. 2006). The respective 
dummy variable takes on the value of 1 if the respondent reported a ranking of “4” or “5” 
in response to the question, i.e. being rather risk loving, and 0 otherwise. 
The size of the insured risk, or the objective probability of risk, is measured with the help 
of information on the household head’s health status. It is thereby assumed that the head is 
the main decision-maker in the household who makes decisions on the basis of knowledge 
29 The pairwise correlations between the independent variables as well as the variance inflation factors did 
not give reason for concerns about multicollinearity. 
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about herself. Even though the insurance of interest is not a health but a life insurance, it is 
argue here that current health status is related with the probability of death. A dummy 
variable indicates whether the household head was ill or injured in the past year. A second 
dummy variable indicates whether the household head received any kind of vaccination. 
The subjective probability of risk is measured by an index created through factor analysis. 
This index is a measure of households’ assessments of their own risk situation. It includes 
information on subjective exposure to illness, accidents and economic shocks, relative to 
other households in their community.30 In addition, the analysis includes the households’ 
actual exposure to shocks in the past. Dummy variables indicate the experience of death, 
illness and other shocks in the five years prior to the survey.  
In order to consider the relevance of bequest motives, the analysis includes the age of the 
household head, the share of dependents in the household and the marriage status of the 
household head. The analysis additionally includes age squared because a considerable part 
of the literature on savings behavior focuses on the savings pattern over a lifetime and 
hence regards age and age squared as important explanatory factors. The general finding is 
that the determinants of savings demand in developing countries usually differ from those 
in developed countries and often contradict the theoretical assumptions of the life-cycle 
theory or the permanent income hypothesis (Deaton 1992; Muradoglu and Taskin 1996; 
Spio and Groenewald 1996).31 
Furthermore, the analysis controls for the residence of households in Brakwa or Benin. 
Earlier studies have pointed out that physical proximity to the providing institution is 
positively related to the uptake of insurance (Wang and Rosenman 2007). Further controls 
are gender, education and employment status of the household head, assets owned by the 
household, land usage, and remittance receipt. Most existing studies investigate the 
association between wealth-related factors (including education) and the use of insurance. 
30 The respective questions in the questionnaire were: „In your opinion, is your household more or less 
exposed to health shocks/ road or work accidents/ economic shocks compared to other households in your 
village?“  
31 In short, in terms of the determinants of savings, the permanent income hypothesis differentiates between 
permanent and transitory components of income. While the first is defined as individual longtime income 
expectations and consumption over lifetime given the present level of wealth, the latter is the difference 
between actual and permanent income, which is not normally used for consumption and hence its marginal 
propensity to be used for savings is unity (Friedman 1957; Kelley and Williamson 1968). The life-cycle 
hypothesis predicts that individuals smooth their consumption evenly over their lives by accumulating 
savings during earning years and dissaving after retirement to maintain consumption levels (Ando and 
Modigliani 1963). 
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Surprisingly, there are several studies that do not find a significant relationship between 
education and insurance uptake (Cole et al. 2013; Giné et al. 2008; Ito and Kono 2010; 
Wang and Rosenman 2007). This might be due to the fact that it is not education as such 
that matters but rather the level of specific knowledge on insurance, or financial literacy in 
general, which has been found to be significantly related to insurance uptake (Giné et al. 
2008). In their study on health insurance uptake, Wang and Rosenman (2007) show that 
education does matter for a household’s perception of the need for insurance but not for the 
final purchase decision. They explain that education relates to the ability of people to 
assess risk and the way insurance would mitigate it. Yet, whether or not a household 
finally decides to purchase insurance depends on different factors.  
Employment status is measured as a dummy variable indicating whether the household 
head is employed (as opposed to self-employed or not occupied) or an employer. Even 
though formal and informal employment is not distinguished, being employed or being an 
employer is typically related to more steady income streams. In order to control for 
potential endogeneity of assets owned by the household, the analysis uses the lagged 
version of an asset index, which captures asset ownership five years ago.32  
The inclusion of employment status as well as land size also follows from the review of the 
literature on borrowing behavior, while the inclusion of remittance receipt is motivated by 
the savings literature. With regard to the first, it has been found that investment plans are a 
much more important driver for the use of formal loans than they are for the use of 
informal loans. This is reflected in the finding that greater land holdings or area of 
operational holdings, less wage-labor income, higher price of output and different primary 
economic activities – factors associated with a higher need for capital in the household – 
are positively associated with the use of formal loans that are hence geared towards 
production purposes and asset management (Barslund and Tarp 2008; Pal 2002; Swain 
2002). With regard to the latter, it has been found that the receipt of remittances appears to 
influence the timing of savings within the life-cycle of a household (Spio and Groenewald 
1996).  
32 Deviating from the approach in Giné et al. (2008), the analysis does not control for credit constraints in our 
estimations. On the one hand, this is because our data do not allow for a good measure of credit constraints. 
On the other hand, the applied empirical model, i.e. estimating the uptake of insurance and the use of credit 
simultaneously, makes it difficult to include credit-related information on the right-hand side of the 
estimation equation. Since the model includes variables for employment status, assets, and land usage, which 
are different measures of the wealth of a household, they may serve as an indication for credit constraints. 
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2.6 Estimation strategy 
As in other studies on insurance uptake (Browne and Kim 1993; Giné et al. 2008; 
Outreville 1996), the empirical analysis relies on a reduced-form approach. While this 
reduced form models insurance uptake as a function of demand and supply side 
determinants, a structural estimation would, in contrast, explicitly model those two sides of 
the insurance market. In this study that draws on a geographically limited area, there is the 
obvious problem of limited variance on the supply side, which, cannot be adequately 
controlled for. Accordingly, the results can only be interpreted as conditional on the 
prevailing supply side conditions that were described in detail above. 
In order to investigate the correlates of households’ uptake of microinsurance and other 
financial services, a reduced-form multivariate probit model is estimated. Due to the 
connection to the Gaussian distribution, this allows for flexible modeling of the underlying 
association structure, i.e. the cross-dependencies in latent utilities across the different 
services, and straightforward interpretation of the parameters. The alternative choices in 
the estimation are represented by the five latent variables: use of insurance I*, use of 
formal savings options S1*, use of informal savings options S2*, use of formal loans L1*, 
and use of informal loans L2*. Each latent response depends on a vector of explanatory 
variables X, unknown parameters βS1, βS2, βL1, βL2, βI, and the stochastic components of 
the error terms εS1, εS2, εL1, εL2, εI. The latter consist of those unobservable factors 
which explain the marginal probability of making the decision for one of the choices. The 
set of explanatory variables included in vector X is identical in the five equations, 
assuming that the same decision-making process underlies each choice. 
   I * = X´ βI + εI                   (1) 
S1* = X´ βS1 + εS1                                                                                   
S2* = X´ βS2 + εS2  
L1* = X´ βL1 + εL1 
L2* = X´ βL2 + εL2  
The five equations from (1) may be expressed as five binary variables Yj (j = I, S1, S2, L1, 
L2) that take the value of 1 if the household uses a financial service, and 0 otherwise.  
Yj = 1(X´ βj + εj >0)               j = I, S1, S2, L1, L2                                (2) 
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Each of these functions can, of course, be estimated as single probit models. However, this 
would result in less efficient coefficients, if households’ choices for financial services are 
interrelated. Single probit estimations do not allow for a non-zero correlation between the 
error terms. Therefore, a multivariate probit model is prefferred, in which non-zero 
correlation is possible and hence provides more efficient estimates (Jones 2007). 
In this model, each εj is drawn from a J-variate normal distribution with a mean of 0, and a 
variance-covariance matrix Σ, where Σ has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and 
correlations jkρ = kjρ  as off-diagonal elements. These correlation terms represent the 
unobserved correlation between the stochastic component of each type of financial service 
(Capellari and Jenkins 2003). 
The joint estimation of the five alternative equations (2) is based on a joint multivariate 
probability involving the evaluation of the loglikelihood over I = 1, …, N observations 
5
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= Φ Ω∑                                                            (3) 
where ( )5 .Φ  is the multivariate normal cumulative density function with arguments μi and 
Ω, where 
( )1 S1 1 2 S2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2´ , ´ , ´ , ´ , ´i iS iS iS iS iL L iL iL L iL iI I iIk X k X k X k X k Xµ β β β β β=                      (3a) 
where ijk  are the corresponding sign variables that equal 1 if a household uses a given 
financial service, and -1 otherwise. In matrix Ω, the constituent elements are Ωjk, where 
Ωjj = 1 for j = 1,…,5                                                    (3b)  
This function is estimated using the method of simulated maximum likelihood by 
application of the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane smooth recursive conditioning estimator in 
order to evaluate the multivariate normal distribution functions (Ibid.; Greene 2003). 
Under the assumption ε~N(0,Σ) clarified above, the correlation coefficients summarize the 
association between unobservable household-specific factors that determine the likelihood 
of choosing one of the different financial services. The average marginal effects (AMEs) 
on the marginal probabilities of the explanatory variables in each equation are estimated by 
averaging sample marginal effects, calculated for each household.  
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2.7 Estimation results and interpretation 
The outcome of the multivariate probit regression, showing the AMEs of the explanatory 
variables on the marginal probability to take up any of the five alternatives, is presented in 
Table 3. It is important to note that the outcome categories are not mutually exclusive; in 
other words, households with an Anidaso policy include those who use Anidaso alone as 
well as those who use it in addition to any (combination) of the four alternative financial 
services. The hypothesis that the correlations between the error terms of each equation are 
jointly zero can be rejected at a high significance level (Χ2 = 6,755; p = 0.000); and hence 
applying the multivariate probit model is appropriate.33 
The estimated correlation coefficients indicate that the residuals of the estimation functions 
are highly correlated for the formal financial services, indicating that they have very 
similar unobservable, household-specific determinants. While there is a very strong 
positive correlation between the use of formal savings and the use of formal credit, the 
correlation between the uptake of Anidaso and either of the other two formal services is 
also positive but not as high. The correlation coefficient between the unexplained part of 
the (simultaneous) use of formal savings and formal loans amounts to 0.98, between 
Anidaso and formal savings to 0.69, and between Anidaso and formal credit to 0.56. This 
provides some evidence for a mutually reinforcing relationship between the uptake of 
formal savings, formal loans, and microinsurance. In terms of the informal financial 
services, there is a negative correlation between the error terms of the informal credit 
equation and the insurance equation, and a positive one for the informal savings equation 
and the insurance equation. This conforms only partially to the expectation of a substitutive 
relationship between these services and microinsurance. However, the correlation 
coefficients are not statistically significant, thus inhibiting a final conclusion here.  
The following part discusses the estimation results for the uptake of insurance. The 
findings for the other financial services are only presented where these appear to be 
innovative. It is important to note at this point that any inference on causal relationships 
should be treated with the necessary caution because the analysis is based on cross-
33 Note that it would only be appropriate in the case of independent error terms to deal with the above model 
as independent equations, as explained in the estimation strategy. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, the 
five choice functions were also estimated as binary probit models (see Table 5 in the Appendix). With few 
exceptions, the signs of the estimation coefficients remain the same. Generally, the significance levels are 
lower in the binary probit compared with the multivariate probit results.  
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sectional data. Thus, interpretations are limited to associations and do not intend to draw 
conclusions on causality.  
In contrast to the expectations derived from the benchmark model, but in line with Giné et 
al. (2008), risk averse households are significantly less likely to take up microinsurance. 
This is shown by a comparably large, positive marginal effect of the level of willingness to 
take risk in the insurance function. In terms of the other financial services, the coefficients 
do not exhibit any statistical significance. This suggests that microinsurance is not 
regarded as a mechanism to mitigate risk but rather as a risky undertaking itself. A similar 
finding was shown in Giné and Yang (2009).  
In line with this interpretation and running counter to the prior expectation is the result that 
households which consider themselves to be more exposed to risk than others are less 
likely to be Anidaso policyholders. However, it appears that the Anidaso policy is not 
perceived to be helpful in dealing with risk, at least as far as the risks included in the 
variable (illness, accident, economic shocks) are concerned.34 Since causality cannot be 
fully established, it is important to mention that households which do not have access to 
insurance might be—and feel—more exposed to risk. Regarding the other alternatives, risk 
perception is negatively associated with informal savings and positively associated with 
informal credit, showing larger marginal effects compared with the case of insurance. 
Since informal loans often serve as ex post coping strategies, this indicates that the risk 
perception variable is a good indicator for true risk exposure.  
The benchmark model predicted a positive relationship between the objective size of the 
risk and the uptake of microinsurance. Indeed, there is a negative association between the 
vaccination status of the head of the household and the uptake of microinsurance. This 
implies that households with a head who has not received any vaccination tend to purchase 
the Anidaso policy more than households with a vaccinated head. Given that vaccination 
status is not public information and that it is not part of Anidaso’s eligibility criteria, this 
could be an indication for asymmetric information in the market, i.e. potential adverse 
selection. Yet, it is important to note that vaccination status is only an imperfect measure 
of policyholders’ riskiness, and that illness of the household head in the previous year, 
34 The estimation was repeated and risk perception was replaced by only the subjective exposure to health 
shocks, as this might be the type of risk most relevant for households’ decisions to take up the Anidaso 
policy. This did not change the signs and significance levels of the estimates, except for the fact that the 
respective coefficient in the formal loan function becomes insignificant.  
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which is also thought to measure riskiness, is not statistically significant.35 At the same 
time, illness of the household head is negatively related to the use of formal credit and 
positively to the use of informal credit. The marginal effect is particularly large for 
informal credit. Thus, it seems that households’ primary response in the case of the main 
breadwinner’s illness is to borrow from within their social networks.  
There is mixed evidence for a bequest motive in the uptake of the Anidaso policy. On the 
one hand, there is no significant relationship between the uptake of insurance and the share 
of dependents in the household36 or marriage status of the head. On the other hand, the 
coefficients for the age variables in the insurance function are of the expected sign and 
they are statistically significant. They suggest that there is a life-cycle effect in the uptake 
of the Anidaso policy; whether this life-cycle effect implies a bequest motive, however, is 
questionable due to the insignificant results of marriage status and share of dependents. 
Interestingly, there also seems to be a life-cycle effect for the use of both formal and 
informal credit. With increasing age of the household head, households request more 
insurance and more credit, most likely because their experience with financial matters 
increases, their economic activities are more developed, and their family responsibility 
increases. Yet, this effect holds only up to a certain age and then reverses. The turning 
point for uptake of the Anidaso policy is precisely 47 years of age, for formal credit it is 60 
years of age, and for informal credit it is 42 years of age. The fact that the turning point for 
uptake of the Anidaso policy is relatively low suggests that there is no saving-for-
retirement motive at play. However, for those households who choose the savings 
component, the policy might still be seen as a savings instrument, irrespective of a pension. 
In addition, the evidence suggests the existence of a life-cycle effect in the case of formal 
savings, which is in contrast to much of the literature on savings behavior in developing 
countries (Deaton 1992; Muradoglu and Taskin 1996; Spio and Groenewald 1996), but the 
effect is statistically significant only at the ten percent level.  
35 When substituting the Anidaso insurance uptake by NHIS uptake in the multivariate probit model, illness 
of the household head in the previous year is positively and significantly related with enrolment in the NHIS, 
showing high marginal effects. The difference between the estimates in the Anidaso function and those in the 
NHIS function clearly stems from the fact that the former is a life insurance and the latter is a health 
insurance. This, in turn, underlines the need to consider different types of insurance separately.  
36 The results do not change qualitatively when substituting the share of dependents by household size or the 
share of children in the household.  
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Table 3: Multivariate probit model results on the use of financial services 
Independent  
variables 
(1) Microinsurance (2) Formal savings (3) Informal savings (4) Formal credit (5) Informal credit 
Coeff. t-statistic AME Coeff. t-statistic AME Coeff. t-statistic AME Coeff. t-statistic AME Coeff. t-statistic AME 
Willingness to take risks 0.201 9.164*** 0.023 0.048 0.672 0.015 0.010 0.059 0.004 0.088 0.660 0.031 0.182 0.696 0.062 
Illness 0.255 1.534 0.029 0.063 1.069 0.016 0.119 1.321 0.047 -0.193 -3.939*** -0.076 0.325 13.13*** 0.109 
Vaccination -0.233 -9.151*** -0.032 0.461 1.381 0.143 -0.178 -1.160 -0.071 0.606 8.440*** 0.216 -0.158 -1.199 -0.051 
Risk perception -0.094 -6.193*** -0.014 -0.021 -0.568 -0.008 -0.234 -3.082*** -0.066 -0.032 -0.914 -0.007 0.181 3.385*** 0.072 
Death experience 0.043 0.780 0.006 0.224 3.095*** 0.055 0.358 4.847*** 0.142 0.213 1.911* 0.082 0.665 3.864*** 0.194 
Illness experience 0.019 0.172 0.003 0.220 2.380** 0.047 0.571 118.23*** 0.214 0.492 5.111*** 0.194 0.513 16.26*** 0.101 
Other shock experience -0.034 -0.549 -0.005 0.267 6.441*** 0.044 0.040 0.138 0.013 0.861 6.836*** 0.296 0.411 1.413 0.047 
Age 0.169 6.090*** 0.013 0.033 2.989*** 0.012 -0.071 -1.800* -0.028 0.097 8.694*** 0.020 0.075 4.368*** 0.027 
Age squared -0.002 -5.468*** -0.000 -0.000 -1.716* -0.000 0.001 1.363 0.000 -0.001 -7.251*** -0.000 -0.001 -3.962*** -0.000 
Share of dependents 0.053 0.495 0.008 -0.195 -2.796*** -0.077 0.816 2.276** 0.275 -0.450 -1.292 -0.124 0.217 0.534 0.085 
Married -0.096 -0.574 -0.011 0.216 2.652*** 0.073 -0.373 -1.753* -0.144 0.544 4.125*** 0.162 0.239 2.557** 0.087 
Benin 0.688 3.351*** 0.122 0.170 1.540 0.022 0.299 2.112** 0.092 -0.239 -1.653* -0.065 -0.079 -0.910 -0.006 
Female head -0.030 -0.190 -0.004 -0.570 -6.137*** -0.218 -0.480 -2.301** -0.152 -0.132 -0.734 -0.028 -0.050 -0.817 -0.020 
Schooling 0.039 2.54** 0.004 0.053 8.091*** 0.020 -0.036 -2.690*** -0.014 0.045 1.349 0.010 -0.035 -12.57*** -0.013 
Employee/ employer 0.033 0.278 0.005 0.915 2.794*** 0.345 -0.291 -1.822* -0.109 0.556 3.879*** 0.134 0.281 4.190*** 0.110 
Assets 0.374 2.930*** 0.049 0.300 12.595*** 0.118 0.394 2.712*** 0.155 0.244 4.029*** 0.064 0.022 0.441 0.008 
Land (ln) -0.083 -1.195 -0.013 0.023 0.506 0.009 -0.166 -2.169** -0.065 0.160 2.071** 0.050 0.073 1.852* 0.028 
Remittances -0.189 -2.021** -0.026 0.512 6.007*** 0.190 -0.012 -0.030 -0.004 0.065 0.841 0.020 0.212 1.064 0.079 
Estimated correlation  
coefficients 
ρ21=0.699 
2.473** 
ρ31=0.023 
0.818 
ρ41=0.460 
2.485** 
ρ51=-0.103 
-0.806 
ρ32=0.123 
1.407 
ρ42=0.983 
8.361*** 
ρ52=-0.201 
-25.807*** 
ρ43=-0.055 
-0.312 
ρ53=-0.083 
-1.242 
ρ54=-0.002 
-0.020 
Notes: Results of the multivariate probit model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood with 50 pseudorandom draws. t-statistics refer to the estimated coefficients and are based on robust standard errors. 
Average marginal effects (AMEs) are calculated with respect to the marginal probability of each type of financial service. The model also includes a constant. Sample size is N = 350 observations. Households in the 
sample are weighted according to their sampling probabilities. Wald test of the model: Χ2 = 17.21;  p = 0.0002). The asterisks indicate level of significance: The asterisks indicate level of significance: *** <0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Households with more well-educated heads are significantly more likely to purchase the 
Anidaso policy. This is in contrast to much of the earlier literature, which finds no 
significant relationship between education and the uptake of insurance (Cole et al. 2013; 
Giné et al. 2008; Ito and Kono 2010). This deviating result might be due to the fact that it 
is impossible to also control for financial literacy as many of the mentioned studies do. A 
higher asset index is positively and significantly related to the use of all formal financial 
services as well as informal savings, with particularly high marginal effects in the savings 
equations. This positive relationship is presumably due to the role of assets as collateral for 
formal loans on the one hand and to assets being an indication of the socioeconomic status, 
and hence of financial literacy and availability of liquid resources for insurance and both 
formal and informal savings on the other hand.37 This is in line with the microfinance 
literature, which shows that microfinance typically does not reach the poorest households 
(Datta 2004; Hulme and Mosley 1997; Navajas et al. 2000). 
The results suggest that remittances work as a substitute for the Anidaso policy, shown by 
a negative significant coefficient in the insurance equation, but they are also a source for 
savings, demonstrated by a positive significant coefficient for the formal savings 
alternative. Households obviously regard insurance to be less necessary, if they are 
potentially able to access remittances in cases of future shocks and emergencies. 
Residence in Benin is positively and significantly correlated with the uptake of the 
Anidaso policy (as well as informal savings). Since the bank providing the policy is 
located in Brakwa, it would have been more plausible to assume that there was a negative 
relationship due to the relative distance and hence higher transaction costs. However, it 
seems that the Benin dummy captures information different from pure distance.   
37 When running the same regression with the asset index based on current asset levels (i.e. at the time of the 
survey), the results do not change remarkably. Thus, the potential noise in the regression due to the 
endogenous nature of assets might actually not be extraordinarily large.  
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One possible explanation could be that the PIA, GLICO’s main local agent in the area, 
lives in and is part of the social community of Benin. Hence, trust in the insurance product 
and the local distributing institution may be enhanced through this personal contact, 
resulting in a higher likelihood of Benin households purchasing the policy, even though 
they are farther away from the bank office.38 
2.8 Conclusion and scope for further research 
It was the objective of this chapter to contribute to the discussion on the correlates of 
households’ participation in microinsurance in developing countries. Different from 
previous studies the chapter analyzed the example of a micro life insurance. Furthermore, 
the analysis deviated from earlier work by focusing on the relationships between 
households’ decisions to take up insurance and to use other financial services. The chapter 
demonstrated that microinsurance does not enter a vacuum but joins a range of alternative 
informal and formal financial mechanisms used by households to diversify risk and cope 
with shocks. It hypothesized that savings and loans could be either substitutes of insurance 
if they serve a risk management function or their use could reinforce the uptake of 
insurance if all services are provided by the same financial institution. In order to take into 
the interconnection between different financial services with insurance, a multivariate 
probit model was estimated using data from a household survey of 350 households in two 
neighboring towns in the Central Region of Ghana.    
The results suggest a mutually reinforcing relationship between the uptake of micro life 
insurance, i.e. the Anidaso policy, and the use of other formal financial services. This is 
plausible as the Anidaso policy is distributed via local banks, which also offer formal 
savings options and formal loans. Since it is unclear whether this relationship would hold if 
insurance was supplied and distributed by the insurer itself or via institutions outside the 
38 Similar to the case of the Anidaso policy, there is a strong positive association between residing in Benin 
and taking up NHIS, and possibly other insurance as well. This points out that the Benin dummy is not 
merely a measure of trust in the Anidaso policy and the staff distributing it, as the NHIS is not distributed by 
the same agents. It might instead be a measure of more dynamic interaction within and also between social 
networks in Benin, as this town is much smaller than Brakwa. The importance of exchange of information 
within social networks is emphasized in Giné et al. (2008). In contrast to the Anidaso policy, the relationship 
between the receipt of remittances and the purchase of NHIS is positive, indicating that remittances do not 
always act as substitutes for insurance. The determinants of this relationship remain unclear and seem to be 
an interesting topic for further research.  
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formal financial sector, it would be interesting to repeat our analysis for different provider 
models and/or in a different context, possibly a different country. 
The evidence does not suggest a substitution, or crowding out, effect between the use of 
informal savings and informal loans on the one side and uptake of microinsurance on the 
other side. More precisely, microinsurance does not appear to be simultaneously 
determined with informal savings or informal loans by the same unobservable, household-
specific determinants. This finding is, in fact, not very surprising given that the Anidaso 
policy covers only the risk of death (and potentially, accident and hospitalization), while 
households usually face many more risks, such as illness, harvest failure, or 
unemployment. The policy cannot serve to mitigate all relevant risks; and households 
simply need to apply other risk management strategies, such as risk sharing within social 
networks, as well.  
In line with earlier studies on households’ microinsurance participation behavior, the 
estimation results reveal certain deviations from a neoclassical benchmark model. Risk 
averse households are less, not more, likely to participate in microinsurance. Furthermore, 
households which feel more exposed to risk compared to their neighbors are also less 
likely to participate. Households seem to consider the Anidaso policy to be risky because 
they do not fully understand the insurance and all its terms and conditions. This impression 
is supported by discussions with the sample households during field work. Lack of 
information on the demand side is generally discussed as one of the most important 
challenges of microinsurance in academic and policy-makers’ circles. The analysis calls 
this fact into mind again and emphasizes that major efforts are necessary in providing 
financial literacy to low-income households.  
The analysis provides indicative evidence for the significant role of trust in the insurance 
provider and for the role of social networks found in earlier microinsurance studies. 
Households that live in the smaller one of the two towns of the survey, Benin, which is 
farer away from the bank office, are surprisingly more likely to purchase the Anidaso 
policy (and to participate in the NHIS). This is attributed to the fact that there might be a 
more dynamic interaction within and also between social networks in this smaller town, 
and that, in the case of the Anidaso policy, the insurer’s main local agent lives in and is 
part of the social community of Benin. 
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The findings are ambiguous as to the role of a bequest motive, which is usually part of 
basic life insurance demand models. The results suggest that there is a life cycle effect in 
the uptake of microinsurance. Whether this effect is a sign of a bequest motive, however, 
remains unclear. The evidence further suggests adverse selection in the uptake of the 
Anidaso policy, though the analysis included only suboptimal variables to measure 
riskiness. More research on the uptake of micro life insurance could focus on using better 
risk variables in order to investigate the issue of adverse selection further.  
Furthermore, there seems to be a need for additional studies on the uptake of different 
types of microinsurance, especially those, which have not received much attention to date. 
Having said that, it appears to be desirable to conduct randomized experiments instead of 
cross-sectional household surveys in further analyses of microinsurance uptake. The 
researchers’ control over households’ selection into participation in randomized 
experiments allows generalization of findings to a much higher degree. 
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2.9 Appendix 
Table 4:  Definition of explanatory variables 
Variable Description 
Willingness to take 
risks 
Dummy variable, 1 if household ranks itself as risk loving, i.e. answers 4 or 5 on a 
scale from 0 (unwilling to take risks) to 5 (willing to take risks) 
Illness Dummy variable, 1 if household head was ill or injured in previous year, 0 
otherwise 
Vaccination Dummy variable, 1 if household head has received any vaccination, 0 otherwise 
Risk perception Household’s assessment of own risk situation (subjective exposure to health shocks, 
road or work accidents, and economic shocks compared with neighbors), index 
created by factor analysis; higher index implies higher risk exposure 
Death experience Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced the death of a household member in 
the previous five years and this shock had serious consequences; i.e., household 
needed more than one month to recover, 0 otherwise 
Illness experience Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced the illness of a household member in 
the previous five years and this shock had serious consequences; i.e., household 
needed more than one month to recover, 0 otherwise 
Other shock experience Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced a shock other than death or illness of a 
household member in the previous five years and this shock had serious 
consequences; i.e., household needed more than one month to recover, 0 otherwise 
Age Age of the household head 
Age squared Age of the household head squared 
Share of dependents Share of dependents in the total number of household members 
Married Dummy variable, 1 if household head is married, 0 otherwise 
Benin Dummy variable, 1 if household resides in Benin, 0 otherwise 
Female head Dummy variable, 1 if household is headed by a female, 0 otherwise 
Schooling Number of schooling years of the household head 
Employee/ employer Dummy variable, 1 if household head is wage-employed or an employer herself, 0 
otherwise 
Assets Assets (bicycle, another house, refrigerator, electric iron, mobile phone, radio, TV, 
stove, use of electricity as main lighting source, building materials of higher 
quality, and toilet facilities of higher quality) owned by the household five years 
ago, index created by factor analysis 
Land (ln) Log of size (in acres) of land used by the household, per adult equivalent 
Remittances Dummy variable, 1 if household receives any remittances from former household 
members who have migrated, 0 otherwise 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
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Table 5:  Binary probit model results on the use of financial services 
Independent  
variables 
(1) Microinsurance (2) Formal savings (3) Informal savings (4) Formal credit (5) Informal credit 
Coeff. t-stat. Marg. effect Coeff. t-stat. 
Marg. 
effect Coeff. t-stat. 
Marg. 
effect Coeff. t-stat. 
Marg. 
effect Coeff. t-stat. 
Marg. 
effect 
Willingness to take risks 0.158 1.126 0.008 0.086 0.466 0.030 0.005 0.031 0.002 0.088 0.454 0.016 0.180 1.008 0.066 
Illness 0.241 1.572 0.012 0.047 0.242 0.016 0.115 0.658 0.046 -0.229 -1.094 -0.041 0.335 1.847* 0.121 
Vaccination -0.296 -1.927* -0.015 0.459 2.539** 0.157 -0.176 -1.005 -0.070 0.561 2.746*** 0.099 -0.153 -0.852 -0.055 
Risk perception -0.090 -1.150 -0.004 -0.012 -0.135 -0.004 -0.234 -2.687*** -0.093 0.007 0.070 0.001 0.179 2.032** 0.065 
Death experience 0.108 0.684 0.005 0.280 1.391 0.098 0.361 1.997** 0.143 0.215 0.980 0.039 0.679 3.591*** 0.247 
Illness experience -0.024 -0.151 -0.001 0.209 1.053 0.074 0.573 3.037*** 0.225 0.463 2.072** 0.090 0.507 2.669*** 0.187 
Other shock experience 0.080 0.341 0.004 0.293 1.018 0.107 0.037 0.139 0.015 0.932 3.010*** 0.239 0.414 1.580 0.157 
Age 0.153 3.740*** 0.007 0.033 1.030 0.011 -0.070 -2.452** -0.028 0.092 2.693*** 0.016 0.075 2.314** 0.027 
Age squared -0.002 -3.707*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.671 -0.000 0.001 1.980** 0.000 -0.001 -2.415** -0.000 -0.001 -2.823*** -0.000 
Share of dependents 0.041 0.134 0.002 -0.218 -0.677 -0.076 0.819 2.677*** 0.326 -0.504 -1.502 -0.090 0.222 0.707 0.080 
Married -0.048 -0.249 -0.002 0.263 1.184 0.090 -0.368 -1.791* -0.146 0.586 2.694*** 0.097 0.235 1.062 0.084 
Benin 0.719 4.333*** 0.056 0.127 0.598 0.045 0.300 1.543 0.119 -0.181 -0.775 -0.030 -0.098 -0.498 -0.035 
Female head 0.067 0.352 0.003 -0.543 -2.340** -0.183 -0.476 -2.237** -0.188 -0.097 -0.452 -0.017 -0.040 -0.176 -0.014 
Schooling 0.039 2.607*** 0.002 0.055 2.971*** 0.019 -0.036 -2.000** -0.014 0.040 1.879* 0.007 -0.036 -1.818* -0.013 
Employee/ employer 0.035 0.167 0.002 0.986 3.678*** 0.373 -0.282 -1.126 -0.111 0.500 2.077** 0.111 0.269 1.086 0.101 
Assets 0.358 4.666*** 0.017 0.298 3.000*** 0.104 0.389 3.904*** 0.155 0.204 2.065** 0.036 0.035 0.347 0.013 
Land (ln) -0.159 -1.069 -0.008 0.017 0.108 0.006 -0.166 -1.072 -0.066 0.185 1.086 0.033 0.075 0.499 0.027 
Remittances -0.159 -0.899 -0.007 0.488 2.467** 0.177 -0.007 -0.036 -0.003 0.113 0.520 0.021 0.216 1.075 0.080 
Notes: The model also includes a constant. Sample size is N = 350 observations. Households in the sample are weighted according to their sampling probabilities. The asterisks indicate level of significance: The asterisks 
indicate level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Participation in micro life insurance and subjective risk  
3.1 Introduction  
Microinsurance markets have been growing rapidly in the developing world.39 This 
demonstrates the fact that the poor desire and operate with a whole range of financial 
services to accumulate capital and manage risk (Collins et al. 2009). At the same time, 
public social security systems and safety nets in developing countries are typically weak. 
Often they cover less than 10 percent of the population in developing countries and are 
accessible mainly for employees in the formal sector (ILO 2001). Microinsurance is widely 
recognized as a formal tool that enables the poor to better cope with the consequences of 
shocks, which entail severe setbacks in these peoples’ attempts to overcome their 
vulnerable livelihoods (Cohen et al. 2005; Dercon et al. 2008).  
When financial and insurance markets are incomplete, low-income households typically 
rely on informal strategies to deal with such risks. These strategies, including self-
insurance, risk-sharing arrangements among the family and social networks, or 
diversification into more and less risky activities, are found to balance consumption to 
some extent, but usually not entirely (Dercon 2002; Morduch 1995). Furthermore, while 
they reduce temporary income fluctuations, they often come at the cost of lower total 
returns to wealth (Ibid.; Platteau 1997; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993). In theory, 
microinsurance should thus be in high demand, as it not only offers a direct welfare benefit 
through a payout in the case that an insurable loss occurs, but can also  prevent households 
from engaging in insufficient and costly alternative ways of coping with risk.  
 However, even where respective products are accessible by the low-income population, 
uptake rates have so far remained low. Although microinsurance products – covering 
39 For a detailed definition of microinsurance see Chapter 1.  
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illness, death of an income earner in the household, property loss as well as droughts and 
floods –  have been identified in 77 out of the 100 poorest countries of the world, in most 
of the countries they still cover less than 5 percent of the total population (Roth et al. 
2007).40 Common explanations of the low observed uptake rates are the target group’s 
unfamiliarity with insurance, it’s limited financial literacy, and poorly designed programs 
that do not match the demands of low-income households (Cohen and Young 2007; 
McCord et al. 2012a). While these might be valid assumptions, there is still limited 
rigorous academic research on the various factors that determine households’ participation 
in the microinsurance market with respect to different types of available insurance 
products.  
This chapter extends the analysis of Chapter 2 and investigates the decisions of households 
to purchase micro life insurance and how much coverage to purchase based on a larger 
household survey in three regions across southern Ghana.41 Thereby, it places specific 
emphasis on two sets of factors that are likely to play a role in the setting of 
microinsurance, but are usually not considered in standard models of insurance 
consumption. More precisely, it investigates how the uptake and the extent of coverage of 
micro life insurance respond to trust-building factors and the subjective perception of risk. 
Binary probit and limited dependent variable models are estimated to investigate the 
determinants of uptake and the amount of coverage purchased by households as indicated 
by the percentage of total household income devoted to insurance premiums. The 
insurance product offers a basic term life component for the policy holder, optional 
coverage for the spouse and children, as well as an additional and personally variable 
investment plan that pays out the accumulated amount at the expiry of the term.  
Apart from the permanent loss in total household income if a working household member 
dies, in many developing countries there are substantial funeral costs to be covered. In the 
Ghanaian case that is studied here, a custom of stocking the corpses of deceased relatives 
for long periods, sometimes months, before they are buried has evolved. This is due not 
only to the economic interests of the facilities involved, but also to the fact that funerals are 
seen as an opportunity to demonstrate and enhance social status and prestige. The mortuary 
40 Of the approximately 500 million microinsured people in the world, the majority of about 400 million are 
located in India and China. In these two countries, they nonetheless represent less than 5 percent of the total 
low-income population. The coverage of the poor in Africa and Latin America is approximately 5 percent 
and 10 percent, respectively (Churchill and Matul 2012: 11–12). 
41 This survey followed the pilot survey in the Central Region that generated the data used in Chapter 2. 
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system is a part of the ritual norms to be followed and the length of the process and social 
get-togethers before the actual funeral takes place has increased over time. For a typical 
Ghanaian funeral families are estimated to spend about six months’ income (Microensure 
2011). Often, the access to sources of cash – such as loans and donations from social 
networks or remittances from migrants – is limited, resulting in ruinous consequences of 
these events for the remaining household (Arhin 1994; Geest 2006; Mazzucato et al. 2006). 
Hence, even if some mechanisms are in place to create the large lump sums needed to 
cover funeral expenditures, these are often not sufficient and not accessible by everyone, 
suggesting that micro life insurance could be an important measure to help households 
dealing with the risk of death.  
An increasing number of empirical studies on different forms of microinsurance show that 
patterns of uptake do not necessarily follow the standard benchmark based on expected 
utility theory. Among the core reasons that are suggested to explain empirical deviations 
from common predictions and, subsequently, lower uptake than expected, are behavioural 
factors. Most prominently, several studies suggest that trust, the familiarity with the 
product and the supplier, and social networks are of overarching importance in households’ 
decisions for or against microinsurance, given their limited previous experience with 
formal insurance (Cai et al. 2009; Cole et al. 2013; Giné et al. 2008; Jowett 2003).   
Much less is known, however, about how the subjective evaluation of risk affects 
participation in microinsurance. It is commonly argued that insurance markets suffer from 
information asymmetries at the expense of insurers that are faced with difficulties to assess 
the riskiness of their clients (de Bock and Gelade 2012; Dionne et al. 2000). However, also 
on the side of consumers there may be difficulties in objectively assessing probabilities of 
risk. Rather, individuals tend to evaluate the probability distribution of risk, which 
determines to some extent the value of insurance, based on their perceptions of that risk 
(Kahnemann and Tversky 1979, Böhm and Brun 2008, Slovic et al. 1982).  
The results show that participation in micro life insurance and the amount of coverage 
purchased by households follow some predictions of a standard benchmark model. 
Notably, insurance participation increases with “the intensity for bequests”. However, the 
two sets of nonstandard factors included in the analysis provide highly relevant results that 
add to our understanding of the relatively low uptake rates of microinsurance. Surprisingly, 
households that perceive their exposure to risk to be greater than that of other households 
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in their community are less likely to participate. This effect becomes higher the poorer the 
households are. In contrast, the effect of the subjective risk perception is reversed in the 
decisions to enrol in the NHIS and on the amount of micro life insurance coverage, when 
they have already decided to purchase a policy. Here, risk pessimists behave as expected 
and spend more on premiums. These results suggest that that households that operate in a 
context of limited experience with microinsurance and the providing institutions and that 
receive only little information and customer care, may rationally decide that purchasing a 
policy is too risky an endeavour if they have only very limited funds to spend. In line with 
this reasoning, households’ scepticism regarding the functioning of the product and the 
reliability of the insurer seems to be mitigated by their familiarity with the specific 
provider and their social network integration. In line with previous studies in the field of 
microinsurance participation, these factors are argued to serve as trust-building 
mechanisms, which reduce the uncertainty about the insurance product, increase 
knowledge about it, and induce imitation of peers’ behaviour. 
This chapter aims to add to the limited evidence on the patterns of participation in micro 
life insurance. Although micro life insurance products are most widespread globally and 
come a close second to health insurance in subsaharan Africa (McCord et al. 2012a; Roth 
et al. 2007) empirical studies on them are confined to the study presented in Chapter 2 
based on the small survey in two villages in the Central Region and one study by Arun et 
al. (2012) based on survey data from Sri Lanka. Different to the previous contributions, the 
chapter compares the determinants of micro life insurance participation also to those of 
other available types of insurance, especially the National Health Insurance Scheme 
(NHIS). In addition, by investigating the role of trust and subjective perceptions on risk, 
the results of this chapter add to our understanding of relevant demand-side factors in 
microinsurance markets that go beyond standard theoretical reasoning and help to explain 
low participation rates.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 and 3.3 review the major theoretical 
determinants of life insurance participation and empirical evidence from previous studies 
on participation in microinsurance markets, respectively. Section 3.4 then provides a 
description of the data and the econometric methods applied. Section 3.5 presents the 
descriptive statistics and the empirical results, and section 3.6 concludes.  
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3.2 Theoretical predictions of life insurance consumption 
It is important to note that theoretical models of insurance consumption should be 
applicable to the case of microinsurance as well. It functions in the same way as regular 
insurance except that its clearly defined target group is low-income people (see the 
definition provided in Chapter 1, page 3). However, this is not to say that standard 
insurance theories capture all the relevant determinants of households’ decisions to 
purchase microinsurance, as is further substantiated below. While the standard models of 
insurance consumption typically refer to the amount of insurance purchased, I assume that 
the identified determinants are equally relevant for the insurance participation decisions of 
households as such.  
In line with the expected utility framework and in a full-information setting, standard 
models of life insurance demand assume that consumers – and their households – are risk 
averse and exhibit diminishing marginal utility with respect to wealth. They maximize 
utility by paying small premiums to reduce uncertainty in their income streams due to the 
possibility of a premature death of the primary income earner. The effect of wealth on the 
insurance purchase is strongly connected with the consumer’s attitude towards risk and 
thus ambiguous. For example, with decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing 
wealth, the willingness to pay for insurance is typically assumed to decrease (e.g. Mossin 
1968). Guided by the seminal work of Yaari (1965) and Hakansson (1969), most of the 
early theoretical studies focused on the demand for term life insurance and developed a 
life-cycle model in which the primary income earner maximizes his lifetime utility from 
consumption and from bequests. Hence, the standard approach includes a subjective 
weighting function for bequests; this weight for bequests is expected to increase as 
consumers marry or have offspring and to take on a hump-shape curve because the 
importance of bequests is greatest when the consumer dies at prime age. Bequests may be 
either altruistically (Tomes 1982) or strategically (Bernheim et al. 1985) motivated.   
Instead of a bequest motive, there may as well be a precautionary savings motive that 
determines savings and insurance holdings over the life cycle. Pissarides (1980) points out 
that many life insurance policies include savings and annuity components. As individuals 
normally survive until retirement age, life insurance is primarily considered a “pension,” 
while the bequest motive is satisfied by the fact that, in exchange for a reduction of the 
pension, the insured amount is made available to the consumer’s dependents by the 
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insurance company should the policyholder die before retirement. Preferences regarding 
the utility of bequests and that of consumption may differ over the lifetime, as the former 
may be discounted more heavily than the latter if the bequest motive of insurance 
purchases diminishes with age and, consequently, the retirement motive becomes more 
important. As the microinsurance under study incorporates features of term and whole life 
insurance, the bequest and/or savings motivation has to be established empirically. To 
summarize, within the above framework, the consumption of life insurance is an 
(ambiguous) function of risk aversion and wealth. It increases with the desire to bequest or 
to save over the lifetime and decreases with the costs and the consumer’s expected life 
span.  
However, the conditions of insurance markets in developing countries are different to those 
in conventional insurance markets. For example, information about the average losses and 
average probabilities of the risk of the targeted population is likely to be highly imperfect. 
In the extreme case, this results in strong adverse selection – that is, the selection into the 
insurance scheme only by individuals with higher risk of preretirement death and bad 
health – whereas individuals with low risk probabilities will tend to opt out. This is a 
typical situation when there are information asymmetries in the market and the insurer is 
unable to account for this through corresponding price adjustments (Dionne et al. 2000; 
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Furthermore, transaction costs are high and efficient systems 
of insurance distribution and management are often not in place. This constrains suppliers 
in reaching scale, while at the same time remaining affordable for the low-income 
population (Claessens 2006). Besides wealth, which is among the central factors 
considered in the standard models of insurance consumption, in this context liquidity 
constraints may also become of quite some importance. These constraints are ambiguous 
and may either enhance the demand for insurance, as they increase the need for future 
financial security, or may decrease it as premiums become too costly (Browning and 
Lusardi 1996).  
At the same time many low-income people have low levels of (financial) education and 
only limited experience with formal insurance. Hence, they might be highly uncertain 
about the procedures and benefits involved in purchasing insurance. While not explicitly 
considered in models of insurance consumption, models of financial market participation 
demonstrate that in the presence of strong information gaps and limited financial 
education, trust in the provider and peer influence become highly relevant for the decision 
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to purchase stocks (Guiso et al. 2008; Hong et al. 2004). If this assumption is adapted to 
the case of micro life insurance, it can be expected that a higher level of trust in the 
provider and a higher level of social interaction within groups that are typically approached 
by the provider’s sales staff will increase a household’s willingness to buy a policy.  
Furthermore, prospect theory and other psychological research on risk perception has 
shown that in cases where people lack concrete information and data they rely on intuition 
in their assessment of risk and the related decision making. Individuals can thus make 
imperfect assessments of information (Böhm and Brun 2008; Slovic et al. 1982). For 
example, given a reference point of wealth, consumers tend to react in a risk-loving way 
when confronted with losses, but at the same time show risk averse behavior in the gain 
domain. In addition, individuals tend to overvalue high-probability events, whereas they 
undervalue medium-probability and low-probability events (Kahnemann and Tversky 
1979; Slovic 1987). Thus, insurance is purchased only when the subjective risk perception 
(due to overestimating the probability of an event) compensates for the undervaluation of a 
loss relative to the reference point. In addition, the expectation of risk realization (which 
would translate into a potential insurance payout) may be shaped to a great extent by the 
household’s real experience with shocks, which results in a greater degree of wariness 
towards them (Rogers 1997). Hence, the more shocks a household has experienced in the 
past and the higher its subjective exposure to risks in the future, the greater its willingness 
to purchase insurance will be.  
It seems plausible to assume that in the context of emerging (micro)insurance markets the 
decision-making of low-income households could be at odds with the predictions of the 
standard benchmark model. To summarize from above, alternative models of choice under 
uncertainty suggest that, for example, asymmetric information, liquidity constraints, and 
behavioural factors such as cognitive, emotional or social aspects could provide additional 
insights in the demand side of a market in which not all agents have perfect information 
and people lack experience with formal insurance products.  
It is important to note that the available data does not allow for the empirical assessment of 
the time horizon of the above models of life insurance demand and instead relies on the 
cross-sectional variation of proxies related to the derived determinants. In addition, while 
the theoretical demand models capture the supply side at least in terms of the cost of life 
insurance (for example, the policy loading factor), it is not possible to distinguish between 
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supply and demand with the data at hand. The reduced form analysis tries to address the 
problem of omitted variable bias to the greatest extent possible. 
3.3 Empirical evidence on the participation in microinsurance 
Empirical contributions studying the decision to take up microinsurance are now rapidly 
increasing. Much of this evidence shows that, indeed, participation patterns in various 
microinsurance markets are not necessarily consistent with the benchmark of standard 
insurance models. This section highlights some of the findings, which go beyond the main 
standard theoretical assumptions. 
Giné et al. (2008), followed by Cole et al. (2013), show that Indian farmers’ participation 
in rainfall insurance matches some of the standard predictions of a model augmented with 
borrowing constraints. Insurance uptake decreases with expected income fluctuations, the 
credit constraints faced by a household, and basis risk – that is, the mismatch between the 
index and the actual expected losses covered by the insurance. It increases with household 
wealth. Contrary to the standard insurance theories, however, the authors find that risk 
averse households are significantly less likely to take up insurance, suggesting that 
households that are unfamiliar with the product and provider view purchasing insurance as 
a risky endeavor rather than a decision for safety. Using measures of risk preferences and 
trusting behaviour from lab experiments among tea growers in Kenya, Dercon et al. (2011) 
confirm the negative effect of risk aversion on a composite health insurance product. They 
show that this effect is explained largely by the clients’ general trusting behaviour, which 
determines the subjective beliefs about the credibility of the insurer and the enforceability 
of the insurance contract.  
The level of trust between the insurance provider and a potential client has been shown to 
be a powerful explanatory factor in microinsurance uptake behaviour by a number of other 
studies as well (de Allegri et al. 2005; Cole et al. 2013; Giné et al. 2008; Morsink and 
Geurts 2011). For example, in the context of a government-subsidized sow insurance, Cai 
et al. (2009) show that Chinese farmers shy away from the insurance when they have little 
trust in the local government due to frequent experiences of policy delivery failures. 
Similar evidence on the role of trust in governmental institutions is found in the case of 
community based health insurance in Rwanda (Schneider and Diop 2004). Studies on crop 
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insurance have shown that experience with the institution is important for farmers to trust 
an insurance provider (Giné et al. 2008; Patt et al. 2009).   
Related to the issue of trust, other factors that are now increasingly addressed in empirical 
studies are those of awareness and the influence of social peers (de Bock and Gelade 
2012). Tower and McGuiness (2012) show that a radio campaign in Kenya significantly 
increased knowledge on insurance terms and products. Morsink and Geurts (2011) find 
that clients of a typhoon microinsurance in the Philippines rely on the experiences of claim 
payouts by trusted peers as an informal trust-building mechanisms that substitutes for 
formal trust-building institutions, thereby trying to reduce the risk of opportunistic 
behavior on the part of the insurer in the insurance transactions. By the use of randomized 
control trials, studies have shown that people were more likely to take up sow insurance, 
when they heard about it in a village meeting, rather than through door-to-door visits (Cai 
et al. 2009); that marketing through village opinion leaders had a positive effect on uptake 
of crop insurance (Giné et al. 2008); and that transmission of information on insurance was 
distorted via networks and resulted in negative effects on uptake of health insurance 
(Olapade and Froelich 2012). 
While trust and information diffusion are receiving increasing attention in the 
microinsurance literature, only few studies have investigated the relationship of subjective 
risk evaluation and perception with microinsurance uptake. Different to the use of formal 
savings or formal credit, the results presented in Chapter 2 demonstrate that uptake of 
microinsurance in the two studied towns in the Central Region is negatively related to 
higher perceived exposure to risk. Based on data from focus group discussions conducted 
in the same region, Chapter 4 will show that many people’s image of insurance is based on 
incomplete (and sometimes erroneous) information, or intuitive responses. Positive as well 
as negative perceptions are channelled to other members of the target group, mainly via 
peers. A study by Ito and Kono (2010) on micro health insurance in India uses 
experimental questions to test for the preferences underlying prospect theory and find, 
though weak, support for the hypothesis that subjective probability weighting plays an 
important role and individuals who are risk loving towards losses are less likely to 
purchase insurance. They also find that there is adverse selection in the market as 
households with a higher ratio of sick members are more likely to enrol. Chankova et al. 
(2008) include a measure of the self-perception of health status in their empirical model on 
enrolment in mutual health organizations in West Africa, and Morsink and Geurts (2011) 
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include measures on the perception of the risk of typhoons and accidents and previous 
experiences with both of these events in their analysis of the uptake of typhoon 
microinsurance. More in line with the theoretical reasoning on risk perception and a priori 
common sense, both studies reveal a positive relationship between risk perception and 
enrolment in the insurance schemes.  
The review of empirical contributions shows that the increasing body of literature on 
microinsurance participation has a strong focus on the analysis of health insurance and 
crop insurance. The case of micro life insurance has been studied only to a very limited 
extent, as for example by the study presented in Chapter 2. However, as the motivations 
and conditions underlying different types of insurance vary, there is a need for further 
investigation into the specific determinants of the participation in micro life insurance vis-
à-vis other types of insurance. It is further important to consolidate whether and how, 
beyond the standard theoretical predictions, micro life insurance responds to the above 
identified (behavioural) factors such as trust, social network interactions and perceptions of 
risk.  
3.4 Data and methodology 
3.4.1 Source of data 
The analysis is based on a household survey of 1030 households, including households 
holding the Anidaso micro life insurance offered by the Gemini Life Insurance Company 
(GLICO) (see Chapter 2) and a control group of non-microinsured households, conducted 
in cooperation with the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) of 
the University Legon in southern Ghana from January to March 2009. 42 
As described in Chapter 2, GLICO distributes the Anidaso policy through rural and 
community banks (RCBs) and other microfinance institutions in all of the southern regions 
of Ghana. The policy targets low-income people in rural and urban areas and includes term 
42 As explained in Chapter 1 and 2, prior to the survey, GLICO had been identified as one of the few 
insurance providers in subsaharan Africa offering voluntary life insurance to a meaningful number of low-
income households at that time. While there are now many more actors, including commercial insurers and 
insurance intermediates, that have started to enter the so-called “bottom line” of the market, GLICO has long 
been the largest player among those private insurers offering voluntary and independent microinsurance 
products in the Ghanaian market, including rural areas. 
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life insurance up to the age of 65 as well as an optional and personally variable investment 
plan that pays the accumulated amount at the expiry of the term.43 It is possible to add 
coverage of the spouse, and up to four children. The only clearly identified eligibility 
criteria of the policy are that clients should be below the age of 65 and must be willing to 
use or open an own or a group account at local financial institution from which the 
premiums could be withdrawn. However, in the course of the fieldwork it became obvious 
that the age limit was not always strictly implemented, given that many people especially 
from older generations do not exactly know their own age.44  
In order to ensure regional variation, communities within three service areas of the 26 
financial institutions that distribute the policy were selected from three different regions. In 
order to include a high share of low-income people from the overall population, only RCB 
service areas in semi-urban or rural areas were considered, based on the assumption that 
people in these areas are on average poorer than people in highly urbanized areas (Ghana 
Statistical Service 2007). Out of the possible survey sites that met the above criteria, three 
RCB service areas were chosen in (a) the Agona West Municipal District in the Central 
Region, (b) the Akuapim North District in the Eastern Region and (c) the South Tongu 
District in the Volta Region. Within these service areas, the localities were deliberately 
selected so as to include an equal share of (a) localities with a meaningful number of 
insured clients and (b) localities comparable in size, infrastructure and access to the rural 
bank’s services without any insured clients.  
In the total sample, microinsured households were oversampled, with a third of all 
households in the sample randomly drawn from Anidaso client lists in the localities with 
policyholders. In the same localities, a third of noninsured households in the sample were 
randomly selected according to a counting procedure in each of the localities, with the 
counting interval set according to the official total number of households obtained from the 
1998/1999 National Census. In the following discussion, these two sets of households from 
these communities are referred to as the “in-region sample.” Finally, another third of 
households in the sample were randomly selected in the comparable localities without 
Anidaso policyholders, hereafter called the “out-region sample,” using the same counting 
43 As explained in Chapter 2, the basic coverage is topped up with accident benefits and hospitalization 
benefits for the policyholder, but it became obvious during the fieldwork that most policyholders were 
unaware of the additional benefits and instead considered Anidaso to be a pure life insurance policy or a 
savings device. 
44 For more explanations on the Anidaso policy and its marketing and distribution see Chapter 2. 
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procedure described above. Thus, the sample includes a total of 17 communities from three 
regions (see Table 12). The subsequent analysis takes into account the stratification of the 
sample through the use of appropriate survey probability weights. 
Similar to the smaller survey region described in Chapter 2, aside of micro life insurance, 
households in the sample across all three regions have access to conventional life, accident 
and car insurance provided by commercial and government owned insurance companies, 
such as Donewell or SIC Insurance Company. Moreover, health insurance is provided by 
the public NHIS and old age provision, mostly on a mandatory basis, is offered by the 
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). The NHIS is well received 
especially in rural areas and covers about 34 percent of the population, including low-
income groups (NHIA 2010). In contrast, only 11 percent of the working population are 
enrolled in the SSNIT and these are mainly formal employers and employees (Boon 2007). 
3.4.2 Method 
In order to analyze households’ participation in the micro life insurance market, the 
estimation strategy follows a two-step approach. First, in line with the literature discussed 
above, the cross-sectional determinants of households’ decisions to purchase or not 
purchase insurance can be specified in a discrete choice model as follows: 
   𝑌𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 ,      (4) 
where the dependent variable Yi takes on the value of 1 if a household has purchased life 
microinsurance, and 0 otherwise; β is a (K x 1) vector of unknown parameters; Xi is a 
vector of exogenous values for observation i of variables reflecting the benchmark model 
described above, additional variables assumed to be relevant for the uptake of 
microinsurance and a constant term; and εi ~ N(0,𝜎2). This model is estimated by a 
reduced-form probit model. 
The variables intended to reflect the benchmark model include the following: The level of 
wealth of a household is measured by a (lagged) asset index created by principal 
component analysis on a range of productive and nonproductive assets owned five years 
ago and its second polynomial given potentially nonmonotonic effects of wealth; a dummy 
variable indicating the household head is engaged in nonfarm activities; and the logarithms 
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of the amount of land owned, the amount of remittances received per month and the 
amount of transfers (monetary and in-kind) received per month. A dummy variable 
indicating the experience of a loan denial at a formal institution measures liquidity 
constraints. Indicators of the objective risk include the age of the household head and its 
second polynomial and the household’s health status, measured as the share of (severely) 
ill household members in the last twelve months as a proxy for the probability of death. A 
dummy variable indicating whether or not the household head is risk averse as opposed to 
risk-loving or risk-neutral reflects their risk attitude. It is based on data from a small 
decision experiment that was part of the survey. This experiment involved the chances of 
an additional payment (analogue to an insurance payout) in a hypothetical future scenario 
depending on the possibility of the household head becoming ill or remaining healthy (see 
Appendix 1 for a more detailed explanation).45 The motivation to bequest or to save for 
retirement via a micro life insurance is reflected by a dummy variable indicating whether 
or not the household head is married, the share of kids in the household as well as the share 
of old dependents.  
As discussed above, the analysis focuses on two sets of nonstandard variables that do more 
than simply test the predictions of the standard life-insurance-consumption models. Firstly, 
the household’s subjective perception of risk is considered via a risk-perception index 
created through principal component analysis using polychoric correlations, which are able 
to adequately address the ordinal structure of the underlying variables (Kolenikov and 
Angeles 2008). This index is based on three questions about the household’s subjective 
exposure to illness, accidents and (any) economic shocks relative to other households in the 
community, which are rated by the household head on a scale from one (much less 
exposed) to five (much more exposed). The actual past experience of shocks is reflected by 
variables indicating the number of deaths and the number of economic shocks a household 
has indeed experienced in the last five years. These variables also serve as a control for the 
potential bias given higher (or lower) true levels of exposure to the main idiosyncratic 
shocks. 
45 A simple dummy variable is preferred, given that the actual values of the risk-aversion parameter turned 
out to be highly inflated, reaching unrealistically high values (extremely risk-loving) in approximately 30 
percent of the cases. It is possible that actual risk preferences do not strictly follow the assumptions of a 
quadratic expected utility function with constant relative risk aversion underlying the decision experiment, or 
that respondents had difficulties correctly understanding the procedures involved in the two decision 
exercises. As only about 60 percent of the total sample understood and participated in the decision 
experiment this variable is not included in all subsequent estimated specifications. 
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Secondly, some variables reflect the household’s level of familiarity with institutions 
offering formal financial services in general and the provider of the Anidaso Policy in 
particular to elicit the role of trust-building factors in the uptake decision. At the household 
level, this is a variable denoting the number of years a household has used an RCB’s 
services before the RCB introduced the Anidaso Policy. At the community level these are 
variables indicating the ratio of RCB clients in a community before the Anidaso Policy was 
introduced there and the ratio of Susu clients in the community as proxies for the relative 
level of familiarity with and popularity of formal financial services offered by RCBs and 
the prevalence of informal financial services, respectively.46 The influence of social 
networks is measured by the number of groups the head is a member of, including, for 
instance, social community groups, occupational groups, or self-help groups. In addition, 
the analysis controls for gender, education and the access to media information of the 
household head, as well as for potential local or regional fixed effects (using community or 
region dummies). 
In a second step, the analysis takes into account the extent of micro life insurance 
coverage. The data does not allow us to measure micro life insurance ownership by the 
total insurance in force (the sum of all life insurance purchased), as is often done in the 
literature on the demand for conventional life insurance. However, in accordance with 
prior studies in the context of conventional insurance markets (Burnett and Palmer 1984; 
Truett and Truett 1990), the analysis uses households’ premium expenditures as an 
alternative dependent variable. This variable combines the price with the level of coverage, 
but provides at least some indication of the actual coverage. As many of the households in 
the survey areas have not purchased micro life insurance, the dependent variable is here 
not strictly continuous but is rather limited to zero for a large number of the observations. 
This calls for the application of censored regression models, such as the tobit model (Tobin 
1958). Although this is a widespread approach in the conventional insurance demand 
literature, in the microinsurance literature only Arun et al. (2012) have used it, in the 
context of micro life insurance in Sri Lanka. Following these authors, I define the 
dependent variable as the fraction of the total household income spent on premiums (in 
46 As explained in the previous chapters, Susu refers to a common informal mobile banking system in Ghana 
that includes savings and credit groups and typically involves mobile bankers who go round and collect 
savings from participants at a small fee. Participants can then obtain bigger lump sums of money at the end of 
an agreed term. 
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percent). The tobit model allows the dependent variable Yi, denoting the percentage of 
household income paid for micro life insurance, to be censored as follows: 
     𝑌𝑖 =  �𝑌𝑖∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖 > 0 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖∗ ≤ 0    (𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁)  ,    (5) 
The observed variable Yi is related to an unobserved latent variable, Yi*, for which 
parameters are estimated for the whole sample population, which can be specified as 
              𝑌𝑖∗ =  𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 , (𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁),                            (6) 
with Xi representing the same vector of explanatory variables presented above and εi ~ 
N(0, 𝜎2). The log-likelihood function of the Tobit model can then be formulated as 
     𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑛Φ �0−𝑋𝑖′𝛽
𝜎
� + 𝑖𝜖{𝑌𝑖=0} ∑ 𝑙𝑛 1𝜎 𝜙 �𝑌𝑖−𝑋𝑖′𝛽𝜎 �𝑖𝜖{0<𝑌𝑖} ,  (7) 
where ϕ(.) is the standard normal probability density function and Φ(.) is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. Based on this, the parameters of the tobit model 
are estimated via the maximum likelihood method. As these parameters are only 
meaningful when one is interested in the latent variable Y*, the effects of the explanatory 
variables on the realised variable (that is the effects on the truncated mean of the dependent 
variable) are also assessed using the decomposition procedure suggested by McDonald and 
Moffit (1980).  
As tests on the conditions of normal and homogenous errors provide indications that even 
with a log-transformed dependent variable the tobit model restrictions are not fully met, the 
analysis further includes specifications based on a two-part model and on a simple 
Heckman selection model without exclusion restrictions. Finally, the analysis compares the 
determinants of micro life insurance participation and coverage with those of the NHIS and 
all other (private) insurance policies available in the survey areas.  
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3.5 Results: Determinants of participation and coverage 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Overall, the sample includes low- and middle-income households with an average total 
income of 78.70 cedi per month per adult equivalent (approximately 62.95 US Dollar), 
which is about twice the total national consumption poverty line of 370.80 cedi per adult 
equivalent per year based on the Ghana Living Standard Survey 2005/2006 (Ghana 
Statistical Service 2007). Closely in line with the national average, approximately 30 
percent of the households in the sample fall below this poverty line. Even though all survey 
locations are considered locally as towns, approximately 50 percent of the households are 
engaged in farming. However, nonfarm activities are more widespread, with 69 percent of 
the households engaged in at least one such activity. 
Table 6 demonstrates that microinsured households show significant differences in certain 
characteristics compared to nonmicroinsured households. On average, microinsured 
households have higher mean asset levels and their heads are much more engaged in 
nonfarm activities (88 percent to 68 percent). More of their heads are married, and they 
have a 23 percent higher share of their own children and a three times lower share of 
elderly dependents in the household.     
Surprisingly, according to their subjective evaluation microinsured households feel less 
exposed to risk. Correspondingly, they have experienced fewer cases of death in the past 
five years (0.22 to 0.29). Microinsured households have used the services of a rural bank 
for more than three times as long as the population as a whole (in years); their head is, on 
average, a member in 0.22 more social groups; and they live in communities where there 
was a higher ratio of rural bank clients and a lower ratio of Susu clients before the Anidaso 
Policy was introduced. All of the differences in means mentioned are significant at the 1 
percent level. 
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Table 6: Summary statistics 
Variables 
Microinsured 
households 
mean 
Non-
microinsured 
households       
mean 
Significance 
level of mean 
difference 
(percent) 
Full sample 
mean 
Std. Err. Min. Max. Number of 
observations 
Benchmark         
Risk aversiona 0.134 0.150  0.1498 0.020 0 1 647 
Lagged asset index 0.395 -0.091 1 -0.081 0.042 -1.657 3.451 1031 
Landsize per AE (in acres) 4.945 5.233 1 5.119 0.534 0 158.080 1031 
Engaged in nonfarm activitiesa 0.884 0.683 1 0.688 0.020 0 1 1031 
Income from remittances, per month 8.898 10.483  10.449 1.520 0 400 1031 
Income from transfers/gifts, pm 6.610 7.750  7.726 0.952 0 200 1031 
Total income per adult equivalent per month (Cedi) 85.603 61.417 1 78.710 3.486 1.808 821.918 1031 
Experience of loan deniala  0.203 0.094 1 0.097 0.012 0 1 1031 
Share of severely ill HH members (last 12 mths) 0.208 0.208  0.208 0.013 0 1 1031 
Share of  ill HH members (last 12 mths) 0.665 0.692  0.691 0.015 0 1 1031 
Age a  44.630 49.146 1 49.051 0.655 19 95 1031 
Bequest motive         
Marrieda 0.643 0.532 1 0.535 0.021 0 1 1031 
Share of own children in HH 0.427 0.347 1 0.349 0.012 0.000 0.857 1031 
Share of elderly dependents in HH 0.019 0.060 1 0.059 0.008 0.000 1.000 1031 
Subjective probability of risk         
Risk perception indexa  -0.261 -0.020 1 -0.025 0.046 -1.781 3.334 1011 
Past experience of shocks         
No. of deaths (last 5 yrs) 0.221 0.285 10 0.282 0.025 0 6 1031 
No. of economic shocks (last 5 yrs) 0.555 0.369 5 0.373 0.047 0 20 1031 
Familiarity, networks and information         
Relationship to RCB before Anidaso (in yrs) 3.216 0.993 1 1.040 0.146 0 25 1031 
Ratio of RCB clients in community before Anidaso  0.544 0.424 1 0.427 0.007 0.024 0.867 1031 
Ratio of Susu clients in community 0.161 0.188 1 0.189 0.004 0.012 0.474 1031 
No. of groups membershipsa 1.167 0.942 1 0.947 0.039 0 10 1011 
Reads newspapera 0.524 0.412 1 0.414 0.021 0 1 1011 
Often listens to news on radioa 0.700 0.566 1 0.569 0.021 0 1 1011 
Other variables         
Female-headed HH 0.359 0.454 1 0.453 0.021 0 1 1031 
Years of schoolinga 10.090 8.115 1 8.167 0.223 0 26 1031 
Unweighted number of observations 321 710  1031     
Weighted number of observations 507.37 23803.2  24310.5     
Notes: a = As reported by the household head. Source: Author’s calculation.
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Table 7 reports the distribution of the different insurance categories considered and 
average monthly premium expenditures. The Anidaso Policy exhibits the lowest uptake 
rates with 2.09 percent of the households in the survey areas, while almost half of the 
households are enrolled in the NHIS. Conventional private insurance is more commonly 
used than the Anidaso Policy, though mostly by households with above-average income 
levels.  
Table 7: Types of insurance used and premium expenditures 
Type of insurance No. of 
households 
in sample 
Estimated 
no. of 
households 
in survey 
area 
Estimated 
percentage of 
households in 
survey area 
Average 
premium 
expenditures 
per month       
(Ghana cedi)* 
Percentage of 
total income 
paid for 
premiums per 
month 
Anidaso Policy 321 507.37 2.09 5.44 4.68 
Other private insurance 161 2946.64 12.12 13.22 4.61 
National Health Insurance 
(NHIS) 562 12602.00 51.84 1.23 0.97 
Any insurance**  738 14536.80 59.80 5.60 4.01 
Total 1031 24310.5 100   
Notes: * The exchange rate at the time of our survey (February 2009) was 1.00 Ghana cedi = 1.25 USD. **This includes the Anidaso 
micro life insurance, other private insurances, NHIS, and SSNIT. Source: Author’s calculation. 
Comparing the average premium amounts per month paid for the respective types of 
insurance reveals that the Anidaso micro life insurance is indeed much cheaper than other 
private insurance. While the monthly premiums start at two Ghanaian cedi and go up to 
10–15 cedi if policyholders choose the savings component, the mean monthly premium 
payments amount to 5.44 cedi. Yet the national health insurance premiums are even lower 
with average premiums of 1.23 cedi. This reflects the fact that the NHIS targets the 
population as a whole, including the poorest income segments, and is heavily subsidized 
by the central government.  
3.5.2 Multivariate analysis  
Table 8 presents the probit estimation results on households’ decisions to purchase micro 
life insurance, and Table 9 presents the estimation results of the tobit model, the two-part 
model and the selection model regarding the extent of coverage. Based on the same 
regression techniques, Tables 13 and 14 in the Appendix provide the estimation results on 
participation in and coverage through the NHIS and all types of insurance held by 
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households. I highlight these in comparison with the results on micro life insurance 
wherever it is informative.  
The community level variables on the ratio of RCB clients in the community before 
Anidaso was introduced and the ratio of Susu clients indicate that out-region households 
may be systematically prevented from consuming formal financial services to the same 
extent as the inhabitants of the in-region communities and rather resort to informal ones 
(see Table 8, columns one and two). Hence, the discussion of results concentrates on 
estimations based on the in-region sample. 
With regard to the standard theoretical predictions, the core results are robust across all the 
different specifications. The relationship of micro life insurance participation and wealth 
takes on a hump-shape form, as shown by the significant positive effect of the level term 
and the significant negative effect of the quadratic term of the asset index. While opposing 
Giné et al.’s (2008) finding of a monotonically decreasing relationship in the case of micro 
index insurance in India, this is in line with a recent study on micro index insurance in 
Ethiopia (Clarke and Kalani 2012) and indicates that uptake of micro life insurance is 
lowest for households with very low and very high wealth and highest for those with 
intermediate levels of wealth. The results of the two-part and the selection models 
underline the reversing effect of these wealth indicators, which is demonstrated by the 
significant and negative coefficients of the asset index and transfers in the second-step 
equations. Nonfarm activities of the household head double the probability that a 
household with an initial uptake probability at the population mean purchases micro life 
insurance (last column in Table 8), and also positively affects the amount of coverage 
purchased.  These findings on the wealth indicators do not seem to be unique to the case of 
micro life insurance, but apply to the NHIS and the all-insurance category as well. The 
nonlinear relationship of the asset index with insurance uptake is robust throughout all 
specifications. 
Transfers, remittances and nonfarm employment seem less important for participation in 
other insurances relative to micro life insurance (see Tables 12 and 13). This suggests that 
activities in the nonfarm sector facilitate a greater ability to afford the regular monthly 
premium payments for the Anidaso Policy through more steady and reliable incomes. This 
is less important, for example, in the case of the NHIS, to which premiums can be paid on 
a yearly basis.  
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Table 8: Probit model results on Anidaso microinsurance participation 
Explanatory variables 
Based on total sample  Based on in-region sample  
(1) (2)  (3) (4) AME scaled by 
population uptake 
rate Coeff. S.E. AME Coeff. S.E. AME  Coeff. S.E. AME Coeff. S.E. AME 
Benchmark               
Risk aversion (Alpha<1)    -0.125 0.162 -0.006  -0.059 0.151 -0.003     
Lagged asset index 0.164*** 0.052 0.007 0.181** 0.071 0.008  0.165** 0.078 0.010 0.130** 0.064 0.008 0.383 
Lagged asset index squared -0.066*** 0.021 -0.003 -0.106** 0.046 -0.005  -0.123** 0.051 -0.007 -0.083** 0.037 -0.005 -0.239 
Landsize per AE (log) -0.020 0.038 -0.001 -0.022 0.030 -0.001  0.001 0.029 0.000 -0.008 0.025 -0.000 0.000 
Engaged in nonfarm activities 0.373*** 0.114 0.017 0.579*** 0.155 0.026  0.625*** 0.166 0.036 0.422*** 0.123 0.024 1.148 
Income from remittances (log) -0.008 0.028 -0.000 0.054* 0.032 0.002  0.064* 0.033 0.004 0.001 0.028 0.000 0.000 
Income from transfers (log) -0.001 0.028 -0.000 0.008 0.031 0.000  0.010 0.033 0.001 0.003 0.027 0.000 0.000 
Experience of loan denial 0.338*** 0.126 0.015 0.585*** 0.153 0.026  0.229 0.194 0.013 0.472*** 0.155 0.027 1.292 
Share of ill HH members (last 12 mths) 0.381** 0.189 0.017 0.223 0.186 0.010  0.552*** 0.176 0.032 0.300** 0.149 0.017 0.813 
Age 0.067*** 0.016 0.003 0.089*** 0.034 0.004  0.111*** 0.039 0.006 0.079*** 0.026 0.005 0.239 
Age squared -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000  -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Bequest motive               
Married -0.066 0.121 -0.003 -0.146 0.141 -0.007  -0.050 0.142 -0.003 -0.067 0.120 -0.004 -0.191 
Share of children  0.517*** 0.158 0.023 0.687*** 0.226 0.031  0.673*** 0.237 0.039 0.517*** 0.191 0.030 1.435 
Share of elderly dependents in HH           -0.517 0.398 -0.030 -1.435 
Shocks and subjective risk               
No. of death shocks (past 5 yrs) -0.032 0.080 -0.001 -0.186* 0.109 -0.008  -0.059 0.111 -0.003 -0.050 0.094 -0.003 -0.144 
No. of economic shocks (past 5 yrs) 0.041** 0.019 0.002 0.092** 0.037 0.004  0.103** 0.045 0.006 0.105** 0.042 0.006 0.287 
Risk-perception index, polychoricpca  -0.103*** 0.039 -0.005        -0.102** 0.041 -0.006 -0.287 
Familiarity, networks, information               
Relationship to RCB before Anidaso (in yrs)    0.087*** 0.015 0.004  0.113*** 0.018 0.007 0.065*** 0.014 0.004 0.191 
Ratio of RCB clients to nonclients in community 
before Anidaso  1.193*** 0.320 0.054 1.373*** 0.257 0.062  -0.006 0.389 -0.000 0.026 0.316 0.002 0.096 
Ratio of Susu clients in community -2.373** 1.199 -0.107 -3.058*** 0.947 -0.137  -0.719 0.863 -0.042 -0.777 0.670 -0.045 -2.153 
No. of group memberships    0.062 0.077 0.003  0.009 0.080 0.001 0.084* 0.046 0.005 0.239 
Reads newspaper    -0.051 0.134 -0.002  -0.129 0.143 -0.007 -0.283** 0.118 -0.016 -0.766 
Often listens to news on radio    -0.089 0.130 -0.004  0.022 0.132 0.001 0.030 0.108 0.002 0.096 
Other controls               
Years of schooling    -0.001 0.014 -0.000  -0.020 0.015 -0.001 -0.004 0.013 -0.000 0.000 
Female-headed HH    -0.205 0.158 -0.009  -0.244 0.158 -0.014 -0.284** 0.132 -0.016 -0.766 
Central Region 0.106 0.126 0.005 0.478*** 0.144 0.021         
Eastern Region -0.085 0.220 -0.004 0.044 0.181 0.002         
Community controls No No  yes yes  
Constant -4.089*** 0.484  -4.875*** 0.804   -4.573*** 0.865  -3.796*** 0.606   
Observations 1011 646  448 671  
F-statistic    (25, 596) 4,13  (28, 400) 3,04 (28, 642) 3,35  
Pseudo R-squared 0,121            
Notes: Households in the sample are weighted according to their sampling probabilities. The asterisks indicate level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Author’s calculation based on survey data.  
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Table 9: Tobit, two-part and selection model results on the amount of Anidaso premiums as percent of total income, per month 
Explanatory variables 
Tobit model 
 Two-part model  ML simple selection model 
(1) nontransformed  (2) lognormal  (3) OLS lognormal: 2nd part 
 (4) Heckman: outcome 
eq. 
 
Coeff. SE AME for E(Y|X,Y>0) 
AME for 
E(Y|X)  Coeff. SE 
AME  
for E(Y|X,Y>0) 
AME for 
E(Y|X) 
 Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE  
Benchmark                 
Lagged asset index 1.714 1.072 0.185 0.043  0.672* 0.380 0.032 0.356  -0.275*** 0.074  -0.272*** 0.074  
Lagged asset index squared -1.162** 0.589 -0.125 -0.029  -0.465** 0.216 -0.022 -0.246        
Landsize per AE (log) -0.284 0.390 -0.031 -0.007  -0.123 0.152 -0.006 -0.065  -0.021 0.036  -0.022 0.036  
Engaged in nonfarm activities 5.620*** 2.007 0.606 0.141  2.331*** 0.719 0.109 1,234  -0.332 0.213  -0.290 0.263  
Income from remittances (log) 0.029 0.405 0.003 0.001  0.004 0.160 0.000 0.002  -0.029 0.035  -0.029 0.035  
Income from transfers (log) 0.183 0.415 0.020 0.005  0.087 0.159 0.004 0.046  -0.084** 0.033  -0.082** 0.033  
Experience of loan denial 5.288** 2.277 0.570 0.133  1.932** 0.833 0.091 1.023  0.028 0.153  0.062 0.201  
Share of ill HH members (last 12 mths) 6.666*** 2.377 0.719 0.167  2.744*** 0.890 0.129 1,453  -0.160 0.212  -0.119 0.252  
Age 1.188*** 0.408 0.128 0.030  0.496*** 0.150 0.023 0.263  -0.007 0.006  -0.008 0.008  
Age squared -0.014*** 0.004 -0.002 -0.000  -0.006*** 0.002 -0.000 -0.003        
Bequest motive                 
Marriedb -0.612 1.870 -0.066 -0.015  -0.194 0.717 -0.009 -0.103  0.061 0.176  0.060 0.176  
Share of children  7.197** 3.057 0.776 0.181  2.916*** 1.111 0.137 1,544  -0.270 0.217  -0.202 0.305  
Shocks and subjective risk                 
No. of death shocks (past 5 yrs) -1.308 1.394 -0.141 -0.033  -0.390 0.537 -0.018 -0.206  -0.186* 0.111  -0.189* 0.113  
No. of economic shocks (past 5 yrs) 1.484** 0.597 0.160 0.037  0.589*** 0.216 0.028 0.312  0.051 0.033  0.060 0.046  
Risk perception index, polychoricpca  -1.480** 0.655 -0.160 -0.037  -0.609** 0.241 -0.029 -0.323  0.130** 0.061  0.120* 0.069  
Familiarity, networks, information                 
Relationship to RCB before Anidaso (in yrs) 0.907*** 0.210 0.098 0.023  0.366*** 0.067 0.017 0.194  -0.008 0.009  -0.002 0.021  
Ratio of RCB clients in community  1.042 13.61 0.112 0.026  0.041 5.383 0.002 0.022  omitted   1.326 1.034  
Ratio of Susu clients in community -18.408 37.15 -1,986 -0.462  -5.526 14.65 -0.259 -2,926  omitted   -6.505** 3.051  
No. of groups head is member of 1.177 0.730 0.127 0.030  0.443 0.280 0.021 0.235  -0.003 0.079  0.007 0.082  
Reads newspaper -3.628** 1.839 -0.391 -0.091  -1.482** 0.688 -0.070 -0.785  -0.269* 0.141  -0.293* 0.149  
Often listens to news on radio 0.358 1.745 0.039 0.009  0.028 0.651 0.001 0.015  0.266* 0.155  0.268* 0.156  
Other controls                 
Years of schooling -0.021 0.185 -0.002 -0.001  0.002 0.073 0.000 0.001  0.006 0.014  0.007 0.014  
Female-headed HH -3.062 2.038 -0.330 -0.077  -1.304* 0.771 -0.061 -0.691  0.499** 0.195  0.486** 0.197  
Community controls Yes     Yes     Yes   Yes   
Constant -59.240*** 11.73    -25.615*** 3.694    0.816 0.643  1.550 0.984  
Observations 652   652  296  652 
Left-censored observations 356   356        
Diagnostics and goodness of fit                    R-squared 0.298    
F-test (28, 623) 1,490   5,240  Athro   0.114 0.364  
Normality test (tobcm) Null: normal errors (p-values) 0,000  0,000  Lnsigma   -0.081 0.059  
Notes: Estimations are based on in-region sample only. Households in the sample are weighted according to their sampling probabilities. The asterisks indicate level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Source: 
Author’s calculation based on survey data. 
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While the simple risk-aversion dummy cannot be confidently included in all specifications 
it turns out to be negative (though not significant).47 In terms of the objective size of the 
risk, the results show, as expected, a strongly significant positive relationship with the 
household head’s age in the participation equation. Yet the coefficient of the squared term 
is significant and negative. The turning point in the relationship is at a relatively young age 
of 41.54 years. This finding speaks strongly in favor of a bequest motive, which is further 
substantiated below. It might also indicate that for the older generation the cost of 
evaluating and accepting new products and technical procedures increases. There is also a 
significant positive association between the share of severely ill household members and 
the probability of uptake as well as coverage. Given that the health status of the household 
is not public information and that customers are not obliged to report this in the Anidaso 
Policy admission application, this is an indication, albeit a small one, of adverse selection 
in the market.  
As for the bequest motive hypothesized above, the participation decision seems to be 
largely driven by the desire to bequeath children rather than the spouse. Marital status has a 
negative (though insignificant) effect. However, an increase of the mean share of children 
in the household significantly increases the probability that the household will purchase 
micro life insurance (0.3 percentage points at the margin). The coefficient of the share of 
elderly dependents, on the other hand, is negative but insignificant. These findings are in 
line with recent evidence of an intentional bequest motive in micro life insurance 
participation in Sri Lanka (Arun et al. 2012). However, the marginal effects of the bequest 
motive indicators are all insignificant and smaller with regard to the premium expenditure 
specifications. Hence, the bequest motive is less important in the decision about how much 
coverage to purchase. This finding seems convincing as higher premium payments also 
indicate that a household has chosen an optional savings component in addition to the basic 
term life component.48 Instead of saving for retirement, however, these households might 
also want to use the option of a partial withdrawal of the insured amount mentioned earlier. 
Furthermore, the previous experience of a loan denial has a significant positive effect on 
47 As mentioned before, about 30 percent of the sample did not entirely understand the small decision 
experiment underlying the variable, which leads to a severe reduction in the sample size in these estimations. 
Results on the risk aversion proxy may thus not be fully reliable. 
48 It is not possible to identify exactly whether households have chosen such an additional component. This is 
due to the fact that (a) households are typically not sure about the amounts of premiums they pay for the 
basic term insurance and for the savings component and (b) the premiums paid for the basic coverage varied 
over the survey sites and over the years since the introduction of the policy and it was impossible to obtain 
any clear information on this. 
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the participation decision as such. While credit-constrained households may be driven 
towards other options to protect against risk, there are also some indications that clients 
view the Anidaso Policy as one option for improving their reputation at the bank – that is, 
as an alternative to collateral that will later allow them to access a loan. This was brought 
up in discussions with GLICO’s sales agents and rural banks’ staff, and in focus group 
discussions conducted by the author in the Central Region. Some sales agents have also 
apparently used this as an argument to convince people to buy a policy.  
As hypothesized above, there may be two major sets of factors that are of particular 
importance for participation in microinsurance markets and go beyond the standard 
theoretical predictions. First, these include the perceived and actual risk exposure. Second, 
these are the level of information households possess regarding insurance and financial 
services in general and their level of trust in the providing institutions. Both sets of factors 
are expected to work in favor of the uptake decision and the extent of coverage as their 
levels increase.  
Yet in contrast to a priori theoretical considerations – but in line with the negative effect of 
risk aversion – households with a higher perceived risk exposure compared to others in 
their neighborhood are less likely to purchase the Anidaso Policy. Confirming the earlier 
evidence provided in Chapter 2 with regard to the household data from two towns in the 
Central Region, the risk perception index exhibits a strongly significant negative effect on 
the participation decision. This effect is robust throughout all probit and tobit 
specifications. Increasing the risk perception index from the minimum to the maximum 
value decreases the probability that a household will purchase Anidaso by 2.3 percentage 
points. Interestingly, however, this effect is reversed in the second-step equations of the 
two-part and the selection models. Hence, households that have purchased the policy 
behave as expected: pessimists with a higher exposure to risk purchase more extensive 
coverage (including more family members and/or the pension component). A one-unit 
increase in the risk perception index leads to a 12–13 percent higher fraction of income 
paid for premiums. Recall that, evidently, these are the households with intermediate levels 
of wealth, a higher share of children and a higher objective degree of risk. Underlining this 
finding, the negative effect of the risk perception index on participation decreases with 
rising asset levels, as shown by the distribution of the average marginal effects across the 
range of the asset index (Figures 2 and 3, Appendix). In contrast to the microinsurance 
participation equation, in the regression models of the other insurance categories the 
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subjective risk perception index shows the expected positive significant coefficient for the 
uncensored observations in the tobit specification and the first parts of the two-part and the 
selection models (Tables 13 and 14).  
These findings can be interpreted in somewhat conflicting ways. On the one hand, 
households may not use their perceptions to cope properly with the risk due to irrationality 
or limited (financial) understanding (Giné et al. 2008). They may have a limited ability to 
calculate the probability of the risk involved (prime age death and/or old age) and judge its 
potential implications. On the other hand, given that the life insurance under study does not 
provide full coverage, as may be the case with health insurance or indemnity insurance, the 
lower uptake among households with higher perceived levels of risk and lower levels of 
wealth may be the result of rational choice, as Clarke and Kalani (2012) argue in a model 
of rational hedging applied to index insurance in Ethiopia. This may be the case if there are 
strong expectations that, given the cost of the policy, the potential net payout of the 
insurance will not match either the financial loss incurred through the death of the insured 
household member(s) or the financial needs of old age. 
A third explanation is that of incomplete information and limited experience with the 
microinsurance product and the providing institution on the part of the household. This 
results in limited trust in the functioning and reliability of both. Households with a higher 
awareness of risk also tend to be more cautious in their financial management practices and 
may draw back from the uncertainty associated with the policy. In fact, the policy itself 
might then be considered a risky option and thus not perceived as helpful in dealing with 
the consequences of death or old age. Both of the latter two interpretations are supported 
by the findings for the NHIS and the all-insurance equations, where households seem to 
behave in line with the theoretical reasoning, as shown by the significantly positive effects 
of the subjective risk perception in Tables 13 and 14. These types of insurance seem to be 
regarded as adequate mechanisms to deal with the associated risks, a finding that is 
convincing given that knowledge about and experience with the NHIS and types of 
insurance other than the microinsurance are likely to be greater in the survey regions.  
The variables that control for actual shock experiences exhibit mixed results. The number 
of economic shocks (that is, dramatic increase/decrease of input/output prices, inability to 
sell products, or loss of job) a household has experienced in the last five years has a 
positive effect on the microinsurance participation equation. Counterintuitively, however, 
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the number of death shocks a household has experienced during the past five years is 
negatively related to the choice of buying a policy and the extent of coverage, but the 
significance levels of this finding are not robust throughout all specifications. This could 
be supportive of the negative effect of the subjective risk perception, or it may be an 
indication that households have mainly lost productive household members and have been 
more vulnerable to death, but less able to afford premiums.    
The scepticism regarding the functioning of the product and the reliability of the insurer is 
confirmed by the results from the variables on the level of familiarity with the provider and 
integration into networks. Specifically, with each additional year that a household used 
services from the rural bank before the Anidaso Policy was introduced, the probability that 
the household purchases micro life insurance increases by 19 percentage points for a 
household at the initial population uptake probability. For the same household, each 
additional social group the head is a member of increases the probability of uptake by 24 
percentage points. In the context of incomplete markets and weak formal trust-building 
institutions – both of which impact the quality of bureaucracy, contractual security, etc. – 
households may rely on informal trust-building mechanisms to reduce the risk of 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the insurer to a much greater extent than their 
counterparts in conventional insurance markets. In other words, households then have to 
rely on their own and others’ experience with the providing institution and its staff and on 
insurance advice from peers. This confirms the evidence found in previous empirical 
contributions on other types of microinsurance (e.g. Giné et al. 2008; Morsink and Geurts 
2011) and will be further consolidated in Chapter 4. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Despite the high expectations of policymakers and practitioners in microinsurance 
regarding the improvement of household risk management, participation in the market has 
remained low. At the same time, although life insurance is most common in the 
microinsurance business, it has remained the least studied example of microinsurance to 
date. This chapter’s contribution has been to analyze the determinants of participation in 
micro life insurance and size of coverage relative to other available types of insurance, 
such as health insurance, using household survey data collected in southern Ghana. It was 
argued that beyond standard theoretical reasoning, there are at least two sets of 
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nonstandard factors that are of particular relevance for micro life insurance participation. 
On the one hand, these include households’ perceived risk exposure vis-à-vis their actual 
experience of shocks. On the other hand, based on a growing body of evidence in the 
microinsurance literature, these include the level of information about insurance that 
households possess and their level of trust in the providing institutions. 
The empirical results correspond with many of the benchmark predictions of standard life-
insurance-consumption theories. Specifically, there is a strong indication of a bequest 
motive towards children in the decision to purchase micro life insurance. This underlines 
households’ recognition of the long- and short-term consequences of the death of a major 
breadwinner in terms of permanent losses in total household income and the immediate 
need for funds to cover funeral costs.  
Corresponding to the results of Chapter 2 and one recent study that focused on micro life 
insurance in Sri Lanka (Arun et al. 2012), the evidence suggests that insurance providers 
undertake rather limited outreach to the poorest and most vulnerable households, which 
have the least access to other options to manage risk. This finding is underlined by the fact 
that there tend to be restrictions for households in the access to the rural banks’ services 
that are associated with geographical distance and the related transaction costs. Apparently, 
although highly mobile banking practices via the Susu system are widespread in Ghana, 
this tool has not been exploited by the insurance sales agents.  
More remarkable results are generated when we look at the above-mentioned nonstandard 
determinants of participation in micro life insurance, which deserve greater attention in 
relation to efforts to try to expand outreach to the low-income populations. 
Households that perceive their exposure to risk to be greater than their peers are 
surprisingly less likely to participate. Interestingly, this finding does not hold in the case of 
the NHIS and total insurance holdings and is also reversed in the case of expenditures on 
premiums. Here, households behave as expected: pessimists spend a higher share of their 
income on micro life insurance premiums. The chapter set out conflicting ways to interpret 
these findings. On the one hand, households may not be able to properly cope with the risk 
due to irrationality or limited understanding of the financial dimensions of the policy or the 
implications of the risk involved, as some of the previous literature on micro index 
insurance argues (Cole et al. 2013; Giné et al. 2008). On the other hand, the lower level of 
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participation by poorer households with higher levels of perceived risk may be the result of 
rational choice, with the household weighing the potential gains of the insurance and the 
reliability of a payout against its costs, as a more recent work on micro index insurance in 
Ethiopia has found (Clarke and Kalani 2012). A third argument may provide a way out of 
the dilemma: households operating in a context of incomplete information and limited 
experience with the microinsurance product and the providing institutions may rationally 
decide that purchasing a policy is too risky an endeavor if they have only very limited 
funds to spend. Rather than the households being limited in their ability to understand 
insurance products, it may be the limited information actively provided to the target group 
that creates reservation among them. In line with this reasoning, uptake rates are higher 
among those households that have been using the financial services offered by a rural bank 
for a longer period of time and among those that are integrated into a greater number of 
groups. The latter variable hints at the potentially important influence of peers as an 
informal trust-building mechanism in these circumstances, something which has also been 
highlighted by and Morsink and Geurts (2011) and will be further substantiated in Chapter 
4. In future research it would thus be useful to more comprehensively disentangle the 
effects of heterogeneous subjective beliefs and risk preferences and to examine the impact 
of peer influence on the decision to purchase micro life insurance.  
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3.7 Appendix 
Appendix 1: Small choice experiment to elicit risk aversion and subjective 
beliefs via a proper scoring rule 
This appendix presents the decision exercise conducted on the risk attitude of individuals 
using their subjective beliefs on the probability of risk. It was designed by Prof. Horst 
Zank, University of Manchester, School of Social Sciences, Prof. Susan Steiner, University 
of Hannover. The experiment was conducted under my supervision in the survey 
underlying this chapter. All descriptions below are based on the (unpublished) illustrations 
provided to me by Prof. Horst Zank. 
Set-up 
The choice experiment was part of the survey questionnaire and applied to each respondent 
in the sample. It involved two questions laying out the chances of an additional payment 
(analogue to an insurance payout) in a hypothetical future scenario indicating the 
possibility of becoming ill or remaining healthy. The two choices to be made were purely 
hypothetical and did not involve a real payout of the chosen amounts of money based on a 
person’s health status in the next month. The following question was posed twice to the 
respondent, each time referring to one of the Tables of payment options (below) ranging 
from 1 to 21 (Tables 10 and 11): 
“Suppose that you are offered amounts of money (again) depending on whether or not you 
become ill during the next month. If you become ill during the next month and cannot work 
for one week or more, you receive payment A; but if you do not become ill, you receive 
payment B. These amounts are paid to you in addition to what you already own and earn. 
The Table below indicates possible combinations of payments A and B. (This time, the 
payments are different from the ones in the previous Table).  
[Example given and respondent asked to explain one of the options him/herself] 
Please choose the option that you find is best for you. Please note that there are no right or 
wrong answers because your choice depends on your own preferences and 
circumstances.” 
Application of the proper scoring rule 
The measurement tool jointly estimates a person’s risk attitude and his/her use of 
subjective beliefs on risk (the probability of becoming ill). It exploits a quadratic proper 
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scoring rule as a truth-telling mechanism underlying the two choices made regarding both 
Tables (Tables 10 and 11).  
Individuals are assumed to have subjective expected utility preferences. Simple acts of 
events related to monetary outcomes are denoted by P = (E1: x1, …, En: xn). Subjective 
expected utility (SEU) assigns probabilities p(Ei) to the events Ei and utility u(xi) to 
outcomes, such that acts can be expressed as: 
𝑆𝐸𝑈(𝑃) =  �𝑝(𝐸𝑖)𝑢(𝑥𝑖).𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The application below refers to binary acts that pay x in the event of E and y otherwise. 
The SEU value of such an act would thus be SEU(p) = p(E)u(x) + [1-p(E)]u(y). Utility is 
assumed to be a power function, i.e. u(x) = xα , with α > 0. This describes the Arrow-Pratt 
measure of constant relative risk aversion with a coefficient of 1- α.  
As outlined above, the individual is asked to choose the most preferred act of the two sets 
of actions presented in Tables 10 and 11, which set out payments according to the 
following scoring rule: 
 A. Payment if E (illness occurs): a*[-(1-r)2] + b 
 B. Payment if not E (no illness occurs): a*(-r2) + c 
Hence, the payoffs in the two scenarios are related to the probability of becoming ill (r) in 
the next month, with r Є [0,1]. The value for a, b, and c are fixed at the beginning of the 
experiment. The numbers in Tables 10 and 11 hence represent amounts of money for r = 0, 
0.05, 0.1, …, 0.9, 0.95, 1. The chosen option in only one of the decision rounds returns 
information about the individual relative risk-aversion parameter α and the individual’s 
assessment of the probability of becoming ill in the case that α = 1 (risk neutral). The 
individual’s preferences are then described by the subjective expected value SEV(P) = 
p(E)x + [1-p(E)]y, where P = (E: x, Ec: y).  
However, in the case that utility is not linear, i.e. α ≠1, only via the second decision round 
on payoffs for the same events as in the first round (becoming ill/not becoming ill) it is 
possible to derive both the value of α and the true expected probability (r* in the first 
choice and r** in the second choice), thus r*/r** = p(E).  
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The relationship between p(E) and the given choice (outcome A and B) in Table 11 is: 
𝑝(𝐸)  =  𝑟 ∗
𝑟 ∗  + (1 − 𝑟 ∗) �𝑏 − 𝑎 (1 − 𝑟 ∗)2𝑐 − 𝑎 (𝑟 ∗)2 � 𝛼 − 1. 
 
The risk-aversion parameter α can then be expressed as follows:49 
∝ = 1 + ln � 𝑟 ∗1 − 𝑟 ∗  . 1 − 𝑟 ∗∗𝑟 ∗∗ �
ln�
𝑏 − 𝑎 (1 − 𝑟 ∗)2
𝑐 − 𝑎 (𝑟 ∗)2
𝑏 − 𝑎 (𝑞 − 𝑟 ∗∗)2
𝑐 − 𝑎 (𝑟 ∗∗)2 � 
. 
The more general expression for α given the corresponding r* from the first choice and r** 
from the second choice is given by 
∝ = 1 + ln � 𝑟 ∗1 − 𝑟 ∗  . 1 − 𝑟 ∗∗𝑟 ∗∗ �ln� 𝑥𝑦𝑥′
𝑦′
� .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 Note that α cannot be calculated in cases where one of the r-values is 0 or 1, as the natural logarithm 
cannot be defined. Hence, it is assumed that in the case of r = 0 and r = 1 respondents actually chose a value 
close to that, since in reality it is unlikely that the probability of becoming ill is truly 0 or 1. Hence, although 
the design of the experiment prevented this, these cases are replaced with values 0.01 and 0.99, respectively. 
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Table 10:  Risk game’s first decision round* 
Option Payment A if ill 
a*[-(1-r)2] + b 
Payment B if not ill 
a*(-r2) + c 
1 (r=0)   5.00 40.00 
2 (r=0.05)   6.95 39.95 
3 (r=0.10)   8.80 39.80 
… ... … 
19 (r=0.90) 24.80 23.80 
20 (r=0.95) 24.95 21.95 
21 (r=1) 25.00 20.00 
* a = 20, b = 25, c = 40 
 
 
Table 11:  Risk game’s second decision round** 
Option Payment A if ill 
a*[-(1-r)2] + b 
Payment B if not ill 
a*(-r2) + c 
1 (r=0)   0.00 50.00  
2 (r=0.05)   3.90  49.90  
3 (r=0.10)   7.60  49.60  
… … … 
19 (r=0.90) 39.60  17.60  
20 (r=0.95) 39.90  13.90  
21 (r=1) 40.00 10.00  
** a = 40, b = 40, c = 50 
  
  
80 
 
 
Table 12: Insured and non-insured households across survey sites 
 
Number of non-insured 
households in sample 
Number of insured 
households in sample 
Estimated share of 
insured households in 
population (weighted, in 
percent) 
Central Region    
Policyholder locations    
Nsaba 41 24 0.17 
Duakwa 32 25 0.18 
Kwanyako 44 62 0.35 
Non-policyholder locations    
Mensakrom 27 0 0 
Mankrom Nkwanta 27 0 0 
Asafo 61 0 0 
Eastern Region    
Policyholder locations    
Mamfe 28 28 0.25 
Mampong 43 44 0.36 
Larteh 44 36 0.29 
Non-policyholder locations    
Tingkong/Nyame Bekyere 44 0 0 
New Mangoase 43 0 0 
Asenema 28 0 0 
Volta Region    
Policyholder locations    
Sogakope 99 72 0.34 
Dabala 34 30 0.15 
Non-policyholder locations    
Adutor 59 0 0 
Hikpo 32 0 0 
Kpotame 23 0 0 
Total 709 321 2.09 
Notes: Due to oversampling of insured households, the share of insured households in the respective total community 
population is much smaller than the relative number of these households in the sample suggests. Source: Author’s 
calculation. 
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Figure 2: Effect of the risk perception index on the probability to purchase 
Anidaso life insurance 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of AME’s of the risk perception index across values of the 
asset index 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Table 13: Tobit, two-part and selection model results on the participation in NHIS and the amount of NHIS premiums in percent of 
total income (log-transformed), per month 
Explanatory variables  
(1) Tobit  (2) Probit: 1st part  (3) OLS: 2
nd part  
(4) Probit: selection 
eq.  
(5) Heckman: outcome 
eq. 
 
Coeff. SE AME for E(Y|X,Y>0) 
AME for 
E(Y|X) 
 
Coeff. SE. AME  Coeff. SE.  Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE. 
Benchmark 
                  Lagged asset index 
 
1.532*** 0.325 0.287 0.224  0.428*** 0.114 0.130  0.278 0.172  0.424*** 0.118  0.189 0.135 Lagged asset index squared 
 
-0.556*** 0.166 -0.104 -0.081  -0.158*** 0.060 -0.048  -0.143 0.093  -0.154** 0.064    Landsize per AE (log) 
 
-0.120 0.117 -0.023 -0.018  -0.039 0.043 -0.012  -0.034 0.056  -0.039 0.043  -0.034 0.055 Egaged in non-farm activities 
 
-0.472 0.591 -0.088 -0.069  -0.066 0.205 -0.020  -0.634** 0.253  -0.064 0.206  -0.594** 0.264 Income from remittances (log) 
 
-0.238** 0.118 -0.045 -0.035  -0.068 0.042 -0.021  -0.100* 0.058  -0.068 0.042  -0.106* 0.061 Income from transfers (log) 
 
0.236** 0.113 0.044 0.034  0.086* 0.045 0.026  -0.020 0.054  0.086* 0.045  -0.047 0.059 Experience of loan denial 
 
-2.713*** 0.760 -0.507 -0.397  -0.748*** 0.257 -0.228  -0.461 0.460  -0.739*** 0.264  -0.494 0.514 Share of ill HH members (last 12 mths.) 
 
1.377** 0.643 0.258 0.201  0.461** 0.220 0.140  0.330 0.315  0.462** 0.220  0.355 0.345 Bequest motive 
                  Marriedb 
 
0.834 0.623 0.156 0.122  0.423** 0.211 0.129  -0.531 0.351  0.423** 0.210  -0.396 0.362 Share of kids  
 
-0.935 0.921 -0.175 -0.137  -0.556* 0.323 -0.169  0.541 0.491  -0.539 0.340  0.744 0.500 Age 
 
-0.029 0.094 -0.005 -0.004  -0.043 0.030 -0.013  0.064 0.053  -0.046 0.037  -0.029*** 0.008 Age squared 
 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.001* 0.001  0.001 0.000    Shocks and subjective risk 
                  No. of death shocks (past 5 yrs.) 
 
-0.217 0.421 -0.041 -0.032  0.123 0.143 0.038  -0.540*** 0.206  0.125 0.143  -0.502** 0.209 No. of economic shocks (past 5 yrs.) 
 
-0.051 0.239 -0.010 -0.007  -0.015 0.082 -0.005  -0.049 0.109  -0.014 0.083  -0.013 0.117 Risk perception index, polychoricpca 
 
0.321* 0.188 0.060 0.047  0.162** 0.073 0.049  -0.109 0.096  0.161** 0.073  -0.090 0.102 Familiarity, networks, information 
                  Relationship to RCB before Anidaso (in yrs.) 
 
0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000  0.029 0.018 0.009  -0.001 0.002  0.030 0.019  -0.001 0.002 Ratio of RCB clients in community  
 
-4.427 4.110 -0.828 -0.648  -2.976* 1.518 -0.906  omitted   -7.490** 2.984  1.813 2.328 Ratio of Susu clients in communtiy 
 
5.387 11.09 1.008 0.788  5.924 3.987 1.804  omitted   25.573** 10.88  -6.871 5.469 No. of group memberships 
 
-0.281 0.252 -0.053 -0.041  -0.121 0.088 -0.037  0.119 0.149  -0.121 0.088  0.114 0.156 Reads newspaper 
 
-0.661 0.592 -0.124 -0.097  -0.068 0.205 -0.021  -0.675** 0.284  -0.070 0.205  -0.631** 0.288 Often listens to news in radio 
 
0.296 0.594 0.055 0.043  -0.130 0.187 -0.040  0.560* 0.298  -0.132 0.187  0.611** 0.288 Other controls 
                  Years of schooling 
 
-0.257 0.660 -0.048 -0.038  -0.088 0.217 -0.027  -0.255 0.383  -0.090 0.217  -0.165 0.373 Female headed HH 
 
0.019 0.055 0.003 0.003  0.025 0.020 0.008  -0.046* 0.027  0.025 0.020  -0.040 0.028 Community controls / Constant 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations   671  671  398  671    671 
Left-censored observations 
 
338              Diagnostics and goodness-of-fit                                    
F-statistic 
 
(28, 642) 4.05  (28, 642) 3.43      Atrho   0.082 0.298 R-squared 
          
0.255  Lnsigma   0.402*** 0.051 
Notes: Households in the sample are weighted according to their sampling probabilities. The asterisks indicate level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Table 14: Tobit, two-part and selection model results on the participation in any insurance and the amount of total insurance premiums 
in percent of total income (log-transformed), per month 
Explanatory variables 
  
(1) Tobit   (2) Probit: 1st part    (3) OLS: 2nd part   (4) Probit: selection eq.   
(5) Heckman: 
outcome eq. 
Coeff. SE AME for E(Y|X,Y>0)  
AME for 
E(Y|X)  
 
Coeff. SE. AME   Coeff. SE.   Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE. 
Benchmark                  Lagged asset index 1.198*** 0.282 0.269 0.261  0.253** 0.108 0.089  0.212 0.143  0.223* 0.123  0.115 0.140 Lagged asset index squared -0.322** 0.129 -0.072 -0.070  -0.059 0.056 -0.021  -0.168** 0.076  -0.029 0.075    Landsize per AE (log) -0.179* 0.098 -0.040 -0.039  -0.035 0.041 -0.012  -0.046 0.052  -0.038 0.041  -0.062 0.054 Egaged in non-farm activities -0.018 0.494 -0.004 -0.004  0.116 0.193 0.041  -0.579** 0.273  0.123 0.195  -0.504* 0.289 Income from remittances (log) -0.256** 0.100 -0.058 -0.056  -0.050 0.039 -0.018  -0.148*** 0.055  -0.049 0.040  -0.144** 0.059 Income from transfers (log) 0.063 0.089 0.014 0.014  0.105** 0.042 0.037  -0.127*** 0.048  0.100** 0.043  -0.114* 0.060 Experience of loan denial -1.391** 0.599 -0.312 -0.304  -0.216 0.227 -0.077  -0.408 0.483  -0.192 0.235  -0.344 0.503 Share of ill HH members (last 12 mths.) 0.837 0.552 0.188 0.183  0.267 0.212 0.095  -0.012 0.309  0.275 0.212  0.117 0.349 Bequest motive                  Married 0.670 0.513 0.150 0.146  0.253 0.193 0.090  -0.255 0.321  0.262 0.193  -0.065 0.355 Share of kids  -1.596** 0.765 -0.358 -0.348  -0.401 0.292 -0.142  -0.691 0.496  -0.363 0.296  -0.554 0.523 Age -0.027 0.079 -0.006 -0.006  -0.060** 0.028 -0.021  0.072 0.046  -0.076** 0.035  -0.027*** 0.008 Age squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.001** 0.000 0.000  -0.001** 0.000  0.001** 0.000    Shocks and subjective risk 
                 No. of death shocks (past 5 yrs.) -0.226 0.340 -0.051 -0.049  -0.020 0.130 -0.007  -0.370** 0.159  -0.025 0.128  -0.346** 0.165 No. of economic shocks (past 5 yrs.) -0.017 0.194 -0.004 -0.004  0.057 0.080 0.020  -0.044 0.086  0.065 0.080  0.010 0.094 Risk perception index, polychoricpca  0.326* 0.167 0.073 0.071  0.092 0.070 0.033  0.032 0.095  0.089 0.071  0.069 0.108 Familiarity, networks, information                  
Relationship to RCB before Anidaso (in yrs.) 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.001 0.000  0.001 0.001  0.000 0.001  0.001 0.001 Ratio of RCB clients in community  -2.989 3.268 -0.670 -0.652  0.233 1.406 0.082  omitted   -6.951** 2.850  0.634 2.255 Ratio of Susu clients in communtiy 1.879 8.398 0.421 0.410  -4.662 3.687 -1.650  omitted   26.575** 10.350  -1.163 5.141 No. of group memberships -0.125 0.201 -0.028 -0.027  -0.141 0.091 -0.050  0.430*** 0.151  -0.127 0.094  0.432*** 0.159 Reads newspaper -0.043 0.498 -0.010 -0.009  -0.012 0.201 -0.004  -0.036 0.271  -0.010 0.201  -0.021 0.277 Often listens to news in radio 0.471 0.481 0.106 0.103  0.018 0.175 0.006  0.714*** 0.267  0.014 0.178  0.803*** 0.263 Other controls 
                 Years of schooling 0.043 0.045 0.010 0.009  -0.032* 0.019 -0.011  -0.003 0.027  -0.031 0.019  -0.014 0.032 Female headed HH -0.257 0.544 -0.058 -0.056  -0.162 0.204 -0.057  0.103 0.323  -0.161 0.204  0.082 0.352 Community controls / Constant Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Observations 671   671   421   671   671 
 Left-censored observations 165                           
Diagnostics and goodness-of-fit                                   
F-statistic  (28, 642)  4.09 
 
 (28, 642)  1.51 
    
Atrho 
 
0.421 0.400 
R-squared 
         
0,328 
  
Lnsigma 
  
0.374*** 0.109 
Notes: Dependent variable excludes employer-based pension. Estimations are based on in-region sample only. Households in the sample are weighted according to their sampling probabilities. The 
asterisks indicate level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Source: Author’s calculation.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Gender differentials in micro life insurance participation 
4.1 Introduction  
Microinsurance intends to help low-income people to manage risk and improve their living 
conditions.50 As outlined in the previous chapters, it is seen as a promising alternative to 
informal tools applied by them in response to risks that are often found to be inadequate.51 
The financial vulnerabilities associated with many of those risks, such as death, old age, or 
illness, are commonly found to be different for women and men. As women typically are 
the care givers and risk managers within the household, they are found to disproportionally 
absorb the impact of adverse shocks. Furthermore, the strategies applied to cope with risks 
tend to vary with gender-related individual and household characteristics. In this regard, it 
is possible that women are “particularly good candidates for microinsurance” (Banthia et 
al. 2009: V), if they can gain more from insurance than men.  
However, women in developing countries often face restrictions in terms of access to 
financial markets (e.g. Addai 2011; Guérin 2011; Johnson 2004). Furthermore, risk coping 
within the household may not always be a joint endeavor. Where households are strongly 
divided into male and female spheres, intermediation of resources between spouses to pool 
risk and insure one another might be limited. Thus, whether or not women can satisfy their 
demand for insurance and other financial services to secure their own livelihood and that of 
dependents is likely to be related to (gendered) imperfections in the market as well as to 
intrahousehold power relations and financial management (Banthia et al. 2009). However, 
not much is known about gender differences in insurance behavior. Rather, the typical 
approach in studies on the participation in conventional as well as in microinsurance has 
50 This chapter is based on joint work with Tilman Brück. 
51  For a definition of microinsurance see Chapter 1. 
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been to equate the interest of an individual – presumably a male household head – who 
does or does not purchase insurance coverage to that of the household as a whole.  
It is the objective of this chapter to address this gap and explore gender differentials in the 
insurance behavior between and within households in an emerging insurance market, 
focusing particularly on the case of micro life insurance. In addition, going beyond the 
examination of mere gender differences, the chapter provides a first insight into the 
question of how the decision to purchase micro life insurance responds to intrahousehold 
dynamics in couple households.  
Life insurance is a financial instrument that facilitates intertemporal and interpersonal 
transfers to protect household resources in the event of the death of the policyholder (term 
life insurance) or during his or her old age (permanent life insurance) (Villeneuve 2001). 
Hence, purchasing life insurance serves savings motives, bequest motives, and reallocation 
motives and is closely related to household and/or individual financial portfolio decisions. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the decision to purchase life insurance may be jointly 
determined with the decision to save and/or to borrow. Thus, aside of micro life insurance, 
the analysis takes into account the available formal and informal financial services 
including savings options and loans. 
There are reasons to believe that preferences of women and men on life insurance covering 
the risk of death and saving for old age differ. Women have a higher life expectancy and, if 
married, are generally younger than their husband. In addition, irrespective of their marital 
state and role as a household head or a spouse, they are typically more responsible to cater 
for the needs of children and other dependents. Thus, they are likely to have both higher 
incentives to save for future livelihood during their old age and to insure the family against 
the loss of income after the husband’s or their own death, Yet, women are often found to 
be at risk of being poor during retirement and not well covered by life insurance plans of 
their husbands or of themselves, suggesting unequal access conditions and/or conflicting 
interests on life insurance expenditures within the household (e.g. Bajtelsmit et al. 1999; 
Bernheim et al. 2003; Razavi 1999).  
The analysis uses household survey data collected in three regions of southern Ghana in 
2009 (see also Chapter 2). Multivariate probit models are estimated to investigate gender 
differentials in the uptake of micro life insurance and other formal and informal financial 
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services on the inter-household as well as the intra-household level. On the inter-household 
level, the analysis tests for the effect of different household types in order to find out 
whether households headed by a (single) woman are more or less likely to take up micro 
life insurance vis-à-vis other types of financial services as compared to couple households 
and single man households.52 On the intra-household level, the analysis tests for the effect 
of gender on the individual uptake of micro life insurance and other financial services of 
spouses in the subsample of couple households. Furthermore, using simultaneous bivariate 
probit models that allow for the correlation of spouses’ decision-making, the analysis 
examines whether the husband’s and wife’s uptake of micro life insurance responds to 
different factors and how it relates back to intrahousehold power relations among the two.  
The results show that the effect of gender on the inter-household level differs from that on 
the intra-household level. Households headed by single women are less likely than couple 
households and single men households to purchase micro life insurance, which could be a 
sign of gender discrimination in the market. However, this is disproved by the finding that 
women in couples are, in fact, more likely to purchase micro life insurance compared to 
their husbands. Yet, this is only the case in the regions dominated by matrilineal societies. 
In line with the one study that exists on both spouses’ participation in conventional life 
insurance markets (Gandolfi and Miners 1996), the uptake of micro life insurance of 
spouses in couple households responds to some different individual and household 
characteristics. Compared to the husband, the wife’s uptake is more strongly associated 
with informal non-farm activities, bad health, household wealth and a bequest motive 
towards children. Compared to the wife, the husband’s uptake responds more strongly to 
his perceived risk exposure of the household, indicating stronger pessimism on the value of 
the insurance for the man in couples. Furthermore, there is little evidence that the 
characteristics of the wife and her bargaining power within the household affect the 
husband’s decision to purchase insurance. Yet, the wife’s bargaining power significantly 
increases the probability that she purchases micro life insurance for herself. 
The chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, as reviewed in the previous 
chapters, there is now an increasing body of research on the determinants of participation 
in different types of microinsurance. Yet, there is a dearth of empirical research exploring 
gender dimensions both in conventional and microinsurance markets. This is surprising, 
52 The chapter uses the term single women households for those households, which are headed by women 
who have never been married, who are widowed, and who are divorced. 
 
                                                 
87 
 
given that women and men typically face different vulnerabilities towards risk. The results 
presented in this chapter support the view that there are gender differentials in micro life 
insurance participation, though these may be heterogeneous and rooted in the particular 
local cultural and social background. Furthermore, it is now well documented that intra-
household relations may be characterized by diverging or even conflicting interests and 
different degrees of cooperative behavior. There is an array of so-called collective models 
and respective empirical applications, which address intra-household cooperation and 
bargaining and object the assumption of shared preferences made by standard unitary 
models. The second contribution of this chapter is thus to demonstrate the relevance of 
analyzing insurance participation on a more disaggregated level within households. This 
provides insights into differing interests of spouses on insurance coverage and the role of 
intra-household power relations for respective decision outcomes. Not least, this is 
facilitated by a unique feature of the household survey used for the analysis, which 
collected insurance and other financial information from spouses in separate interviews. 
Given that studies have found that financial information is often not publicly shared within 
households and that for reported use of financial services it matters who in the household is 
asked (Cull and Scott 2010; Malapit 2012), this makes it possible to draw a more complete 
picture of the patterns of participation in the insurance and financial market under study. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 starts with an overview of the standard 
literature on the consumption of life insurance. It then continues to outline gender-related 
issues in insurance participation and intrahousehold financial management. Section 4.3 
presents the data and section 4.4 explains the empirical approach and describes major 
summary statistics of the main variables included in the analysis. Section 4.5 presents the 
empirical results followed by the conclusion in section 4.6.  
4.2 Review of the literature 
4.2.1 Demand for life insurance: The standard approach  
As described in the previous two chapters, according to the standard model of life 
insurance consumption a primary income earner purchases life insurance to maximize his 
lifetime utility and that of dependents. Thereby, the lifetime uncertainty of the primary 
income earner is removed from a household’s allocation decisions. Following from this, 
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life insurance serves the motive of saving for retirement, and a second motive of saving for 
a bequest (Pissaridis 1980; Yaari 1965). Extensions of this basic model have introduced 
subjective discount rates, bequest functions, risk attitudes, human capital and labor income 
(e.g. Fischer, 1973; Campbell, 1980; Hurd, 1989; Lewis, 1989). Furthermore, life 
insurance has been considered as a part of household asset accumulation, portfolio choice 
behavior and financing decisions.53 Especially in the context of high risk and incomplete 
insurance markets in developing countries, aside of insurance, which is not always 
available, savings and borrowing are also commonly used for the purpose of smoothing 
consumption in the wake of high income fluctuations (e.g. Deaton, 1989; Eswaran and 
Kotwal, 1989; Besley, 1995; Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Dercon, 2005; Morduch, 1995).  
It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive survey of the large 
empirical research on the purchase of conventional life insurance.54 Yet, as shown by the 
previous chapters, household participation in micro life insurance in developing countries 
may be determined to quite an extent by factors that go beyond the standard determinants 
considered in the literature on conventional life insurance. In line with the results of studies 
on other types of microinsurance (Cai et al. 2009; Giné et al. 2008; Morsink and Geurts 
2011), informal trust-building mechanisms, such as the familiarity with the insurance 
provider and the product turn out to be relevant determinants. In addition, Chapter 1 has 
shown that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the use of micro life 
insurance and the use of other formal financial services.  
While there is now detailed knowledge on many reasons why households or individuals 
hold life insurance and other financial assets, much less is known about whether there are 
gendered differences in the decisions to purchase life insurance and/or use other financial 
services and how these decisions relate to the household structure and the interaction of 
spouses. The first and only study that provides evidence on the intra-household level of 
both husbands’ and wives’ purchase of life insurance based on data from the United States 
shows that couples decide strategically on who should carry insurance depending on the 
returns to human capital and household production. Yet, their findings also indicate that 
the wife’s demand for life insurance function shows considerable differences to that of the 
53 An overview over the theoretical and empirical literature on household financing and portfolio allocation 
decisions is provided by Campbell  (2006).  
54 A review over the empirical literature on the demand for life insurance over the past 50 years is provided 
by Zietz (2003). 
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husband. Most importantly, the bequest motive seems to be relevant only for the wife’s 
purchase of life insurance. While such results provide an indication that preferences over 
life insurance of men and women differ, they do not make this point explicit.  
However, many studies have found that women, and elderly widows in particular, are at 
high  risk of being poor and not well-covered by life insurance and other financial assets 
both in industrial countries as well as in developing countries (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 
1991; Bernheim et al., 2003; Razavi, 1999; Banthia et al., 2009). In the latter countries, 
their vulnerability is often increased by unfavorable legal rights on and control over assets 
after the death of their husbands. Furthermore, women in developing countries are found to 
be keen savers. Yet, they frequently deplete accumulated savings to deal with shocks 
affecting household members. Hence, women are neither always adequately protected by 
insurance bought by their husbands (if there is one), nor those bought by themselves.  
In short, we know very little on how different characteristics of women (wives) and men 
(husbands) affect the decisions to purchase life insurance or to use other financial services. 
Furthermore, none of the above studies addresses the reasons for the observed variations of 
vulnerability and financial protection of women and men. Apart from data limitation, this 
may be due to the simplified approach of treating the household as if it was a single 
decision-maker and thus a place of common preferences.  
4.2.2 Gender and household decision making 
The development of so-called collective models that consider the dimensions of an 
intrahousehold economy has already started in the 1980s. These models deviate from the 
traditional unitary approach of treating households as if they were single individuals. 
Instead, they allow for the interaction of spouses with different preferences, who bargain 
over allocation or production decisions.55 There is now an increasing body of research on 
the influence of spouses’ relative bargaining power on various outcomes, including 
expenditures on clothing, food, alcohol or tobacco, health, and children’s needs (e.g. 
Lundberg et al. 1996; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; Thomas 1990). Bargaining models 
55 See Doss (2001) and Chiappori and Donni (2011) for a review on intrahousehold decision-making models. 
These include cooperative models with Pareto efficient allocation outcomes and non-cooperative (or 
strategic) models, which are based on the concept of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and allow for non-Pareto 
efficient outcomes. 
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include a “sharing rule”, which depends on factors that affect spouses’ relative bargaining 
power, such as spouses’ utility outside the joint arrangement (threat point) and each 
spouse’s control over household resources.56  
Only recently have studies started to explicitly take into account the mechanisms of 
intrahousehold decision-making in the analysis of insurance, saving and borrowing 
behavior. In his unique theoretical model, Browning (2000) develops a simplified non-
cooperative model on intertemporal savings decisions in a two-person household. He 
shows that husbands discount the future more than wives since the latter are typically 
younger and expect to live longer. Under the assumption of less than perfect sympathy 
between the spouses, household portfolio allocations depend strongly on the relative 
distribution of income between the two. Husbands are shown to have a higher preference 
for annuities and lower preferences for private savings and life insurance than wives. 
On the empirical side, several studies have found that retirement and overall wealth, 
investment and portfolio composition decisions differ significantly across gender and 
marital states.57 The wife’s bargaining power is found to be positively associated with 
household net worth (Friedberg and Webb 2006; Lundberg and Ward-Batts 2000), 
positively associated with the living standard during widowhood indicated by the amount 
of savings and life insurance holdings (Aura 2005; Babiarz et al. 2012), and negatively 
associated with investment in risky assets such as stocks (Bernasek and Shwiff 2001; 
Friedberg and Webb 2006; Lyons et al. 2008). In contrast, when husbands are more 
powerful, couples are found to be more likely to invest in stocks and annuities that pay off 
during their lifetime, rather than term life insurance (Euwals et al. 2004; Lyons et al. 
2008). Apart from women’s higher life expectancy and motivation to leave a bequest, such 
evidence has also been explained by the observation that women tend to bear lower risk. 
Yet, lower risk bearing among women seems to be caused to a great extent by gender-
related differences in earnings, financial knowledge and psychological factors, such as 
self-confidence (Dwyer et al. 2002; Hinz et al. 1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). 
Furthermore, Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2000) show that even in the absence of 
56 In some of the literature this outside option is considered to be the utility levels in the case of divorce, 
whereas others view the non-cooperative marriage as the outside option. 
57 A profound review over the recent literature on gender and marital differences in wealth and investment 
decisions in industrial countries is provided by Lyons et al. (2008).  
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bargaining, the characteristics of both spouses are determinants of households’ total 
savings and wealth accumulation. 
To measure relative bargaining power, studies have either used indicators of relative 
resource control such as income, age and education inequalities (Folbre 1988; Lundberg 
and Ward-Batts 2000), indicators of who in the household has the “final say” (Friedberg 
and Webb 2006; Lyons et al. 2008), or extra-household environmental parameters such as 
characteristics of the marriage market and the divorce legislation (Chiappori et al. 2002), 
and social security laws (Aura 2005; Duflo 2003). The indicators of relative resource 
control are plagued by certain disadvantages over the other two. For example, relative 
earnings reflect relative wage rates of women and men in the labor market, which jointly 
affect time allocation, savings, insurance and investment decisions (Lundberg and Ward-
Batts 2000; Lyons et al. 2008). The age differential might also be an inappropriate measure 
of bargaining power. Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2000) caution that older wives may not 
necessarily be more powerful, especially given the fact that their chances for re-marriage 
declines. Compared to  the effects of relative income and education, the effect of the age 
differential of couples on wealth and portfolio decisions has been rather inconclusive 
(Browning et al. 1994; Lundberg et al. 2003; Lundberg and Ward-Batts 2000; Lyons and 
Yilmazer 2010). 
With regard to spouses’ financial management in the context of developing countries, a 
number of studies show that women and men in couples command over different asset and 
income streams (e.g. Zwarteveen 1996, Johnson 2004), operate in separate economies (Hill 
1975), hide income and undertake financial transactions that are unknown to their spouses 
(Malapit 2012, Goldstein 1999, Ashraf 2009), and use separate and different types of 
financial services, such as loans and savings accounts (Johnson 2004, Karanja-Diejomaoh 
1978, Oppong 1971). Not least, this is caused by the fact that in developing countries 
women often face restrictions in terms of access to financial markets (Addai 2011; Guérin 
2011; Johnson 2004; Kabeer 2008). There is some evidence that the ability to overcome 
such gendered financial market imperfections by intra-household resource transfers 
strongly depends on the distribution of resources and opportunities among spouses 
(Fletschner 2009). Specifically in the case of Ghana, studies have shown that households 
do not always pool their financial resources (Doss 2001) and that the gender-related 
control over resources matters for intrahousehold allocation decisions (Ibid.; Goldstein 
1999) and production decisions (Carr 2008).  
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In sum, the evidence provided by the literature suggests that household resource protection 
and financing decisions depend on gender-specific preferences and intra-household power 
relations among spouses. Yet, there is only scarce empirical evidence on the relationship of 
spousal characteristics and intra-household power relations with conventional life 
insurance in the context of retirement saving as well as individual and household portfolio 
decisions. Respective evidence on microinsurance in general and micro life insurance in 
particular essentially does not exist. 
4.3 The survey data 
This study employs data from the survey on household risk management and insurance 
conducted in the Central region, Eastern region and Volta region of southern Ghana 
described in Chapter 2. As explained there, the survey contains 1,030 households randomly 
selected across 17 semi-urban communities within the service areas of three rural and 
community banks (RCBs), which provide the Anidaso policy from the Ghanaian Gemini 
Life Insurance Company (GLICO). The policy is similar to a universal life insurance and 
includes a term component up to the age of 65, topped up by accident benefits and 
hospitalization benefits for the policyholder. Contributions towards a so called investment 
plan and supplemental term coverage on the spouse, and up to four children can be added 
on a voluntary basis.58 The survey included communities where policyholders were located 
(in-region) and communities from the same service areas comparable in size and 
infrastructure where no policyholders were located (out-region). Microinsured households 
were oversampled and represent 50 percent of the households in the in-region. 
The survey data is particularly suitable for this study, as the questionnaire included 
sections on the individual use of financial services provided by formal and informal 
financial institutions that had to be answered separately by the household head and his wife 
in couple households. These included questions on savings and insurance held with formal 
and informal financial institutions, as well as loans taken from these during the past five 
years, which is the time period the micro life insurance had been on the market. Both 
spouses were also asked individually about their perception of various risks and risk 
58 GLICO recruits and trains sales agents who typically come from the communities where the 
Anidaso policy is offered and who are in charge of marketing the policy and communication 
between GLICO and the distributing bank. For more information about the Anidaso policy, see 
Giesbert, et al. (2011) and Steiner and Giesbert (2010).  
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attitude, as well as their integration into networks. Furthermore, in the two survey areas in 
the Central Region and the Eastern Region the population is dominated by the ethnic group 
of the Akan. Different to other ethnic groups, their families and household structures are 
based on the maternal line. Although husbands perform the role of a household head, in 
these matrilineal societies they typically have less control over their wives and children 
and household decisions than husbands in patrilineal societies, such as those in the Volta 
Region (Okali 1983). Aside of the rather imperfect measures of bargaining power of 
spouses that can be obtained from the survey data (see below), this exogenous variation of 
the sociocultural context across the regions allows for an additional insight into the gender 
and bargaining power nexus with the use of micro life insurance and other financial 
services. 
The analysis in this chapter considers data from the 685 households of the in-region to 
ensure equal access of households to the micro life insurance and other formal financial 
services, which was shown to be systematically lacking for the out-region in Chapter 2. 
From this sample, it considers only the single headed households and couple households 
with complete item responses in the financial services modules and in which the head (or 
at least one spouse in couple households) is below the age of 75. This ensures that, in 
principle, at least one of them would have been able to access the insurance scheme.59 For 
the sake of simplicity, the five couple households that are headed by a woman and 97 
households with a single head who is married are dropped from the analysis. While the 
married single headed households are not unusual, they are of quite a distinct type. In these 
households it is likely that husbands have migrated and the available “woman head” is 
presumably not the primary decision-maker in most cases. In the few married single men 
households the spouses may also have migrated. However, it may also be the case that 
these spouses still live with their family, which is not an uncommon practice especially 
among the matrilineal Akan in the Central and Eastern Region. It is impossible to trace the 
exact whereabouts of the spouses in the married single households in the data. More 
importantly, for these households the complete and necessary information for the financial 
services module of both spouses is not available. As shown in the Appendix in Table 22 on 
the distribution of the sample, this reduces the total number of observations used in the 
59 According to the few eligibility criteria for policyholders clients should be adults below the age of 65 and 
in a healthy condition, but these criteria are not always strictly met. Especially people from the older 
generation often do not know their own age. The age margin of accepted clients since market entry (five 
years prior to the survey) goes beyond 65 and includes people in their seventies today.   
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analysis to 568 households. Among these, 313 are couple households, 204 are single 
women households and 51 are single men households. The analysis on intra-household 
insurance patterns uses the subsample of 626 husbands and wives of the couple 
households.60  
According to the sampling frame, the distribution of the microinsured and non-
microinsured households in the sample is nearly balanced across the three survey regions. 
However, on the individual level, which was not considered in the sampling frame, there is 
a higher proportion of female policyholders in the Central Region as compared to the other 
two regions. On the aggregate household level, correctly weighted uptake rates are slightly 
higher in the Central and Eastern Regions than in the Volta Region (Table 22). All further 
analysis accounts for the survey probability weights. 
4.4 Empirical approach 
The primary interest in the subsequent analysis is on the effect of gender in relation to the 
different household types and power relations within the couple household subsample. In 
the first step, the analysis investigates gender-related differences in the uptake of micro life 
insurance and the use of other financial services across households by estimating a 
standard unitary model on the aggregate household level. Single women households, in 
which a woman is the most important decision-maker, are expected to be more likely to 
purchase micro life insurance, given the assumed higher motivation of women to leave a 
bequest to children and to save for retirement, which single women are responsible for on 
their own. However, the true preferences of women may not be revealed if there are gender 
disparities in the access to financial services, as outlined above. Hence, one may 
alternatively hypothesize that single women households are less likely to use micro life 
insurance and other financial services. The model includes dummy variables indicating 
single women and couple households, with single men households being the omitted 
category. In the second step, to follow up the effect of gender within the couple 
households, the data for husbands and wives are combined to form a ‘household equation’ 
of couples and include gender as an explanatory variable. Both models are estimated by 
using a multivariate probit model that is specified as follows: 
60 Cohabiting couples are also included in the sample. Though they are not spouses in legal terms, for 
simplicity reasons they are referred to as spouses, husbands and wives as well. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the insurance behavior of husbands and wives is not affected by other adult members of the household. 
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  𝑌𝑖
𝑗  = 𝑋𝑖′𝛽𝑖𝑗 + 𝐹𝑖′𝛽𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗          (8) 
With    𝑌𝑖
𝑗 =  �1   𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖𝑗 > 0      (𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑗)                 0  𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖𝑗  ≤ 0      (𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑗)   , 
where 𝑌𝑖
𝑗  is the latent propensity to use financial service j for household/individual i. 
Financial services j can be micro life insurance, formal savings, informal savings, formal 
loans or informal loans. F refers to a dummy variable indicating that the household head or 
the individual (in the household equation of the couples) is female. The vector X refers to 
control variables on the individual, household, and community level. These are derived 
mainly from the literature on the demand for life insurance and microinsurance. On the 
individual level, these include two dummy variables indicating informal and formal non-
farm employment vis-à-vis farming as the omitted category, credit constraints measured by 
the experience of a loan denial, an index on the subjective perception of risk61, a dummy 
variable indicating illness for more than one week continuously, years of schooling, age 
and the squared term of age, the number of group memberships as a way to capture the 
impact of social networks, and a dummy variable indicating enrolment in the public 
pension scheme (SSNIT). The latter variable is included as the expectation of future public 
pension benefits is likely to reduce the need for private life insurance coverage. In the 
aggregate household level estimation, individual characteristics refer to those of the 
household head. Hence, in couple households, these are not necessarily coinciding with the 
characteristics of the potential insurance holder, the owner of a savings product, or the 
borrower. On the household level, control variables include an asset index (based on 
principal component analysis on the assets held five years ago), land size, the share of 
children to measure bequest motives62, the experience of death in the past five years, the 
experience of other shocks in the past five years and the relationship to formal banks in 
years prior to the introduction of the micro life insurance, to measure the familiarity with 
and exposure to formal financial services. On the community level, the analysis controls 
for locally varying access conditions to financial services. The respective variables include 
the ratio of formal bank clients and the ratio of Susu clients prior to the introduction of the 
micro life insurance to indicate the prevalence of formal and informal financial services 
61 See Chapter 2, p. 62 for a more detailed description of the construction of the index. 
62 Using the share of children in a household instead of their total number ensures a higher variation of the 
variable and the children’s influence is then also set in relation to the number of other household members 
who potentially influence household decision-making. 
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options, respectively.63 Region dummies are also included. The intra-household level 
estimation further includes interaction terms of gender with the three regions as a source of 
exogenous variation of women’s power in the household, given that the Central and the 
Eastern region are dominated by the matrilineal ethnic group of the Akan.  
 In line with the approach taken in Chapter 1, the assumption is that the determinants of the 
decisions to use loans and savings options investigated simultaneously with the insurance 
are similar, though not necessarily of the same magnitude and direction. As mentioned 
above, under this reduced-form specification the parameters capture the combined supply 
and demand effects. The error terms of the financial services functions are allowed to be 
correlated: 
  𝐶𝑂𝑉�𝜀𝑖
𝑗 , 𝜀𝑖𝑘� =  𝜌𝑗𝑘.               (9) 
Attributing a gender effect in the couple households only on a gender dummy variable is 
not fully convincing. This approach assumes that spouses make financial choices 
independently. As outlined above, however, recent evidence rather suggests that the 
choices of individuals in couple households at least partly also reflect the preferences of 
the spouse.  
In the third step, a more complete unitary model of the use of micro life insurance is 
estimated, which includes individual characteristics of both spouses. In line with Gandolfi 
and Miners (1996) and Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2000), it is expected that even in the 
absence of bargaining, characteristics of both spouses should affect their individual and 
joint insurance behavior. This part of the analysis focuses only on the decision to purchase 
micro life insurance, primarily because the number of observations in each of the financial 
service categories becomes too limited to obtain meaningful results from multivariate 
probit estimations.64 Different specifications are used to estimate this model. Firstly, the 
following simple probit model is specified on the aggregate household level:  
  𝑌𝑖  = 𝑋𝑖′𝑓𝛽𝑖𝑓 + 𝑋𝑖′𝑐𝛽𝑖𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖′ℎ𝛽𝑖ℎ +  𝑋𝑖′𝑤𝛽𝑖𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖      (10) 
63 As explained in the previous chapters, Susu describes well-known and widespread informal mechanisms of 
savings and loan taking in Ghana, including individual savings collectors, rotating savings and credit 
associations, and savings and credit “clubs” run by an operator. 
64 Furthermore, it would become too complex to additionally take into account the potentially simultaneous 
nature of spousal decision-making in the joint estimation of all financial services.  
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With    𝑌𝑖 =  �1   𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖 > 0      (𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)                 0  𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖  ≤ 0      (𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)   , 
where the vectors (𝑋𝑖𝑓,𝑋𝑖𝑐 ,𝑋𝑖ℎ,𝑋𝑖𝑤) describe the characteristics of the household, the 
community, the husband and the wife, including the same variables introduced above. 
Secondly,  individual- level equations of both husbands and wives are estimated in a 
simultaneous framework, similar to the above case of the simultaneous choices of different 
financial services. This has rarely been done in the literature (e.g. Lyons and Yilmazer 
2010), but is the appropriate approach if spouses’ insurance equations are endogenous to 
one another and unobserved factors affect both spouses’ ability and willingness to purchase 
micro life insurance. At the same time, it allows the spouses’ individual position in the 
financial market as well as the determinants of the decision to use micro life insurance to 
be different. Thus, function (2) is estimated as a bivariate probit model including two 
equations for husbands and wives that follows a bivariate normal distribution. As above in 
the multivariate probit model, the error terms of the equations are allowed to be correlated: 
     𝐶𝑂𝑉�𝜀𝑖𝑚 , 𝜀𝑖𝑓� =  𝜌𝑚𝑓,      (11) 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑚and 𝜀𝑖
𝑓 capture unobserved demand shocks of spouses in couple i. If spouses 
have the same unobserved access conditions, perfect information and share preferences 
then ρ would be close to 1. On the contrary, the closer ρ is to zero, the more disconnected 
is the access and insurance behavior of the spouses. In addition to the bivariate joint 
probabilities, conditional probabilities can be defined to assess the probability that wives or 
husbands purchase micro life insurance conditional on their spouses’ insurance status.  
The fourth step is to take an even closer look into the intrahousehold dimension. The 
models of insurance participation on the aggregate level of the couple, as well as on the 
individual level of husband and wife are augmented by including variables suggested by 
the household bargaining approach.65 In line with some of the above literature it is 
expected that it is determined by the relative control of spouses over household resources. 
Following other authors (e.g. Babiarz et al. 2012; Fletschner 2009; Lundberg and Ward-
Batts 2000; Lyons and Yilmazer 2010), bargaining power is measured by 1) the share of 
65 It is important to note that it is beyond this study’s scope to test the possibility of non-Pareto efficiencies 
predicted by the non-cooperative household models, and thus address welfarist objectives. 
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husband’s and wife’s income in total household income, 2) the age differential between 
husbands and wives, and 3) the education differential as indicated by the years of 
schooling.66 It is important to caution again that while relative income seems to be the 
most obvious indicator of relative resource control, it is likely to be strongly correlated 
with unobserved determinants of the decision to purchase insurance. As the age differential 
might also not be a reliable indicator of decision-making power in a couple, the relative 
education is the preferred proxy of bargaining power in this analysis, as it serves as a more 
long-term proxy of the husband’s and the wife’s potential earnings. Overall, the simple 
collective models enable only an initial insight into the question of how intrahousehold 
power relations influence insurance decisions.  
4.5 Descriptive statistics 
4.5.1 Dependent variables 
Table 15 shows the use of financial services across couple households, single men and 
single women households and of spouses within couple households. These exclude the 
retirement plan of the SSNIT that is mandatory for formal sector employees. An estimated 
3.0 percent of all households in the survey areas have purchased micro life insurance, 
which is very low. Still higher is the 6.8 percent uptake of conventional life insurance. The 
proportion of couples who have either micro life insurance or conventional life insurance is 
higher than that of single women and men, with 3.7 and 8.3 percent respectively. 
Interestingly, a higher proportion of wives have purchased micro life insurance as a 
principal compared to their husbands (2.1 to 1.9 percent), while there are more policy 
holders of conventional life insurance among husbands (7.0 to 1.2 percent).67  
Compared to micro and conventional life insurance, the use of other formal and informal 
financial services is much higher across all household types. The unconditional evidence 
66 As variables 2) and 3) increase, they indicate rising values for the wife compared to the husband. In other 
words, the age differential, for example, shows how many years younger or older the wife is compared to the 
husband. 
67 Note that participation rates are quite different with regard to public health insurance (NHIS), for instance, 
that is also available for the low income population. With 42.67 percent the participation of households in the 
NHIS is much higher. On the individual level, in the total sample the share of female spouses being a 
member of the NHIS is higher than the share of household heads (on average 50.72 to 40.31 percent, 
respectively). 
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shows that couples use more of any of the financial services. Using informal financial 
services is more common among single women compared to single men. This gender 
pattern is supported to some extent within couples, in which a higher proportion of wives 
use informal savings than husbands. Informal and formal loans, in particular, are most 
common among husbands and single women. 
It is important to note that the categories of informal savings and informal loans comprise 
of only institutional services, including those offered by Susu schemes, financial groups, 
moneylenders and other institutions. Informal options outside any institutional framework, 
such as savings at home or loans obtained from family or friends, are not considered since 
the latter information is not available in the data. The prevalence of informal financial risk 
management may thus be much higher than suggested here. The formal savings and loans 
categories include savings held at and loans obtained from MFI’s, RCBs, commercial 
banks, cooperatives and funds established for formal sector employees, and a remainder 
category.  
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Table 15: Distribution of financial services across households and individuals 
Financial service 
Households Spouses in couples 
Weighted % 
 
Weighted % 
  
Couple Single men Single women All 
 
Husbands Wives All 
Life insurance 11.6 5.4 5.7 9.5 
 
8.8 3.3 6.1 
 
Micro life insurance 
(Anidaso) 3.7 3.1 2.2 3.0 
 
1.9 2.1 2.0 
 
Conventional life insurance 8.3 2.3 3.7 6.8 
 
7.1 1.2 4.2 
Formal savings 68.1 38.7 34.3 49.3 
 
55.8 32.4 44.1 
 
MFI 1.6 5.7 0.1 1.8 
 
0.5 1.2 0.8 
 
RCB 48.9 26.8 24.6 35.1 
 
35.4 23.6 29.5 
 
Commercial bank 29.4 12.6 12.0 18.8 
 
25.6 8.3 16.9 
 
Cooperative/pension fund 3.4 0.1 1.8 2.6 
 
3.0 1.3 2.1 
 
Other 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 
 
0.4 0.0 0.2 
Informal savings 23.7 7.5 14.1 18.0 
 
8.0 17.7 12.9 
 
Susu 17.3 4.9 10.2 13.2 
 
4.5 14.8 9.6 
 
Financial group 6.4 2.6 3.9 4.9 
 
3.5 2.9 3.2 
Formal loans 31.5 14.0 16.9 24.2 
 
24.1 11.7 17.9 
 
MFI 5.1 0.2 1.4 3.0 
 
4.3 1.2 2.7 
 
RCB 17.3 9.1 10.7 14.6 
 
11.1 7.7 9.4 
 
Commercial bank 11.6 4.7 4.4 7.5 
 
10.8 2.0 6.4 
 
Cooperative 1.8 0.0 0.9 1.1 
 
1.0 0.8 0.9 
Informal loans 10.5 2.6 10.0 10.0 
 
8.7 3.9 6.3 
 
Money lender 4.3 0.0 1.9 2.8 
 
2.5 2.2 2.4 
 
Susu 1.5 0.0 2.0 1.7 
 
1.0 0.4 0.7 
 
Financial group 3.8 0.2 5.0 3.4 
 
3.1 1.2 2.2 
 
Other 2.1 2.4 1.2 2.5 
 
2.1 0.0 1.1 
Total sample (N) 313 51 204 568 
 
313 313 626 
Notes: Includes only couples with complete information and non-married single men/women Source: Authors’ 
calculation  
 
Table 16 provides descriptive evidence on the prevalent motivations of purchasing micro 
life insurance. The majority of men and women report that they have purchased the policy 
for the relatively unspecific reason “to secure against future shocks”. “Protection for the 
family in case of accident or death” comes second and is mostly mentioned by husbands, 
followed by the option “to save for future livelihood”. Hence, the majority of clients seem 
to view micro life insurance as a means of precautionary savings to deal with any type of 
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future risk. This interpretation is supported by evidence obtained from focus group 
discussions in the Central Region, where many participants view the micro life insurance 
rather as a savings instruments and are highly unsure about the exact benefits it provides. 
As a consequence, they regard it as a panacea for any difficulties they face in life.68 
Table 16: Motivation of individuals to purchase micro life insurance across 
household types 
 Couple households  
Single headed 
households  All 
 
Percent 
 
Percent 
 
Percent 
 
Husbands Wives 
 
Single men Single women 
  
To secure against future shocks (n=169) 45.5 70.3  65.4 61.2  59.8 
To protect family in case of 
accident/death (n=68) 31.0 20.8  16.7 20.5  23.4 
To obtain collateral for loans (n=15) 8.0 1.3  5.5 5.7  4.9 
To save for future livelihood (n=25) 11.3 3.7  12.5 11.1  8.8 
Other (non-genuine purpose) (n=8) 4.2 4.0  0.0 1.5  3.0 
Total (n=285) 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 
Notes: The figures represent unweighted percent of households in the sample. Source: Authors’ calculation  
 
4.5.2 Individual, household and community characteristics 
Table 17 provides descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in the analysis. 
Not surprisingly, single women and wives earn less income from economic activities and 
attended school for fewer years than single men and husbands.  
68 The distribution of self-reported purchase reasons of conventional life insurance shows a very similar 
pattern. However, the number of observations across the considered household types is too limited to offer 
meaningful results. 
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Table 17: Summary statistics 
 
Couple households 
 
Single headed households 
 
All 
Variables Husbands 
 
Wives 
 
Single men 
 
Single women 
     
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
 
Mean Min Max 
Individual characteristics 
                Income from economic activities per month (GHC) 156.61 (12.16) 
 
78.66 (7.74) 
 
93.22 (18.43) 
 
91.76 (10.97) 
 
110.71 (5.71 0 900 
Informal non-farm employmenta 0.4 (0.04) 
 
0.7 (0.04) 
 
0.62 (0.09) 
 
0.67 (0.04)) 
 
0.59 (0.02) 0 1 
Formal non-farm employmenta 0.26 (0.04) 
 
0.1 (0.02) 
 
0.17 (0.07) 
 
0.13 (0.03)) 
 
0.17 (0.02) 0 1.00 
Experience of loan deniala 0.1 (0.02) 
 
0.06 (0.02) 
 
0.17 (0.07) 
 
0.03 (0.01) 
 
0.07 (0.01) 0 1 
Risk perception index -0.18 (0.09) -1.09 (0.06) 0.05 (0.19) 0.04 (0.1) -0.37 (0.05) -1.78 3.33 
Illness (last 12 mths)a 0.21 (0.03)  0.18 (0.03)  0.08 (0.05)  0.37 (0.04)  0.23 (0.02) 0 1 
Years of schooling 10.49 (0.41)  7.14 (0.42)  8.58 (0.85)  6.83 (0.48  8.38 (0.24 0 26 
Age 46.61 (1.14)  39.57 (1.01)  46.98 (3.79)  49.94 (1.27)  45.39 (0.64 19 83 
No. of group memberships 0.91 (0.06) 
 
0.97 (0.06) 
 
1.22 (0.48) 
 
0.88 (0.07 
 
0.95 (0.04) 0 10 
Enrolled in pension scheme (SSNIT) 0.16 (0.03) 
 
0.05 (0.02) 
 
0.25 (0.08) 
 
0.08 (0.02) 
 
0.12 (0.01) 0 1 
Household characteristics 
                Total household income per month (GHC. per adult equivalent) 80.55 (6.03) 
 
80.55 (6.03) 
 
150.53 (30.05) 
 
67.44 (6.01) 
 
83.68 (3.70) 2 630 
Total value of household assets (GHC) 840.09 (192.63) 
 
840.09 (192.63) 
 
919.15 (263.39) 
 
527.21 (166.91) 
 
782.77 (95.13) 0 18637.67 
Land size per AE  5.85 (0.82) 
 
5.85 (0.82) 
 
8.64 (3.85) 
 
3.19 (0.93) 
 
5.06 (0.47) 0 98 
Share of children  0.43 (0.02) 
 
0.43 (0.02) 
 
0.06 (0.03) 
 
0.3 (0.03) 
 
0.37 (0.01) 0.00 0.86 
Death experience (past 5 yrs.) a 0.12 (0.03) 
 
0.12 (0.03) 
 
0.27 (0.09) 
 
0.32 (0.04) 
 
0.2 (0.02) 0 1 
Other shock experience(past 5 yrs. ) a  0.5 (0.04) 
 
0.5 (0.04) 
 
0.33 (0.09) 
 
0.4 (0.04) 
 
0.46 (0.02) 0 1 
Relationship to banks (yrs) 2.9 (0.47) 
 
2.9 (0.47) 
 
1.55 (0.71) 
 
1.33 (0.41) 
 
2.27 (0.23) 0 37 
Community characteristics 
                Ratio of bank clients (5 year lag) 0.67 (0.01) 
 
0.67 (0.01) 
 
0.7 (0.03) 
 
0.65 (0.01) 
 
0.67 (0.01) 0.48 0.88 
Ratio of Susu clients (5 year lag) 0.17 (0.01) 
 
0.17 (0.01) 
 
0.19 (0.01) 
 
0.16 (0.01) 
 
0.17 (0.00) 0.01 0.26 
Relative characteristics husband/wifeb 
                Wife's income differential -0.28 (0.03) 
 
-0.28 (0.03) 
       
-0.28 (0.03) -1 1 
Wife's age differential -7.04 (0.40) 
 
-7.04 (0.40) 
       
-7.04 (0.40) -35 13 
Wife's education differential -1.64 -0.19 
 
-1.64 -0.19 
       
-1.64 -0.19 -10 8 
Husband has 3+  years more education (one std dev) a 0.40 (0.04) 
 
0.40 (0.04) 
       
0.40 (0.04) 0 1 
Total sample (N) 313 
 
313 
 
51 
 
204 
 
881 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a: Dummy variable where 1 = yes; b: only measured in couple households.  Source: Authors’ calculation.  
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The proportion of single women and wives in informal non-farm employment is higher 
than that of husbands and single men, but the opposite is true with regard to employment in 
the formal non-farm sector. With a mean age of 50 years, single women are slightly older 
than the average person in the sample (48 years). In contrast, wives are 40 years old on 
average and 7 years younger than their husbands. Interestingly, single men seem to be most 
active in social and financial groups and they are most likely to be enrolled in the SSNIT. 
In terms of their subjective exposure to risk, single women and men feel most exposed and 
husbands feel least exposed to risk, as measured by a respective risk perception index. 
Finally, with 6 months on average, husbands and single men are those with the longest 
relationship to formal banks prior to the market entry of the Anidaso policy.   
Regarding the household characteristics, the descriptive statistics indicate that single men 
households are richest and single women households are poorest in terms of assets and 
land. Unsurprisingly, the share of children is highest among couples and single women 
with 43 and 30 percent, respectively, and lowest among single men with only 2 percent. In 
terms of shocks experienced by households during the past five years it is not surprising 
that the experience of a death in the household is considerably higher among single women 
and single men households. Other shocks, however, are more often experienced among 
couples. The descriptive statistics on our bargaining power proxies measured in couple 
households show that the wife’s share in total household income is, on average, 28 
percentage points lower than the husband’s, she is 7 years younger and went to school for 
1.64 fewer years. The community level characteristics are similar across the considered 
household types.  
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Inter-household comparison 
This section addresses gender differentials in the use of micro life insurance and formal 
savings and informal savings options as well as formal and informal loans on the aggregate 
household level. The main interest of the analysis lies in the effect of the different 
household types considered, i.e. single women households and couple households in 
comparison to the omitted category of single men households. Table 18 presents the results 
with respect to these variables of a multivariate probit model that simultaneously estimates 
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the use of any of these five financial services. The full model including all individual, 
household and community control variables is shown in the Appendix, Table 24. The 
estimated correlation coefficients shown in the bottom line of the table confirm the earlier 
results on the Central Region of the multivariate probit model presented in Chapter 2. The 
residuals of the estimated functions are significantly correlated for the formal financial 
services, indicating that they are jointly influenced by the same or similar unobservables. 
Hence, applying a multivariate estimation framework is appropriate and improves 
estimates for any of the five equations as compared to the univariate alternative. There is 
no significant correlation of the informal services functions with micro life insurance. 
Thus, there seems to be no substitution effect between these options and micro life 
insurance. The mean of the predicted values from all financial services equations differ 
from the actual sample mean by 1.2 to 12.0 percent, indicating a good fit of the household-
level regression.    
The results show a negative effect of the dummy variables indicating single women 
households and, surprisingly, also couple households in the micro life insurance equation 
relative to the reference group of single men households. Hence, single men are the group 
that is most likely to purchase the micro life insurance, which is surprising given that they 
neither have a wife, nor many children living with them. On average, single women 
households are 11 percentage points and couple households are 10 percentage points less 
likely to purchase micro life insurance as compared to single men households. With regard 
to the couple households the primary motive to purchase micro life insurance might thus 
not be reallocation and household resource protection in favor of a surviving spouse. Yet 
the effect is statistically significant only for single women households. 
However, as compared to the reference group of the single men households, single women 
and couple households are more likely to use any of the other financial services. This could 
point out that, in fact, single men households face higher barriers to access both formal and 
informal savings and loans options and use micro life insurance as an alternative coping 
strategy, or as a way to gain reputation at the bank to qualify for a loan. As compared to 
the other groups of households, couple households are significantly more likely to use 
formal and informal savings. Single women households are significantly more likely to use 
informal loans, though the effect does not appear to be economically relevant. As a 
robustness check, the same analysis was performed with the insurance category including 
also conventional life insurance. The effect of the single women household dummy is still 
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negative in the insurance equation, but loses significance (results not shown). Thus, if at all 
these results point to a higher access barrier of (single) women to formal financial services 
this, surprisingly, seems to be more pronounced in the case of micro life insurance as 
compared to life insurance in general.  
Table 18: Multivariate probit model results on the effect of gender and household 
type on households’ uptake of micro life insurance and other financial 
services 
 Single woman household Couple household Observed uptake rates 
Predicted 
uptake rates 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Percent Percent 
Micro life insurance -0.441** (0.198) -0.111 -0.319 (0.198) -0.096 3.0 4.7 
Formal savings 0.031 (0.337) 0.007 0.871** (0.369) 0.210 51.1 63.1 
Informal savings 0.382 (0.481) 0.000 0.926** (0.459) 0.000 13.2 19.4 
Formal loans 0.290 (0.489) 0.062 0.314 (0.467) 0.058 23.8 31.1 
Informal loans 1.618** (0.809) 0.000 1.380* (0.790) 0.000 9.6 10.8 
Observations 568 
Estimated corr. 
coefficients 
p21= 0.449*** (0.136) p41=0.369*** (0.112) p51=-0.109 (0.144) p32= -0.301** (0.128) 
p42=0.217 (0.140) p43= -0.179 (0.130) p53= 0.409** (0.172) p54= -0.381*** (0.119) 
Note: The model also includes individual, household and community controls. Robust standard errors are 
given in parentheses. The model also includes a constant and corrects for the sampling probability weights. 
Wald test of the model: Χ2 (115) = 480.78; p = 0.0000). The asterisks indicate level of significance: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
The effects of the head’s individual, the household and the community characteristics are 
in line with those presented in the previous two chapters (Table 24). The largest signficant 
marginal effects are obtained for the employment and loan denial variables. The household 
head’s employment in formal or informal non-farm work rather than farm work increases 
uptake of micro life insurance by 12 percentage points in both cases. Experience of a loan 
denial increases the probability to purchase micro life insurance, as well as to use formal 
savings and informal loans. As explained in the previous chapters, informal loans are a 
substitute for formal ones (as also indicated by the negative correlation coefficient of the 
formal and informal loan functions), whereas life insurance and formal savings are options 
that can serve as collateral. Large positive and significant average marginal effects are also 
obtained for the variables indicating the share of children in the household, thus signaling a 
bequest motive in the purchase decision, and previous shock experience other than death 
during the past five years. Shock experience may create a higher wariness and wish to 
secure household resources by purchasing insurance, especially when people have the 
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vague imagination that the policy could help with regard to various future shocks as 
suggested by self-reported reasons to purchase the insurance presented above.  
4.6.2 Intra-household comparison  
This section addresses the effect of gender within the couple households on the use of 
micro life insurance and formal savings and informal savings options. Furthermore, it deals 
with the differences of husbands’ and wives’ insurance participation functions and the role 
of intra-household power relations in these. 
4.6.2.1 Gender effect 
Table 19 shows the results of the same multivariate probit model that is now estimated on 
the individual level of the combined dataset of husbands and wives with respect to the key 
variable of interest. These include the gender of the individual as well as gender and region 
interaction terms. As explained above, the differences in matrilineal versus patrilineal 
societies across the three survey regions introduce a source of exogenous variation in 
women’s power in decision-making in the household.69 There are serious limitations to 
calculate correct marginal effects of interaction terms in a multivariate probit model. In 
order to gain an insight into the true magnitude and significance of the interaction effects 
the average marginal effects of the interaction terms displayed in the table are obtained 
from simple probit models on each of the financial services.70 The estimated correlation 
coefficients of the error terms of the five equations in the multivariate probit model are of 
the same sign and significance as in the household-level regression. The model fit of the 
intra-household regression even improves, with predicted values from all financial services 
equations that differ from the actual sample mean by 1.2 to 5.9 percent. 
Remarkably, the negative gender effect suggested by the inter-household comparison is not 
generally confirmed for couple households. Rather, there are significant differences across 
69 When including interaction terms of the different household types with regions in the household-level 
regression above, these show the same direction of effects with regard to single women households across the 
different regions, but these turn out not significant. 
70 These are calculated using Stata’s inteff command. There are no available routines in Stata or other 
statistical programmes for calculating the correct marginal effects and standard errors for interaction terms in 
a multivariate probit model. Using standard bootstrapping methods to calculate them manually turns out too 
expensive in computational terms. 
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the three survey regions. Contrary to the lower likelihood of single woman heads to use 
micro life insurance, wives in the Central Region are 6.1 percentage points and wives in 
the Eastern Region are 3.3 percentage points more likely to purchase micro life insurance 
than husbands, relative to the reference group of wives in the Volta Region. These are 
fairly large magnitudes, given that the low predicted (and actual) uptake of 3.4 percent (2.1 
percent). These results suggest that due to the higher power status of wives in the Central 
and Eastern Region the incentives for husbands to purchase insurance protection for the 
spouse and children could be lower; and wives ability (or necessity) to purchase insurance 
on their own to secure their livelihood during old age or leave a bequest could be higher.  
Table 19: Multivariate probit model results on the effect of gender on spouses’ 
uptake of micro life insurance and other financial services 
  Female Female*Central Region 
Female*Eastern 
Region 
Observed 
uptake 
rates 
Predicted 
uptake 
rates 
 
mvprobit 
est. probit est. 
mvprobit 
est. 
probit 
est. 
mvprobit 
est. 
probit 
est. Percent Percent 
  Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME     
Micro life 
insurance -0.599*** -0.027*** 0.727*** 0.061** 0.433* 0.033* 2.1 3.4 
 (0.199) (0.009) (0.249) (0.315) (0.254) (0.026)   
Formal savings -0.827*** -0.224*** 0.215 0.080 0.232 0.051 44.1 50.0 
 (0.296) (0.081) (0.404) (0.123) (0.390) (0.123)   
Informal savings 0.304 0.050 -0.082 -0.019 -0.152 -0.006 12.9 14.1 
 (0.387) (0.059) (0.480) (0..074) (0.535) (0.108)   
Formal loans -0.567 -0.107* -0.284 0.025 0.478 0.116 17.9 22.0 
 (0.380) (0..065) (0.535) (0.117) (0.440) (0..110)   
Informal loans 0.704 0.044 -1.349** -0.119* -1.267* -0.096 6.3 7.3 
 (0.446) (0.039) (0.532) (0..101) (0.647) (0..090)   
Observations 626 
Estimated corr. 
coefficients 
p21= 0.403*** (0.117) p31= 0.123 (0.132) p41= 0.502*** (0.104) p51= 0.090 (0.131) 
p32= -0.189 (0.142) p52= -0.556*** (0.177) p43=  -0.165 (0.138) p53= 0.406* (0.208) 
p54= -0.075 (0.135)    
Note: The model also includes individual, household and community controls. Robust standard errors are 
given in parentheses. The model also includes a constant and corrects for the sampling probability weights. 
Wald test of the model: Χ2 (110) = 584.95; p = 0.0000). The asterisks indicate level of significance: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
4.6.2.2 Husbands’ and wives’ insurance participation and bargaining power 
While apparently being an important determinant of the insurance behavior in couple 
households, attributing a gender effect only on a gender dummy variable is not fully 
convincing as it assumes that spouses make financial choices independently. As outlined 
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above, however, the choices of individuals in couple households may also reflect the 
preferences of the spouse (Lyons et al. 2008). Table 20 shows the results of a bivariate 
probit model that is simultaneously estimated for husbands and wives and includes both 
spouses’ characteristics in each equation.71 As a robustness check the estimation  is 
repeated for only those husbands and wives, which have not covered their spouse under 
their own policy (see Table 26 in the Appendix).72 This eliminates the bias that might arise 
from the fact that spouses are less likely to purchase micro life insurance if they are already 
covered by the other one’s policy, provided that they are aware of that coverage and only 
interested in the term life component of it and not in the investment plan. In fact, during 
fieldwork it became clear that spouses were not always informed about each other’s 
insurance status and the respective policy details. Overall, the results are nearly the same as 
those of the bivariate probit model based on the total sample of couples. 
The results of the bivariate probit model show that, as expected, the error terms of the 
spouses’ equations are significantly correlated with a coefficient of ρ = 0.73. Thus, 
unobserved characteristics affect both spouses’ insurance equation and their choices are 
jointly determined at least to some extent. Very similar results are obtained when 
performing the same analysis for any life insurance purchased (including conventional life 
insurance) though the correlation coefficient becomes somewhat smaller (Table 27 in the 
Appendix). In fact, the figures in the bottom row of Table 20 indicate that husbands are 30 
percent more likely to be insured if the wife is also insured. Wives are 25 percent more 
likely to be insured if the husband is also insured. These results support that wives are 
individually more likely to purchase micro life insurance on their own, but the conditional 
probabilities indicate cooperation and joint willingness to protect future household 
resources and provide for their old age among some of the spouses.  
In line with Lyons and Yilmazer’s (Ibid.) findings on the investment for retirement 
behavior of US American couples, only few characteristics of the spouse are decisive for 
each spouse’s marginal probability to purchase micro life insurance.  
71 As mentioned above the use of micro life insurance of husbands and wives cannot be estimated in a 
simultaneous framework with other financial services due to the limited number of observations in each of 
the respective categories. 
72 As shown in Table 23 in the appendix, 86 percent of the couples in the sample have not covered their 
spouse under their policy. 
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Table 20: Probit model results on spouses’ uptake of micro life insurance  
 Explanatory variables Husband  Wife 
 
AME AME 
Individual characteristics of husband      
Informal non-farm employment 0.014 (0.009) 
 
0.014 (0.010) 
Formal non-farm employment 0.019* (0.010) 
 
0.007 (0.012) 
Experience of loan denial 0.017* (0.010) 
 
0.007 (0.013) 
Risk perception index -0.006* (0.004) 
 
-0.007 (0.005) 
Illness (last 12 mths) 0.007 (0.008) 
 
-0.003 (0.010) 
Years of schooling -0.001 (0.001) 
 
-0.002** (0.001) 
Age 0.003 (0.003) 
 
0.002 (0.003) 
Age squared -0.000 (0.000) 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
No. of group memberships 0.006 (0.004) 
 
0.003 (0.005) 
Enrolled in pension scheme (SSNIT) 0.015* (0.009) 
 
0.013 (0.012) 
Individual characteristics of wife 
    
 
Informal non-farm employment -0.004 (0.008) 
 
0.033** (0.016) 
Formal non-farm employment 0.005 (0.014) 
 
0.038* (0.020) 
Experience of loan denial -0.030** (0.014) 
 
0.032** (0.016) 
Risk perception index 0.004* (0.006) 
 
-0.001 (0.008) 
Illness (last 12 mths) -0.001 (0.009) 
 
0.026*** (0.009) 
Years of schooling -0.001 (0.001) 
 
0.002 (0.001) 
Age 0.000 (0.002) 
 
0.006* (0.003) 
Age squared -0.000 (0.000) 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
No. of group memberships -0.002 (0.005) 
 
0.003 (0.006) 
Enrolled in pension scheme (SSNIT) -0.045* (0.023) 
 
-0.025 (0.021) 
Household characteristics 
    
 
Asset index (5 year lag) -0.003 (0.005) 
 
0.012* (0.006) 
Asset index squared  -0.003 (0.003) 
 
-0.004 (0.003) 
Land size per AE  -0.000 (0.000) 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
Share of children  0.016 (0.017) 
 
0.023* (0.020) 
Death experience (past 5 yrs.) 0.008 (0.009) 
 
-0.002 (0.010) 
Other shock experience (past 5 yrs.)  0.015** (0.006) 
 
-0.008 (0.008) 
Relationship to banks (yrs) 0.002*** (0.001) 
 
0.001 (0.001) 
Community characteristics 
    
 
Ratio of bank clients (5 year lag) 0.015 (0.033) 
 
0.055 (0.043) 
Ratio of Susu clients (5 year lag) 0.147 (0.110) 
 
-0.060 (0.130) 
Central Region -0.011 (0.011) 
 
0.051*** (0.016) 
Eastern Region 0.022 (0.016) 
 
0.023 (0.018) 
Observations 313 
 
313 
Estimated correlation coefficient 0.730*** (0.134) 
Log Likelihood -1102.6861 
Chi2 112.46 
Prob > chi2 0.0001 
Probability husband insured if wife insured 33.9 
Probability wife insured if husband insured 29.3 
Probability husband insured if wife non-insured 3.5 
Probability wife insured if husband non-insured 4.2 
Notes: The model includes a constant and corrects for the sampling probability weights. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
The probability that the husband purchases micro life insurance increases with his own 
enrolment, but decreases with the wife’s enrolment in the SSNIT. This could be an 
indication that the savings for retirement motive in the husband’s decision to purchase life 
insurance is greater than the motive to reallocate resources in favor of the spouse, 
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especially when she is already covered by alternative protection. The wife’s purchase 
probability significantly decreases with her husband’s level of education. This finding 
could be explained by an opposition of higher educated husbands to their wives spending 
money on life insurance on their own, given that husbands are unlikely to benefit from the 
insurance due to their lower likelihood to outlive their wives.  
In line with Gandolfi and Miner’s (1996) study on the life insurance purchasing behavior 
of US American couples, the findings also indicate some outstanding differences of the 
wife’s decision to purchase micro life insurance relative to the husband’s. Most notably, 
the variable indicating bad health during the past 12 months is significant and positive only 
in the wife’s equation. Similarly, compared to husbands, the household’s level of wealth 
and the share of children (signaling a bequest motive) significantly increase only the 
probability that the wife purchases micro life insurance, but not the husband. The average 
marginal effects of the non-farm employment variables and credit constraints are 
significant and positive in both spouses’ equations, but the effects are 1-2 percentage 
points larger for the wife. The subjective risk perception index turns out to have a 
significant negative effect only on the husband’s uptake of micro life. In line with the 
argumentation in Chapter 3, risk pessimists may be highly reserved towards the insurance, 
when there is limited experience with the microinsurance product and the providing 
institutions. Rather than being more likely to purchase insurance because of their perceived 
higher risk exposure, they might think that taking up a policy is itself too risky an endeavor 
given their uncertainties and limited funds to spend. The results further support the 
regionally heterogeneous gender effect identified above. The dummy variables indicating 
the household’s residence in the Central Region and the Eastern Region show a positive 
effect on the probability that the wife holds a policy. Though, the effect is only statistically 
significant for the Central Region, but not on the probability that the husband holds one.   
Table 21 provides estimates from the simple collective models at the aggregate household 
level of the couples as well as on the individual level of husbands and wives. These include 
the relative characteristics of husbands and wives presented above as measures of relative 
bargaining power. The results of this part of the analysis has to be treated with caution, 
given that the applied proxies of bargaining power are not strictly exogenous factors 
indicating spouses’ individual threat point of the utility outside marriage. More detailed 
results including the estimates of the most important control variables in the different 
specifications are provided in Tables 28 and 29 in the appendix. 
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The effect of the wife’s share of current income from economic activities in total 
household income included in the first specification is significant and positive in the 
equation of the couple on the aggregate level and (much more) in the wife’s equation, but 
not in that of the husband. In contrast, the husband’s contribution to total household 
income included in the second specification has neither a positive effect in the equation on 
the aggregate level of the couple nor in his own, but it has a significant positive effect 
again in the wife’s equation. This result points to a strong overall income effect on the 
wife’s probability to purchase micro life insurance (which is underlined by the effects of 
household wealth in the model as well as the unitary bivariate model specifications above). 
Hence, wives from poorer households might be comparatively less powerful and also less 
able to afford purchasing a micro life insurance. However, current income is supposedly 
endogenous with respect to life insurance. Therefore, the variable is not included in the 
following specifications.  
Instead, the third specification of the model includes the age differential of the wife. While 
this variable is, again, not the preferred proxy of bargaining power, it neither appears to 
have a significant effect on insurance status of the couple at the aggregate level, nor on the 
insurance status of the husband or the wife at the individual level. Yet, the set of age-
category dummy variables included as controls (Tables 28 and 29) show that husbands in 
the upper age groups are significantly less likely (up to 10 percentage points) to purchase 
micro life insurance, whereas wives in the upper age groups become significantly more 
likely to purchase micro life insurance (up to 11 percentage points). This supports the 
notion that husbands are less inclined to purchase micro life insurance as compared to 
wives, given that wives are likely to outlive them. 
Finally, the third and fourth specification tests for the effect of the preferred measures of 
bargaining power indicating spouses’ education differential. Controlling for levels of 
education of both spouses, the wife’s education differential in years shows a significant 
positive effect on the couple’s equation on the aggregate level, as well as on the wife’s 
equation, though the estimates are significant only at the 10 percent level. In line with this 
finding, an alternative variable indicating that the husband has been to school for at least 3 
years longer than the wife (which is more than one standard deviation of the education 
difference between the two) has a significant negative effect on the probability that the 
couple purchases micro life insurance on either spouse. While the average marginal effects 
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are relatively low (0.005 and -0.026, respectively), the magnitude of effects has to be 
considered in relation to the low uptake in the survey areas.  
Table 21: Probit model results on the effect of bargaining power on the uptake of 
micro life insurance (collective models) 
 
Wife's income 
contribution  
Husband's 
income 
contribution  
Wife's age 
differential  
Wife's 
education 
differential  
Husband has 3+  
years more 
education 
(one std dev) 
 
AME 
 
AME 
 
AME 
 
AME 
 
AME 
Univariate probit          
Couple 
(aggregate) 0.135** 
 
0.084 
 
-0.002 
 
0.005* 
 
-0.026* 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.014) 
Bivariate probit          
Husband 0.028 
 
0.051 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.008 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.008) 
Wife 0.121*** 
 
0.072* 
 
-0.001 
 
0.005** 
 
-0.019* 
  (0.042) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.011) 
Notes: The effects of variables are estimated in separate regressions including the same explanatory variables 
as in the unitary models above.   Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate levels of 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Weak as this result may be, it implies that rising levels of education of the wife relative to 
her husband – reflecting increasing control over resources, which, in turn, increases 
bargaining power – increase the probability of micro life insurance uptake on the aggregate 
household-level, but especially that of the wife. Supporting this finding, very low 
education of the wife relative to the husband (as implied by the alternative variable 
definition) has no impact on the husband’s probability to purchase micro life insurance, but 
significantly reduces the probability of uptake on the aggregate level of the couple and 
particularly that of the wife.  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined gender differentials in the use of micro life insurance and other 
formal and informal financial services in the context of an emerging insurance and 
financial market in Ghana across and within households. Different to the previous chapters 
and other studies on the participation in microinsurance, the primary contribution of the 
chapter has been to take a closer look at the intra-household dimension of the decision-
making on micro life insurance. Aside of investigating merely gender effects, the chapter 
accounted for both husbands and wives participation in micro life insurance in couple 
households and provided initial evidence on the question of how this relates back intra-
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household power relations. Thereby, the analysis allowed for the possibility that spouses 
face a conflict between the decision to purchase life cycle protection that may eventually 
provide more benefits to a surviving spouse, or alternative resource allocations. Three main 
issues have been revealed. 
First, the observed patterns of financial market participation on the inter- and intra-
household level demonstrate that gender differentials based on demand and supply factors 
are intertwined both with the type of household and regionally varying sociocultural 
conditions. On the inter-household level, single woman are less likely than couple 
households and single men households to purchase micro life insurance, and slightly more 
likely to use informal loans, which could be a sign of gender discrimination in the market. 
Surprisingly, single men households are most likely to purchase micro life insurance 
compared to the other household groups. This seems to be due to gender discrimination 
against single men with respect to the provision of other financial services and easier 
accessibility of the insurance scheme for them. Furthermore, the intra-household results 
also disprove gender discrimination in the provision of micro life insurance towards 
women in general. In fact, women in couples are more likely to purchase micro life 
insurance compared to their husbands, though this applies only to women in the Central 
and Eastern Regions. Related to the prevalence of matrilineal inheritance rules, wives in 
these regions have a higher status and husbands have less control over household decision-
making compared to husbands in patrilineal societies. However, the higher likelihood of 
these wives to purchase micro life insurance for themselves leaves room for ambiguous 
interpretation. On the one hand, they might be able to decide more independently on 
purchasing adequate financial protection for their children or their own livelihood during 
old age. On the other hand, in the matrilineal context husbands might be less willing to 
purchase insurance protection that could also benefit their spouse and children.  
Second, spouses’ uptake of micro life insurance responds to some different individual and 
household characteristics. Such differences affect insurance participation if husbands and 
wives have different preferences on insurance, for example related to different life 
expectancies and gendered responsibilities within the household. Compared to the 
husband, the wife’s uptake is more strongly associated with household wealth and non-
farm employment, bad health, and a bequest motive towards children. Compared to the 
wife, the husband’s uptake responds more strongly to his perceived risk exposure of the 
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household, indicating stronger pessimism on his side that the insurance provides effective 
risk protection. 
Third, there is some empirical support for the hypothesis that bargaining power of the wife 
proxied by income, age and education differentials of spouses increases the probability that 
spouses purchase micro life insurance on the aggregate level of the couple. However, 
results on the individual level show that the wife’s bargaining power does not significantly 
increase the husband’s probability to purchase micro life insurance, but only the 
probability that the wife purchases insurance coverage for herself. Surprisingly, descriptive 
evidence also shows that only a negligible minority of wives takes the opportunity to 
insure their husband’s death under their policy. Yet, in some households the husband also 
purchases life insurance (irrespective of the wife’s power status), and there is evidence that 
spouses’ insurance status is positively correlated to some extent. This stands somewhat 
against the picture of entirely selfish spouses, among which the husband would prefer not 
to purchase life insurance that includes survivor benefits due to his lower probability to 
outlive the wife.  
Further research will have to shed more rigorous and conclusive light on the role of 
intrahousehold bargaining on the insurance behavior of couples, which requires better 
(exogenous) measures of relative bargaining power, such as variations in social security 
laws. Furthermore it could be interesting to consider a non-cooperative framework, which 
allows for non-Pareto efficient outcomes, to find out in more detail to what extent spouses 
pool resources and decide independently on their financial protection. 
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that women are indeed an important target 
group for the provision of micro life insurance. Yet, providers seeking to assist individuals 
in their decisions on appropriate financial protection need to take into account the decision-
making dynamics within the household and the potentially different preferences on 
respective choices between women and men. The results stress the importance of tailored 
insurance services that fit the need of all individuals within a household and across 
different household types as well as the communication with and between both spouses of 
a couple about their financial risk management.    
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4.8 Appendix 
Table 22: Distribution of households, household heads and their spouses 
Region Households    Heads   Female spouses 
    No. 
Cell 
percent 
Weighted 
percent 
 
No. 
Cell 
percent 
Weighted 
percent 
 
No. 
Cell 
percent 
Weighted 
% 
Central Region 183 32.2 39.4 
 
183 32.2 39.4 
 
104 65.8 62.8 
 
Microinsured 92 16.2 1.0 
 
46 8.1 0.5 
 
49 15.7 1.1 
Eastern Region 192 33.8 28.1 
 
192 33.8 28.1 
 
94 60.6 75.9 
 
Microinsured 95 16.7 1.3 
 
72 12.7 1.0 
 
29 9.3 0.8 
Volta Region 193 34.0 16.4 
 
193 34.0 16.4 
 
115 72.8 74.8 
 
Microinsured 86 15.1 0.7 
 
79 13.9 0.6 
 
14 4.5 0.2 
Total 568 100.0 100.0 
 
568 100.0 100.0 
 
313 100.0 100.0 
  Microinsured 273 48.1 3.0 
 
197 34.7 2.1 
 
92 29.4 2.1 
Notes: Includes only households and individuals of couples, non-married single women and non-married 
single men with complete survey information and with the head or female spouse below the age of 75. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on survey data 
 
Table 23: Person coverage of the Anidaso policy (percent) 
 Couple households  Single headed households  All 
 
Husbands Wives 
 
Single men Single women 
  
Prinicipal only (n=99) 42.3 4.7 
 
72.3 46.8 
 
33.8 
Principal and spouse (n=11) 9.4 3.5 
 
0.0 0.0 
 
3.9 
Principal and children (n=147) 16.8 89.2 
 
27.7 53.2 
 
52.1 
Principal, spouse and children (n=32) 31.5 2.6 
 
0.0 0.0 
 
10.2 
Total (n=289) 100.0 100.0 
 
100.0 100.0 
 
100.0 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on survey data 
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Table 24: Multivariate probit model results on households’ uptake of micro life insurance and other financial services 
 Explanatory variables 
  
Micro life insurance 
 
Formal savings 
 
Informal savings 
 
Formal loans 
 
Informal loans 
Coeff. 
 
AME 
 
Coeff. 
 
AME 
 
Coeff. 
 
AME 
 
Coeff. 
 
AME 
 
Coeff. 
 
AME 
Individual  characteristics (head)                    
Informal non-farm employment 0.375*** (0.135) 0.123  0.223 (0.241) 0.030  0.207 (0.268) 0.000  0.116 (0.244) 0.046  0.697** (0.296) 0.000 
Formal non-farm employment 0.321* (0.170) 0.120  0.377 (0.322) 0.038  0.042 (0.321) 0.000  0.188 (0.296) 0.075  0.490 (0.306) 0.000 
Experience of loan denial 0.401** (0.162) 0.159  0.164 (0.277) 0.010  -0.217 (0.298) 0.000  0.287 (0.356) 0.113  0.316 (0.285) 0.000 
Risk perception index -0.111** (0.046) -0.016  -0.101 (0.095) 0.000  0.132 (0.085) 0.030  0.005 (0.081) 0.002  0.150 (0.115) 0.036 
Illness (last 12 mths) 0.114 (0.119) 0.043  0.050 (0.233) 0.002  -0.177 (0.241) 0.000  0.062 (0.216) 0.015  -0.072 (0.222) 0.000 
Years of schooling -0.002 (0.013) 0.000  0.027 (0.024) 0.000  -0.049** (0.023) -0.012  0.075*** (0.025) 0.030  -0.002 (0.026) -0.001 
Age 0.093*** (0.033) 0.013  0.078** (0.039) 0.000  0.101* (0.052) 0.025  0.116*** (0.044) 0.046  -0.112** (0.049) -0.027 
Age squared -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000  -0.001** (0.000) 0.000  -0.001** (0.001) 0.000  -0.001** (0.000) 0.000  0.001** (0.001) 0.000 
No. of group memberships 0.049 (0.056) 0.008  0.136 (0.084) 0.000  0.100 (0.108) 0.027  -0.035 (0.086) -0.014  0.323*** (0.103) 0.087 
Enrolled in pension scheme (SSNIT) 0.203 (0.148) 0.079  0.268 (0.309) 0.012  0.127 (0.276) 0.000  0.836*** (0.292) 0.281  0.335 (0.296) 0.000 
Household characteristics                    
Asset index (5 year lag) 0.101 (0.072) 0.001  0.292** (0.123) 0.001  0.088 (0.122) 0.000  0.399*** (0.138) 0.003  0.260** (0.123) 0.000 
Asset index squared  -0.102** (0.040) -0.004  -0.208** (0.091) -0.003  -0.037 (0.069) 0.000  -0.187*** (0.071) -0.008  -0.165 (0.108) 0.000 
Land size per AE  0.001 (0.003) 0.000  -0.020*** (0.008) 0.000  -0.009 (0.007) -0.002  0.012* (0.007) 0.004  0.007 (0.009) 0.001 
Share of children  0.518** (0.225) 0.056  0.002 (0.405) 0.000  -0.069 (0.389) -0.015  0.641 (0.431) 0.234  0.524 (0.501) 0.086 
Death experience (past 5 yrs.) 0.127 (0.128) 0.046  0.040 (0.231) 0.001  -0.239 (0.254) 0.000  0.407 (0.257) 0.086  -0.512* (0.285) 0.000 
Other shock experience (past 5 yrs.)  0.198** (0.099) 0.069  -0.543*** (0.205) -0.017  0.104 (0.189) 0.000  0.362* (0.192) 0.059  0.287 (0.214) 0.000 
Relationship to banks (yrs) 0.035*** (0.011) 0.006  1.193*** (0.281) 0.000  -0.048** (0.023) -0.013  0.010 (0.018) 0.004  -0.036* (0.021) -0.011 
Gender and type of household                    
Single woman head -0.441** (0.198) -0.111  0.031 (0.337) 0.007  0.382 (0.481) 0.000  0.290 (0.489) 0.062  1.618** (0.809) 0.000 
Couple  -0.319 (0.198) -0.096  0.871** (0.369) 0.210  0.926** (0.459) 0.000  0.314 (0.467) 0.058  1.380* (0.790) 0.000 
Community characteristics Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Observations 568  568  568  568  568 
Fraction in survey areas 3.0  51.1  13.2  23.8  9.6 
Estimated probabilities 4.7  63.1  19.4  31.1  10.8 
Estimated correlation coefficients p21= 0.449*** (0.136)  p31= 0.122 (0.097)  p41=0.369*** (0.112)  p51=-0.109 (0.144)  p32= -0.301** (0.128) 
  p42=0.217 (0.140)  p52= -0.878*** (0.255)  p43= -0.179 (0.130)  p53= 0.409** (0.172)  p54= -0.381*** (0.119) 
Notes: Results of the multivariate probit model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood with 50 pseudorandom draws. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Average marginal effects (AMEs) are calculated with respect to the marginal probability of each type of financial service. The model also includes a constant and corrects for the 
sampling probability weights. Wald test of the model: Χ2 (115) = 480.78; p = 0.0000). The asterisks indicate level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ 
calculation. 
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Table 25: Multivariate probit model results on spouses’ uptake of micro life insurance and other financial services 
 Explanatory variables 
  
Micro life insurance 
 
Formal savings 
 
Informal savings 
 
Formal loans 
 
Informal loans 
Coeff. AME 
 
Coeff. AME 
 
Coeff. AME Coeff. AME 
 
Coeff. AME 
Individual  characteristics                     
Informal non-farm employment 0.516*** (0.169) 0.160  0.727*** (0.223) 0.097  0.466 (0.312) 0.000  0.507* (0.303) 0.001  0.471 (0.326) 0.000 
Formal non-farm employment 0.585*** (0.193) 0.222  0.793*** (0.308) 0.207  0.087 (0.431) 0.000  1.096*** (0.343) 0.000  0.160 (0.395) 0.000 
Experience of loan denial 0.562*** (0.171) 0.216  0.683** (0.317) 0.259  -1.128*** (0.436) 0.000  0.538 (0.331) 0.000  0.998*** (0.315) 0.000 
Risk perception index -0.162*** (0.060) -0.014  -0.041 (0.097) -0.016  0.039 (0.120) 0.004  0.125 (0.098) 0.019  0.226* (0.125) 0.007 
Illness (last 12 mths) 0.294** (0.134) 0.094  0.477** (0.222) 0.177  0.403 (0.262) 0.000  0.196 (0.243) 0.000  -0.143 (0.320) 0.000 
Years of schooling -0.008 (0.014) -0.001  0.054** (0.022) 0.021  -0.034 (0.027) -0.006  -0.028 (0.026) -0.004  0.003 (0.029) 0.000 
Age 0.106*** (0.034) 0.008  -0.046 (0.039) -0.018  -0.043 (0.066) -0.006  0.104* (0.059) 0.017  -0.058 (0.067) -0.002 
Age squared -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000  0.001 (0.000) 0.000  0.000 (0.001) 0.000  -0.001* (0.001) 0.000  0.001 (0.001) 0.000 
No. of group memberships 0.077 (0.078) 0.007  0.159 (0.137) 0.062  0.830*** (0.175) 0.191  0.091 (0.130) 0.017  0.514*** (0.197) 0.041 
Enrolled in pension scheme (SSNIT) 0.066 (0.161) 0.023  0.149 (0.338) 0.059  -0.841* (0.499) 0.000  1.008*** (0.313) 0.000  0.144 (0.396) 0.000 
Household characteristics                     
Asset index (5 year lag) 0.120 (0.086) 0.002  0.299** (0.131) 0.002  0.285* (0.163) 0.000  0.602*** (0.181) 0.000  0.484** (0.243) 0.000 
Asset index squared  -0.073* (0.044) -0.003  -0.040 (0.062) -0.001  -0.129* (0.078) 0.000  -0.232*** (0.068) 0.000  -0.255** (0.110) 0.000 
Land size per AE  -0.004 (0.005) 0.000  0.002 (0.006) 0.001  -0.002 (0.010) 0.000  0.015** (0.008) 0.003  -0.024 (0.020) -0.001 
Share of children  0.437 (0.270) 0.029  0.146 (0.457) 0.058  0.010 (0.521) 0.024  -0.413 (0.460) -0.088  -0.117 (0.727) -0.007 
Death experience (past 5 yrs.) 0.093 (0.170) 0.025  0.283 (0.279) 0.089  -0.473 (0.372) 0.000  0.124 (0.336) 0.000  -0.615* (0.352) 0.000 
Other shock experience (past 5 yrs.)  0.070 (0.110) 0.026  -0.239 (0.181) -0.067  0.333 (0.214) 0.000  -0.049 (0.189) 0.000  0.558** (0.279) 0.000 
Relationship to banks (yrs) 0.034*** (0.011) 0.019  0.040** (0.020) 0.015  -0.043* (0.023) -0.012  -0.013 (0.020) -0.003  -0.021 (0.020) -0.003 
Gender and region interactions                    
Central Region -0.107 (0.234) -0.029  0.295 (0.360) 0.087  -0.137 (0.446) 0.000  -0.450 (0.408) 0.000  0.196 (0.603) 0.000 
Eastern Region 0.014 (0.285) 0.004  -0.266 (0.440) -0.072  0.925 (0.589) 0.000  0.354 (0.483) 0.000  -1.333* (0.707) 0.000 
Female -0.599*** (0.199) -0.166  -0.827*** (0.296) -0.248  0.304 (0.387) 0.000  -0.567 (0.380) 0.000  0.704 (0.446) 0.000 
Female*Central Region 0.727*** (0.249) 0.210  0.215 (0.404) 0.079  -0.082 (0.480) 0.000  -0.284 (0.535) 0.000  -1.349** (0.532) 0.000 
Female*Eastern Region 0.433* (0.254) 0.074  0.232 (0.390) 0.078  -0.152 (0.535) 0.000  0.478 (0.440) 0.000  -1.267* (0.647) 0.000 
Community characteristics  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes  
Observations 626  626  626  626  626 
Fraction in survey areas 2.1  44.1  12.9  17.9  6.3 
Estimated probabilities 3.4  50.0  14.1  22.0  7.3 
Estimated correlation coefficients p21= 0.403*** (0.117)  p31= 0.123 (0.132)  p41= 0.502*** (0.104)  p51= 0.090 (0.131)  p32= -0.189 (0.142) 
  p42= 0.405*** (0.126)  p52= -0.556*** (0.177)  p43=  -0.165 (0.138)  p53= 0.406* (0.208)  p54= -0.075 (0.135) 
Notes: Results of the multivariate probit model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood with 50 pseudorandom draws. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and 
are adjusted for clustering on the household level. Average marginal effects (AMEs) are calculated with respect to the marginal probability of each type of financial service. The 
model includes a constant and corrects for the sampling probability weights. Wald test of the model: Χ2 (110) = 584.95;  p = 0.0000 ). The asterisks indicate levels of significance: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table 26: Bivariate probit model results of participation in micro life insurance 
with only non-spousal coverage of husbands and wives 
 Explanatory variables 
 
Husband 
 
Wife 
  
AME 
 
AME 
Individual characteristics of husband             
Informal non-farm employment 
 
0.007 (0.007) 
 
0.016 (0.010) 
Formal non-farm employment 
 
0.013 (0.008) 
 
0.003 (0.011) 
Experience of loan denial 
 
0.009 (0.007) 
 
-0.008 (0.013) 
Risk perception index 
 
-0.004* (0.003) 
 
-0.009* (0.005) 
Illness (last 12 mths) 
 
0.008 (0.006) 
 
-0.007 (0.010) 
Years of schooling 
 
-0.000 (0.001) 
 
-0.002** (0.001) 
Age 
 
0.001 (0.002) 
 
0.000 (0.003) 
Age squared 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
No. of group memberships 
 
0.004 (0.003) 
 
0.001 (0.005) 
Enrolled in pension scheme (SSNIT) 
 
0.007 (0.006) 
 
0.017 (0.012) 
Individual characteristics of wife 
      Informal non-farm employment 
 
0.002 (0.006) 
 
0.024* (0.014) 
Formal non-farm employment 
 
0.005 (0.010) 
 
0.028 (0.019) 
Experience of loan denial 
 
-0.113*** (0.017) 
 
0.025* (0.014) 
Risk perception index 
 
0.004* (0.004) 
 
0.005 (0.007) 
Illness (last 12 mths) 
 
-0.001 (0.006) 
 
0.027*** (0.009) 
Years of schooling 
 
-0.001 (0.001) 
 
0.002 (0.001) 
Age 
 
0.001 (0.002) 
 
0.008** (0.003) 
Age squared 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
 
-0.000* (0.000) 
No. of group memberships 
 
-0.002 (0.004) 
 
0.005 (0.005) 
Enrolled in pension scheme (SSNIT) 
 
-0.023* (0.017) 
 
-0.016 (0.021) 
Household characteristics 
      Asset index (5 year lag) 
 
-0.004 (0.004) 
 
0.011** (0.006) 
Asset index squared  
 
0.001 (0.002) 
 
-0.004 (0.003) 
Land size per AE  
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
 
0.000 (0.000) 
Share of children  
 
0.007 (0.012) 
 
0.021* (0.020) 
Death experience (past 5 yrs.) 
 
0.004 (0.007) 
 
0.004 (0.009) 
Other shock experience(past 5 yrs.)  
 
0.008* (0.005) 
 
-0.011 (0.007) 
Relationship to banks (yrs) 
 
0.001** (0.000) 
 
0.001 (0.001) 
Community characteristics 
      Ratio of bank clients (5 year lag) 
 
0.010 (0.024) 
 
0.061 (0.044) 
Ratio of Susu clients (5 year lag) 
 
0.117 (0.076) 
 
-0.056 (0.131) 
Central Region 
 
-0.009 (0.008) 
 
0.052*** (0.017) 
Eastern Region 
 
0.018 (0.011) 
 
0.022 (0.019) 
Observations   270 
 
270 
Estimated correlation coefficient 
 
0.677*** (0.171) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-847.22777 
Chi2 
 
982.74 
Prob > chi2 
 
0.0000 
Notes: The model includes a constant and corrects for the sampling probability weights. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table 27: Bivariate probit model results on the participation in any life insurance 
of husbands and wives  
 Explanatory variables 
 
Husband 
 
Wife 
  
AME 
 
AME 
Individual characteristics of husband 
      Informal non-farm employment 
 
-0.017 (0.030) 
 
0.028** (0.014) 
Formal non-farm employment 
 
0.088*** (0.033) 
 
0.007 (0.016) 
Experience of loan denial 
 
0.000 (0.028) 
 
0.007 (0.016) 
Risk perception index 
 
0.004 (0.011) 
 
-0.003 (0.007) 
Illness (last 12 mths) 
 
0.036 (0.026) 
 
-0.002 (0.014) 
Years of schooling 
 
0.005** (0.003) 
 
-0.004** (0.001) 
Age 
 
0.016 (0.012) 
 
0.007 (0.005) 
Age squared 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
No. of group memberships 
 
0.029** (0.013) 
 
0.008 (0.007) 
Enrolled in pension scheme (SSNIT) 
 
0.008 (0.034) 
 
-0.005 (0.016) 
Individual characteristics of wife 
      Informal non-farm employment 
 
0.005 (0.029) 
 
0.041* (0.021) 
Formal non-farm employment 
 
-0.082* (0.047) 
 
0.093*** (0.031) 
Experience of loan denial 
 
-0.018 (0.031) 
 
0.033* (0.019) 
Risk perception index 
 
0.005 (0.017) 
 
-0.010 (0.011) 
Illness (last 12 mths) 
 
-0.039 (0.028) 
 
0.008 (0.014) 
Years of schooling 
 
0.001 (0.003) 
 
0.003* (0.001) 
Age 
 
0.018 (0.016) 
 
0.005 (0.004) 
Age squared 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
No. of group memberships 
 
-0.005 (0.017) 
 
0.009 (0.008) 
Enrolled in pension scheme (SSNIT) 
 
-0.086 (0.060) 
 
-0.046 (0.028) 
Household characteristics 
      Asset index (5 year lag) 
 
-0.015 (0.016) 
 
0.021** (0.010) 
Asset index squared  
 
0.001 (0.008) 
 
-0.013** (0.006) 
Land size per AE  
 
0.000 (0.001) 
 
0.001 (0.001) 
Share of children  
 
-0.127** (0.054) 
 
0.006 (0.027) 
Death experience (past 5 yrs.) 
 
-0.035 (0.035) 
 
-0.005 (0.016) 
Other shock experience (past 5 yrs.)  
 
0.051** (0.022) 
 
0.001 (0.010) 
Relationship to banks (yrs) 
 
0.005*** (0.002) 
 
0.002*** (0.001) 
Community characteristics 
      Ratio of bank clients (5 year lag) 
 
-0.048 (0.103) 
 
0.079 (0.058) 
Ratio of Susu clients (5 year lag) 
 
-0.375 (0.357) 
 
-0.326* (0.186) 
Central Region 
 
-0.090** (0.041) 
 
0.054** (0.021) 
Eastern Region 
 
-0.101* (0.057) 
 
-0.018 (0.024) 
Observations 
 
313 
 
313 
Estimated correlation coefficient 
 
0.618*** (0.124) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-1726.6275 
Chi2 
 
174.92 
Prob > chi2 
 
0.0000 
Notes: Both models include a constant and correct for the sampling probability weights. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table 28: Univariate probit model results on the participation in micro life 
insurance of couples (collective model)  
 Explanatory variables (1)  (2)  (3) 
AME 
 
AME 
 
AME 
Wife's income contribution 0.135** (0.056) 
      Husband's income contribution 0.084 (0.055) 
      Wife's age differential 
   
-0.002 (0.002) 
   Wife's education differential 
      
0.005* (0.003) 
Husband has 3+  years more education (one std 
dev) 
      
-0.026* (0.014) 
Total household income per month (GHC, per 
adult equivalent) 0.000 (0.000) 
      Asset index (5 year lag) 0.005 (0.008) 
 
0.005 (0.008) 
 
0.005 (0.008) 
Asset index squared  -0.006 (0.004) 
 
-0.006 (0.005) 
 
-0.006 (0.005) 
Informal non-farm employment 0.038** (0.018) 
 
0.030* (0.016) 
 
0.028* (0.016) 
Formal non-farm employment 0.042** (0.021) 
 
0.041** (0.019) 
 
0.028 (0.018) 
Husband started secondary school 
   
0.002 (0.106) 
 
0.053 (0.105) 
 
completed secondary school 
   
0.011 (0.024) 
 
0.018 (0.023) 
 
tertiary education 
   
0.003 (0.019) 
 
0.018 (0.020) 
Wife started secondary school 
   
-0.012 (0.110) 
 
-0.045 (0.109) 
 
completed secondary school 
   
-0.038 (0.040) 
 
-0.018 (0.035) 
 
tertiary education 
   
-0.018 (0.034) 
 
-0.033 (0.036) 
Husband in age group 33-35 
   
-0.006 (0.026) 
   
 
age group 36-38 
   
-0.031 (0.035) 
   
 
age group 39-42 
   
-0.021 (0.038) 
   
 
age group 43-45 
   
-0.076 (0.048) 
   
 
age group 46-49 
   
-0.049 (0.052) 
   
 
age group 50-53 
   
-0.044 (0.059) 
   
 
age group 54-56 
   
-0.104 (0.066) 
   
 
age group 57-61 
   
-0.128* (0.075) 
   
 
age group 62+ 
   
-0.137 (0.088) 
   Wife in age group 28-30 
   
0.017 (0.023) 
   
 
age group 31-33 
   
0.034 (0.029) 
   
 
age group 34-35 
   
0.057 (0.035) 
   
 
age group 36-38 
   
0.059 (0.039) 
   
 
age group 39-42 
   
0.065 (0.045) 
   
 
age group 43-46 
   
0.099* (0.054) 
   
 
age group 47-50 
   
0.139** (0.061) 
   
 
age group 51-54 
   
0.134* (0.069) 
   
 
age group 55+ 
   
0.113 (0.074) 
   Observations 313 
 
313 
 
313 
Pseudo R2 0.2061 
 
0.1730 
 
0.1946 
Log Likelihood -882.13278 
 
-918.89137 
 
-89884031 
Chi2 78.86 
 
69.67 
 
75.78 
Prob > chi2 0.0002 
 
0.0013 
 
0.0004 
Notes: The model corrects for the sampling probability weights and  includes a constant. Additionally, it 
includes the same explanatory variables as in the univariate models above.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ 
calculation. 
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Table 29: Bivariate probit model results on the participation in micro life insurance of husbands and wives (collective model) 
    Husband Wife 
 
Husband Wife 
 
Husband Wife 
 Explanatory variables 
  AME AME 
 
AME AME 
 
AME AME 
Wife's income contribution 0.028 (0.041) 0.121*** (0.042) 
          Husband's income contribution 0.051 (0.040) 0.072* (0.040) 
          Wife's age differential 
     
-0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 
     Wife's education differential 
          
0.001 (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 
Husband has 3+  years more education (one std dev) 
          
-0.008 (0.008) -0.019* (0.011) 
Total household income per month (GHC, per adult 
equivalent) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
          Asset index (5 year lag) -0.003 (0.005) 0.013** (0.006) 
 
-0.005 (0.006) 0.016** (0.007) 
 
-0.004 (0.005) 0.012* (0.007) 
Asset index squared  -0.004 (0.003) -0.005* (0.003) 
 
-0.003 (0.003) -0.005 (0.004) 
 
-0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) 
Informal non-farm employment 0.007 (0.010) 0.026** (0.013) 
 
0.011 (0.009) 0.018 (0.011) 
 
0.014 (0.009) 0.013 (0.011) 
Formal non-farm employment 0.013 (0.012) 0.023 (0.014) 
 
0.023** (0.011) 0.013 (0.014) 
 
0.019* (0.010) 0.006 (0.012) 
Husband started secondary school 
     
-0.396*** (0.064) 0.235*** (0.045) 
 
-0.377*** (0.055) 0.297*** (0.042) 
 
completed secondary school 
     
0.005 (0.014) 0.004 (0.017) 
 
0.009 (0.014) 0.014 (0.019) 
 
tertiary education 
     
0.011 (0.011) 0.001 (0.013) 
 
0.015 (0.014) 0.029 (0.020) 
Wife started secondary school 
     
0.273*** (0.039) -0.406*** (0.066) 
 
0.260*** (0.034) -0.461*** (0.064) 
 
completed secondary school 
     
0.013 (0.022) -0.045 (0.036) 
 
0.016 (0.021) -0.039 (0.033) 
 
tertiary education 
     
0.000 (0.019) -0.029 (0.032) 
 
-0.005 (0.020) -0.054 (0.033) 
Husband in age group 33-35 
     
-0.002 (0.014) 0.001 (0.022) 
     
 
age group 36-38 
     
-0.022 (0.021) 0.000 (0.027) 
     
 
age group 39-42 
     
-0.014 (0.020) 0.006 (0.032) 
     
 
age group 43-45 
     
-0.023 (0.026) -0.058 (0.042) 
     
 
age group 46-49 
     
-0.023 (0.028) -0.015 (0.040) 
     
 
age group 50-53 
     
-0.018 (0.032) -0.010 (0.047) 
     
 
age group 54-56 
     
-0.049 (0.036) -0.043 (0.051) 
     
 
age group 57-61 
     
-0.066 (0.040) -0.052 (0.058) 
     
 
age group 62+ 
     
-0.095* (0.050) -0.048 (0.069) 
     Wife in age group 28-30 
     
0.012 (0.013) 0.006 (0.020) 
     
 
age group 31-33 
     
0.007 (0.017) 0.031 (0.025) 
     
 
age group 34-35 
     
0.024 (0.020) 0.026 (0.030) 
     
 
age group 36-38 
     
0.018 (0.022) 0.051 (0.033) 
     
 
age group 39-42 
     
0.004 (0.025) 0.059 (0.037) 
     
 
age group 43-46 
     
0.035 (0.030) 0.076* (0.043) 
     
 
age group 47-50 
     
0.045 (0.033) 0.104** (0.048) 
     
 
age group 51-54 
     
0.042 (0.038) 0.091* (0.053) 
     
 
age group 55+ 
     
0.049 (0.040) 0.076 (0.060) 
     Observations 313 
 
313 
 
313 
Estimated correlation coefficient 0.610*** (0.160) 
 
0.483** (0.156) 
 
0.641*** (0.144) 
Log Likelihood -978.32724 
 
-929.03397 
 
-1005.1182 
Chi2 155.42 
 
. 
 
. 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
 
. 
 
. 
Notes: The model corrects for the sampling probability weights and  includes a constant. Additionally, it includes the same explanatory variables as in the univariate models 
above.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Client perceptions of the value of microinsurance 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapters, uptake of microinsurance generally falls short of 
projections.73 This has recently made practitioners focus on client value (Magnoni and 
Zimmerman 2011; Matul et al. 2011; McCord et al. 2012b). In a vastly underserved market 
with potentially high demand for microinsurance, it is understood that low uptake can 
either be a sign of poorly designed insurance products or of misperceptions about the value 
of these products (Matul et al. 2011). However, empirical research on what constitutes 
client value in microinsurance has been limited.74 This chapter intends to fill this gap and 
achieve a systematic and detailed understanding of the value that clients perceive in 
microinsurance. The analysis is based on qualitative data from focus group discussions 
among both existing and potential clients75 of micro life insurance in the Central Region of 
southern Ghana in between of the two surveys that generated the data used in the previous 
chapters.  
The survey data show that illness and death constitute the most important risks for 
households, which is in line with much of the literature on risk exposure and risk 
management in other countries (Cohen and Sebstad 2005; Cohen et al. 2005; Dercon 2002; 
Dercon et al. 2008; Tesliuc and Lindert 2004). Hence, one would expect that health and 
73 This chapter is based on joint work with Susan Steiner. 
74 Efforts have mostly been confined to the development and application of practically oriented value 
assessment tools. One example is the ILO’s PACE (Product, Access, Cost and Experience) (Matul et al. 
2011). This is a tool that scores microinsurance products in relation to alternative risk management options. It 
relies on staff interviews, process reviews, and secondary performance and other data. However, it does not 
explicitly include the clients’ perspective on the value of the respective microinsurance products.  
75 Henceforth, the chapter refers to potential and existing clients simply as clients. As explained below, value 
can be perceived by both.  
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life insurance was a priority purchase for many households. The previous chapters showed 
that the uptake of health insurance, in the form of the publicly provided National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS), is indeed quite high (approx. 50 percent) in the Central Region 
as well as other regions covered by our surveys. However, the uptake of micro life 
insurance is below 5 percent. Possibly, this limited uptake is a sign that clients do not 
perceive much value in the micro life insurance under study. This chapter seeks to shed 
some light on this question by investigating when and why clients perceive value.  
Microinsurance practitioners define client value as the “added value – in comparison to 
other available risk coping mechanisms – of having insurance either when claims are made 
or as a result of the changed behavior caused by owning a policy and trusting that it will be 
honored” (Magnoni and Zimmerman 2011: 5) or as “reducing vulnerability due to 
improved risk-management practices that then contributes to improved well-being” (Matul 
et al. 2011: 1). While useful as a starting point to think about client value in 
microinsurance, these definitions largely ignore the debate on the client value of goods and 
services in the marketing literature of the past 25 years.76 This literature treats client value 
as the outcome of an evaluative judgment that is subjective, personal, and context-
dependent (Holbrook 1996; Sánchez-Fernandez and Iniesta-Bonillo 2007; Zeithaml 1988). 
It distinguishes between unidimensional and multidimensional models of client value 
(Sánchez-Fernandez and Iniesta-Bonillo 2007). Unidimensional models assume that clients 
apply cognitive reasoning to weigh the benefits of goods and services against their costs. 
Multidimensional models, in contrast, regard the value perceived in goods and services as 
a complex phenomenon consisting of several dimensions that include cognitive as well as 
affective factors.  
In line with this second approach, client value is here considered to be a multidimensional 
concept. The chapter studies value from the clients’ perspective whereby it assumes that 
value is a subjective and relativistic judgment that involves cognitive as well as affective 
processing of information. Indeed, the previous chapters as well as other studies on the 
determinants of microinsurance uptake have pointed out that behavioral factors, such as 
trust, familiarity with the provider as well as imitation of peers’ behaviour, play a large 
76 This literature mostly uses the terms ‘customer value’ or ‘consumer value’, not ‘client value’. Throughout 
this chapter the term ‘client value’ is used as it elaborates on insurance, which is characterized by long-term 
contractual arrangements between policyholder and provider. In this context, ‘client’ is considered to be the 
more adequate term than ‘customer’ or ‘consumer’. The chapter refers to ‘Client value’ also when discussing 
the literature even if the respective contributions employ another term.    
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role in explaining households’ decisions to purchase microinsurance (Cai et al. 2009, 2013; 
Cole et al. 2013; Giné et al. 2008; Morsink and Geurts 2011; Thornton et al. 2010). This 
suggests that affections and social interactions should be taken into account when trying to 
understand why people value (or do not value) and purchase (or do not purchase) 
microinsurance.  
Using an exploratory approach, this chapter identifies which dimensions constitute value 
for clients of micro life insurance and which context factors help to explain why clients 
form the value judgments they do. A qualitative research design is considered to be the 
most appropriate given that the analysis delves into an area that has not received much 
attention by the microinsurance literature. Any value dimension as well as context factor 
that appears relevant to the group participants is here allowed to come up during the 
discussions. To the extent that certain aspects emerge in several or even all groups, one 
may assume that they are reflective of general patterns of value perceived among the focus 
group participants, which represent the typical target group of microinsurance. As 
demonstrated by qualitative studies on client value within the marketing literature (Pura 
and Gummerus 2008; Williams and Soutar 2000; Zeithaml 1988), the advantage of this 
approach is that it facilitates an insight into the value dimensions that are relevant for 
clients of micro life insurance without making many prior assumptions.  
It is important to clarify that this approach does not allow us to measure the contribution of 
the separate dimensions to overall client value quantitatively, as in Lemmink et al. (1998), 
de Ruyter et al. (1997), Sweeney and Soutar (2001) and Sánchez et al. (2006), among 
others. The chapter also does not intend to develop a measurement scale for client value, as 
in Sweeney and Soutar (2001) and Sánchez et al. (2006). Hence, the disadvantage of the 
approach is that no inference can be made on which dimensions of client value are 
quantitatively more important than others. This – as well as an examination of whether the 
proposed model of client value can be confirmed for different types of microinsurance as 
well as in different country settings – is left for future research.  
The chapter contributes to the literature in four ways. First, it shows what academics as 
well as practitioners interested in microinsurance can learn from the marketing literature 
with regard to to how to think about client value. Second, it investigates to what extent 
existing models of client value - generally developed on the basis of research in 
industrialised countries - explain perceptions of client value in developing countries. Third, 
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using the example of micro life insurance, it proposes a first sketch for a conceptual model 
of what constitutes client value vis-à-vis this particular product. And fourth, it analyzes 
how value perceptions are shaped by the specific context of the focus group participants, 
which is an area that has not received much attention in the literature. It is shown that 
clients judge the value of microinsurance in five different dimensions, namely 
consumption outcome, quality, costs (all are forms of functional value), emotional value, 
and social value. The dimensions of consumption outcome, quality and emotional value 
play the largest role in our focus group discussions. The personal background of clients, 
their risk management framework and the interaction with the insurance provider and their 
peers largely explain why clients form the value judgements they do. 
The practical implication of this chapter is to add to policy maker’s and insurance 
provider’s understanding of clients’ perceptions of the value of microinsurance. As argued 
by Woodruff (1997), there are usually differences in what managers think their clients 
value and what clients say they value. Therefore, it is imperative to consider the clients’ 
view when trying to comprehend why uptake of microinsurance has been lower than 
expected. Knowing more about which dimensions clients value will help insurance 
providers focus more on those aspects that have not received sufficient attention.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Following this introduction, section 
5.2 provides a review of models of client value and elaborates on the role of the context for 
value perceptions. Section 5.3 describes the methodologies of data collection and data 
analysis applied. Section 5.4 turns to the results from our focus group discussions and 
presents five dimensions that constitute value from the perspective of microinsurance 
clients. Subsequently, section 5.5 discusses how context factors determine whether or not 
clients perceive value in microinsurance. Section 5.6 concludes and derives respective 
policy recommendations. 
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5.2 Connceptual framework 
5.2.1. Models of client value77 
The question of what constitutes client value has been originally addressed by 
unidimensional models. These models claim that clients weigh benefits against costs and 
thereby concentrate on economic utility (Sánchez et al. 2006). One of the most popular 
definitions is provided by Zeithaml (1988: 14) who defines client value as “the consumers’ 
overall assessment of the utility of a product based on perceptions of what is received and 
what is given.” Similarly, Monroe (1990) describes client value as the ratio of perceived 
benefits and perceived sacrifice. The receiving components or benefits have often been 
reduced to the quality of a good or service, and the giving components or sacrifice to the 
price. However, these two features may be too narrow. Benefits may also come in the form 
of such things as brand reputation or convenience and sacrifice as operating costs, time or 
effort (Best 2013; Bolton and Drew 1991; Zeithaml 1988). 
Typically, unidimensional models regard benefits and sacrifices as antecedents of value. 
They are seen as abstractions within clients’ cognitive organization of information, rather 
than specific product attributes. Value is understood as a mental concept at an even higher 
level than benefits and sacrifices and as more individualistic and personal. Due to its 
complexity, value has often been empirically measured by a simplistic indicator of the 
value-for-money perceived by clients (Bolton and Drew 1991; Sánchez-Fernandez and 
Iniesta-Bonillo 2007; Zeithaml 1988).  
The multidimensional models of client value are much broader and allow for affective 
value dimensions. One of the first multidimensional models is the one by Sheth et al. 
(1991). The authors identify five value dimensions (functional, emotional, social, 
epistemic, and conditional), which are assumed to influence consumption choice. 
Functional value is the utility derived from the capacity of a good or service for functional, 
utilitarian, or physical performance. Emotional value is the utility derived from the feelings 
generated by a good or service. Social value is the utility acquired from a good or service’s 
association with particular social groups. Epistemic value relates to the capacity of a good 
77 This review intends to cover the most important models of client value. For the sake of briefness, it will 
not, however, provide a complete review. The interested reader may consult Sánchez-Fernández and Iniesta-
Bonillo (2007).  
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or service to offer novelty or surprise to the client. Conditional value is the utility derived 
in the context of a specific set of circumstances. Later contributions confirm these 
dimensions to be valid with some modifications. Sweeney and Soutar (2001) do not find 
epistemic and conditional value to play a role in the context of durables, and they 
distinguish between two types of functional value, i.e. quality/performance and price/value 
for money. Sánchez et al. (2006) identify four types of functional value (installations, 
professionalism, quality, and price) besides emotional and social value in their study of 
tourism packages. Pura and Gummerus (2008), analysing value in the context of mobile 
services, ascertain six value dimensions, i.e. conditional, epistemic, emotional, social, 
monetary, and convenience value.  
A second line of multidimensional models has started with Mattson (1991) on the basis of 
Hartman’s (1973) framework of an axiological approach towards value. Value is here 
assumed to precede client satisfaction, and the specific dimensions are emotional, practical, 
and logical (or systemic). Emotional value is equivalent to the understanding in the above 
models. Practical value refers to the physical and functional aspects of consumption, and 
logical value focuses on the rational and abstract characteristics of the good or service, 
such as value-for-money. Followers of this approach include de Ruyter et al. (1997) and 
Lemmink et al. (1998), who study value in the context of museum and restaurant visits 
respectively.  
A different model is Holbrook’s (1994, 1996) typology of client value. He defines client 
value as an “interactive relativistic consumption preference experience” (Holbrook 1994: 
22). This means that a) there is an interaction between the consumer and the good or 
service, and value cannot occur without the consumer appreciating certain attributes of the 
good or service (interactive), b) the value of different objects may be compared, different 
individuals perceive different value for the same good or service, and value crucially 
depends on the context in which it is perceived (relativistic), c) value is an evaluative 
judgment (preference), and d) value resides in the consumption experience, not in the 
purchase itself (experience) (Holbrook 1996). The author proposes three dichotomies of 
client value: extrinsic (the good or service as a means to an end) versus intrinsic (the 
consumption experience valued on its own), self-oriented (the effect the good or service 
has on oneself) versus other-oriented (the effect achieved in others), and active (the good 
or service may be manipulated by the consumer) versus reactive (the consumer is affected 
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by the good or service). Combining these dichotomies with each other leads to eight types 
of value, i.e. efficiency, play, excellence, aesthetics, status, ethics, esteem, and spirituality.  
Comparing these marketing models of client value to the above definitions of client value 
in microinsurance reveals that the latter are short-sighted for several reasons. First, 
Magnoni and Zimmerman (2011) and Matul et al. (2011) do not explicitly acknowledge 
that value may have several dimensions. Second, even though they incidentally take on a 
marketing perspective (and refer to such issues as service quality, client satisfaction and 
potential misperception of the value offered), they focus on the economic benefits that can 
be expected, in the sense of an increase in people’s welfare. They either vaguely generalize 
the benefits (“added value”) or name a particular form of benefit (“reduced vulnerability”). 
This approach is much closer to specifying the impact of microinsurance than to 
addressing value aspects such as quality, convenience, or emotions. Third, and related to 
this, the definitions do not sufficiently account for the fact that client value is always 
perceived client value and therefore a subjective construct. Value may differ from person 
to person and even from time to time for the same person (Holbrook 1996; Zeithaml 1988). 
Additionally, perceptions are not necessarily based on objective information, but may be 
rather formed on the basis of intuition (Böhm and Brun 2008; Slovic et al. 1982). And 
fourth, both definitions suggest that client value could only be evaluated after having 
purchased insurance, which is, however, not the case. Client value may instead also be 
perceived at the prepurchase stage (Sánchez et al. 2006; Sweeney and Soutar 2001; 
Woodruff 1997), which is of crucial importance for the ultimate purchase decision. If an 
individual considers purchasing insurance but does not perceive its value to be sufficiently 
high, the insurance will not be purchased.  
5.2.3. The context of client value 
It is generally recognized that client value strongly depends on the context in which it is 
perceived (Holbrook 1996; Zeithaml 1988). Yet, little attention has been paid to the 
question of how the context is related to the formation of value perceptions and their 
change over time (Woodruff and Flint 2006). Some models of client value treat the context 
as one of several dimensions of client value (Pura and Gummerus 2008; Sheth et al. 1991). 
Even though Pura and Gummerus (2008) argue convincingly that the context affects the 
(content-related) dimensions of value, it can be argued that treating it as a separate 
 
129 
 
dimension would be misleading. Rather, the context can be viewed as a cross-cutting 
determinant of all value dimensions. For example, whether an individual experiences joy 
while consuming a good or service, or thinks that the value for money is too low, always 
depends on his or her specific situation. 
Context conditions include such factors as client characteristics, personal values, needs, 
and financial resources (Bolton and Drew 1991; Ravald and Grönroos 1996). In addition, 
Woodruff and Flint (2006) point out that value perceptions may change after recent 
experiences with a particular good or service. With regard to life insurance, considered in 
this chapter, it is plausible that individuals see more or less value contingent on whether 
they have a spouse and children, whether they have access to other effective risk 
management options (for example, savings or loans), and whether they have heard from 
other people that life insurance has been useful for them, among other factors. One could 
even imagine that the value that individuals see in other types of insurance, such as health 
or agricultural insurance spills over to the value perceived in life insurance. Beyond 
identifying the value that the focus group participants place on micro life insurance, the 
following analysis also explores how these value perceptions are formed.  
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1. Data collection  
Focus group discussions were conducted in two small towns – namely, Brakwa and 
Nyakrom – in the Central Region of Ghana, in October 2008.78 These towns lie within the 
respective service areas of two rural banks that distribute the (universal) Anidaso micro life 
insurance of the Gemini Life Insurance Company (GLICO) (for a detailed description of 
the policy see Chapter 2, pp. 24-26).  The chapter refers to the supply side (composed of 
GLICO, the rural bank, and the sales agents) simply as the insurance provider when no 
further disaggregation is required.  
Brakwa was chosen as a study site due to the fact that the town was already part of the 
smaller household survey presented in Chapter 1 in February 2008. To ensure that results 
78 In terms of living standards, households in the Central Region have slightly below average mean annual 
expenditures of 1,810 Ghana Cedi in 2005/06 compared with 1,918 Ghana Cedi for the whole country 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2008). 
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are not highly specific to the conditions in one RCB survice area, Nyakrom was chosen as 
an additional study site because it was similar in terms of size and the number of Anidaso 
policyholders. In both Brakwa and Nyakrom, people also had access to commercial life 
and non-life insurance, mainly provided by the Donewell and Unique insurance 
companies, and to public insurance schemes such as the Social Security and National 
Insurance Trust (SSNIT) and the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). 
Two focus group discussions were conducted in each of the two towns, using a purposive 
sampling frame. With the help of the local sales agents, groups of different professional 
associations were approached, which had previously attended information sessions on the 
Anidaso policy. GLICO typically targets its marketing efforts towards groups in order to 
reduce marketing costs. At the end of the information sessions, attendants are allowed to 
purchase the policy on the spot. Therefore, a substantial number of the professional 
associations’ members in Brakwa and Nyakrom were microinsured. In Brakwa, one focus 
group (comprised only of females) consisted of market women, whereas the other group 
(males) consisted of members of a farmers association. In Nyakrom, one group (females) 
was composed of members of a dressmakers group, while the other (males) was composed 
of participants involved in construction/masonry. These professions can be considered to 
be typical for the target group of microinsurance. Focus group participants were not paid 
for their attendance of the discussion; but they received free soft drinks and a meal. 
Attendance of the focus group discussions was not obligatory, but the groups selected the 
desired number of eight participants per focus group among themselves.79 The only 
intervention from the research team was to require that half of the participants of each 
focus group were insured and the other half were not insured. Hearing the views of both 
existing and potential microinsurance clients was considered an important aspect in the 
design of the focus group discussions. The potential clients are those that have not 
purchased the micro life insurance, although they belong to the group of people that was 
approached by the insurance provider. Non-insured members were deliberately invited 
from the same associations, and not anyone else from the towns, because they were the 
most likely to also have had direct exposure to the micro life insurance in an information 
session. Furthermore, inviting participants from real groups is often advised for the 
79 As a result, it might well be that there was a self-selection of the more extrovert and potentially more 
influential people from the respective real groups in the focus group discussions. However, this holds equally 
true for all members who chose to participate, both the insured and the non-insured.   
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conduct of focus group discussions as they share certain experiences, opinions, and 
incidents in their daily lives - a common ground - that increases their willingness to 
exchange thoughts and ideas compared with strangers (Kitzinger 1994; Loos and Schäffer 
2012).  
One can therefore expected a greater stimulus for the discussion, provoking the elaboration 
of arguments and counterarguments, from introducing heterogeneity in terms of the 
insurance status of participants (Wibeck et al. 2007). In addition, separate discussions with 
insured participants on the one hand and non-insured participants on the other hand could 
have been less focused on the primary interest of the value perceived in micro life 
insurance among the non-insured participants. This is because, naturally, they have had 
less interaction with the insurance provider as compared to those who have purchased the 
Anidaso policy. The challenge of having insured and non-insured participants in one 
group, however, consisted in the possibility of the non-insured people not feeling at ease – 
because the issue of interest was insurance – and, hence, not participating equally in the 
discussion. The result section will return to this issue.  
Having separate male and female groups appeared important in order to make group 
participants feel comfortable in speaking about their behaviour and experiences in financial 
matters (Morgan 1997). Often, financial decision making in Ghana is separated between 
men and women. Even within households, spouses often do not have full information 
about each other’s financial budget and respective sources (Doss 1996; Goldstein 1999).  
The discussions were held by two moderators from the Institute of Statistical, Social and 
Economic Research (ISSER), who had considerable experience with focus group 
discussions.80 One of the moderators led the female groups, while the other moderated the 
male groups. Even though the moderators introduced themselves as researchers, some 
focus group participants thought they represented GLICO. Hence, the moderators clarified 
their role again in those groups where misconceptions were prevalent. However, even in 
the group that needed most of this clarification, the point was understood by all 
participants approximately after the first fifteen minutes of the discussion. 
80 Before the conduct of the actual discussions, both moderators were trained, and they moderated two pilot 
focus group discussions in Accra. 
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The discussions were semi-structured and the moderators used discussion guidelines. To 
elicit the client value, beliefs and understandings of micro life insurance and other 
available types of insurance, the guidelines distinguished between three main discussion 
areas: a) application of different risk management strategies in cases of death and illness, 
and perception of the value of these, b) experiences with, knowledge about, and valuation 
of insurance in general and the micro life insurance in particular, and c) factors influencing 
the decision to buy insurance. All discussions were held in the local language, Twi, and 
were recorded using digital audio and video recorders. They were then completely 
transcribed and translated into English by the moderators. The transcripts were made 
anonymous.  
5.3.2. Data analysis 
The analysis was guided by the conceptual framework outlined above, keeping different 
models of client value as well as different context factors in mind. In a first cycle of open 
coding, value items and context factors were identified that were then grouped into 
categories. It turned out that these categories were broadly in line with several of the 
previous contributions in the marketing literature, especially Parasuraman et al. (1988) on 
the attributes of service quality, Sweeney and Soutar (2001) and Sánchez et al. (2006) on 
the specific dimensions of client value, and Pura and Gummerus (2008) on the context. 
Hence, in the refinement of the coding scheme, a flexible approach was used that allowed a 
mix of deductively and inductively developed codes (Friese 2012; Saldaña 2013). The 
coding approach to the transcript data included an eclectic combination of attribute, 
magnitude, descriptive, process, affective, and pattern (Ibid.). From the identified value 
items respective value attributes could be derived (that are more abstract and general), 
which, subsequently, defined the overall higher-level value dimensions. In some cases, the 
value items are directly summarised in value dimensions, if there were only few observed 
value items making aggregation into attributes difficult (in the case of social value) or if 
the value items appeared to be too specific to the case of life insurance (in the case of 
consumption outcome). In a similar manner, all aspects related to the context of the focus 
group participants were coded and structured by developing higher-level context factors. 
Furthermore, the codes captured the evaluative tendency of statements made by the focus 
group participants and whether or not these were based on own experiences with the micro 
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life insurance. The transcript data was coded and analyzed using the qualitative data 
analysis software Atlas.ti. 
In what is termed group-to-group validation, the analysis explores the value that clients 
perceive in micro life insurance by identifying how many groups mention a specific topic, 
how many statements of the same type are made in each group, and whether reactions 
towards certain topics are similar or different across the groups (Morgan 1997). The 
interest here is not in absolute numbers of the codes, but rather on whether there are 
substantially more statements of one type as compared with another and whether and how 
they are interrelated.81 Beyond these rather quantitative means of investigation, the main 
analysis consists in the in-depth interpretation of the coded data. Verbatim quotations of 
the transcripts are presented to illustrate the patterns and key issues of client value that 
emerge from the discussions.  
One issue that became obvious during the coding excercise was that the focus group 
participants in all groups, but especially in the Brakwa female group and the Nyakrom 
male group, referred to an Anidaso group when, instead, they should have been talking 
about the Anidaso insurance. Indieed in both towns there existed various social, financial 
and occupational groups, which is typical across Ghana. In Brakwa, there was even one 
self-help group called Anidaso (‘help’) and there is a slight chance that the participants of 
the Brakwa female group indeed talked about this group. However, the context in which 
most of the respective statements were made suggests that the participants referred to the 
Anidaso insurance, rather than to a specific group. All statements about the Anidaso group 
are thus treated in the same way as those statements that unequivocally referred to the 
insurance.82   
81 Interrelation of codes refers to incidences where codes overlap, co-occur, or follow one another. The 
investigation of these interrelations allows us to detect common patterns underlying the data (Friese 2012). 
Thereby it was possible to discover, for example, that emotional value attributes are often connected to 
certain quality attributes.   
82 One can suspect that the confusion of insurance and groups comes from the fact that the focus group 
participants are more familiar with the idea of mutual help groups than with the concept of insurance. In 
addition, they are often approached by the insurance staff in the context of their groups and group meetings.  
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5.4 Results from the focus group discussions 
5.4.1 General observations 
The multidimensional approach to client value turns out to be relevant and appropriate in 
the focus group discussions. The participants do not only talk about benefits and sacrifices 
related to micro life insurance, but also discuss a wide range of value items that can be 
ultimately summarized in five dimensions of client value. As illustrated in Figure 4, the 
participants discussed microinsurance with respect to emotional value, social value, and 
different forms of functional value, in line with Sweeney and Soutar (2001) and Sánchez et 
al. (2006). Beside the functional value dimensions of quality and costs, the results of the 
coding suggest consumption outcome as a separate form of functional value. This relates to 
the perceived consequences of insurance consumption (Woodruff and Flint 2006) and, in 
particular, the perceived insurance benefits that the micro life insurance provides.83  
Emotional value, quality and consumption outcome are the value dimensions that receive 
the greatest attention in the focus group discussions in terms of the number of statements 
made, the respective length of discussion, and the variety of items revealed under each 
dimension (reflected in Figure 4 by the bold box lines).84 Costs as well as social value are 
less extensively addressed (reflected in Figure 4 by the dashed box lines).85 This does not 
imply that costs and social value are unimportant in contributing to overall value 
perceptions.   
83 Some authors recognise that service quality may have several components, one for the process of the 
service delivery and one for the outcome of the service delivery (Grönroos 1982; Rust and Oliver 1994). The 
classification made here follows these authors to some extent, but the outcome component is depicted as an 
own value dimension beside quality.    
84 See also Table 30 and Figure 6 in the Appendix. 
85 This pattern is not specific to the micro life insurance, but is mirrored with regard to other types of 
insurance. The focus group participants discuss the National Health Insurance Scheme and health insurance 
in general, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust, other life insurance schemes, property and fire 
insurance, funeral insurance, and insurance as such. Taking all value codes together, the majority of 
contributions (about three quarters of all codes) are related to the micro life insurance. 
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   Source: Authors’ own illustration 
Figure 4: Perceived value dimensions and attributes 
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The value dimensions turn out to be interrelated, rather than independent from one another, 
as suggested by Sheth et al. (1991). This is in line with Sweeney and Soutar (2001) who 
claim that purchasing an attractive good is likely to simultaneously evoke favourable 
functional as well as emotional or social responses. Of course, the same is true in the 
opposite (negative) direction. In the empirical setting of this study, there are particularly 
strong links between emotional value and quality (reflected in Figure 4 by connecting 
arrows). There is also some indication for links between emotional value and consumption 
outcome, between social value and consumption outcome as well as between emotional 
and social value (dashed arrows in Figure 4). 
The value perceptions revealed in the focus group discussions are not necessarily based on 
participants’ own experiences with micro life insurance. Own experiences refer to 
incidences of purchasing the policy, making use of customer service, asserting a claim, or 
consuming payout benefits. This holds true for the non-insured participants (by definition), 
but also for the insured participants. Many of the insured participants did not have contact 
with the insurance provider after purchasing the Anidaso policy. They are therefore similar 
to the non-insured participants in the sense that they have not used the insurance for risk 
management. Insured and non-insured participants also rarely base their value assessments 
on the processing of (objective) information about insurance coverage and associated 
services. In the majority of cases, perceptions are instead based on visions (Woodruff and 
Flint 2006) and expectations of what insurance in general and the micro life insurance in 
particular entails. The insured participants make, on average, more statements on the value 
that they perceive in micro life insurance than the non-insured participants. Nevertheless, 
there turn out to be no noteworthy differences in what they say about the value perceived.  
The value dimensions as well as their underlying attributes do not carry clear evaluative 
connotations (Lemmink et al. 1998). Their underlying items may have a negative or a 
positive inclination, depending on how they are described by the focus group participants. 
For example, when the participants discuss items of service quality, such as attention by 
the sales agents, they may note that the attention was either more than expected or 
insufficient and hence assess the quality as being either high or low. Similarly, costs may 
be judged as high or adequate. Many of the value items are discussed in the context of 
specific life events, shock scenarios or encounters with the insurance provider and are 
portrayed as either negative or positive in that particular situation.  
 
137 
 
Overall, the micro life insurance is perceived in a very positive way in the two female 
groups and the Nyakrom male group. The Brakwa male group shows some divergence 
from the other groups, with a high concentration of negative statements. In this group, one 
participant had a negative experience with the customer service of the insurance provider. 
This participant’s contributions dominate the discussion and strongly influence the other 
participants in their assessment of the value of micro life insurance. Subsequently, 
participants in this group talk about certain value items, which appear much less or not at 
all in the other groups. Therefore, the picture that emerges from the Brakwa male group 
may be an extraordinary one. However, one can well imagine that more of such negative 
experiences and subsequent value judgments would have emerged, had one conducted a 
larger number of focus group discussions or done research over a longer period of time 
(such that the focus group participants were able to draw upon more experiences).  
5.4.2 Perceived value dimensions and underlying attributes  
The following section elaborates on each one of the five value dimensions and their 
underlying attributes. The meaning of these dimensions and attributes in the empirical 
setting of micro life insurance are illustrated by presenting the value items they are 
composed of. The section concentrates on value items that are mentioned across more than 
just one group, although others are mentioned when relevant. Table 30 in the Appendix 
lists all value items.  
5.4.2.1 Functional value: consumption outcome  
Woodruff and Flint (2006) note that clients perceive value in the consequences that the 
consumption of a specific good or service promises. Such value may also be perceived if 
the good or service is not actually used but intended to be used. This perfectly describes 
the identified consumption outcome dimension. The focus group participants discuss the 
consumption outcome in terms of the insurance benefits they have received or expect to 
receive as a result of being insured. Many of these benefits are specific to the case of life 
insurance and may not be reproducable with regard to other types of insurance. Hence, 
different to the other value dimensions, this functional value dimension is decribed merely 
in terms of the value items that are discussed, rather than by intermediate value attributes, 
which might anyways not be applicable to other types of insurance.  
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Among these are a whole range of perceived benefits that are thought to contribute to the 
value of the micro life insurance but that are not actually part of the policy. Beside the 
(true) benefits of a payout after death, a pension plan, and the financing of hospitalization 
costs86, participants across all groups perceive many other benefits in micro life insurance. 
Most commonly mentioned is the rather unspecific notion that it will help in the future. 
Participants typically think the insurance would cover almost any type of problem that 
might befall them. This overly positive, but unspecific view on microinsurance is 
particularly transmitted in the Brakwa female group. 
“We should pay this money monthly so if one day if something happens to you 
and you see them eh eh! it means that they will take care of you or help you, 
that is why we also joined. We all have hope.“ (Brakwa, female, insured) 
“That insurance, how I understand it is that you have put something down to 
help you at the time you are in some difficulty, so, that thing you have put 
down, that is what will take you out of that difficulty.“ (Nyakrom, male, non-
insured) 
These examples demonstrate that there is either a widespread lack of knowledge on the 
specific type of help that the micro life insurance provides or, if the participants are aware 
of the actual insurance benefits, they nevertheless convey the picture of insurance as a 
panacea to their peers.  
Very important in terms of the perceived benefits is the idea that the micro life insurance 
covers all kinds of medical treatments. Other perceived benefits include help to repay 
loans, help to progress (related to employment and business investments), and other 
payouts (sometimes referred to as loans) that are not actually related to any insured event. 
The women in Brakwa emphasize the perceived benefits of funds to finance children’s 
education and payments for fire or construction damage. Focus group participants often 
consider micro life insurance in relation to their own personal experiences of shocks and 
difficulties, rather than the specific terms and conditions of the policy. 
“Right now the difficulties I’ve encountered, not being in the group, now, if I 
were in the group, when my child completed school, I will have helped her 
continue. […] I have to join so that I can get money to further her education.“ 
(Brakwa, female, non-insured) 
86 Note that the coverage of hospitalization costs does not entail any costs of medical treatment, but just a 
contribution to the expenses for the overnight stays.  
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 “[…]based on this group, employment can come into this town. Based on 
what? This Anidaso group, jobs could come into this town so it can gain a big 
name, if it gets a big name, it can let the whole Agonaman, people will hear 
about it and they will come and join this Anidaso group.“ (Nyakrom, male, 
insured) 87 
These and several other comments across the focus group discussions reveal that many 
participants have not fully understood the terms and conditions of the Anidaso policy and 
base their value assessments on false impressions about the insurance benefits. Such 
impressions are often passed on to other focus group participants. Some insured 
participants try to convince the non-insured participants to purchase the micro life 
insurance, holding out the prospect of various kinds of help that would then be provided to 
them. 
Ideas about the benefits of micro life insurance are also guided by the perceived benefits of 
other types of insurance. For example, one woman in Brakwa talks about fire in the 
mission house of her church. She proclaims that seeing how its insurance enabled the 
church to rebuild the house helped her recognize the benefits of insurance and made her 
purchase the Anidaso policy. The facts that the policy does not cover the eventuality of fire 
and that it is provided by a different insurance company do not seem to be part of this 
participant’s considerations in buying it. 
Once confronted with the true benefits of micro life insurance, perceptions of the 
consumption outcome may turn strongly negative if the true benefits are not in line with 
the envisioned benefits. This is particularly underlined in the Brakwa male group.  
“They [insurance provider] told us that […] if your child is ill you will go to 
the hospital. They made us put our hope in it, in the beginning, I didn’t want to 
do it, but when they came, they convinced us to join, I was the fourth person. 
[…] But since then, if your child falls ill, my child was ill and I came here, the 
man told me to go and see their manager. I did aaaa, and I wasn’t seeing 
anything.“ (Brakwa, male, insured) 
“I didn’t want to do it, but [sales agent] said that after three months or one 
year if we come for a loan, they will give us. So, it made me really happy, I was 
enthusiastic about it. So, after doing it for about two to three years, I was 
87 The context of the quote makes clear that the speaker vaguely addresses the insurance provider and the 
research team to help his community by providing jobs. Thereby, the participant intends to hijack the agenda 
of the focus group discussion for his own interests. This is a common peculiarity of the Nyakrom male group, 
whose participants typically make a direct connection between employment and risk management as they 
regard the possibility to generate income from their own work as the most important precondition for being 
able to manage risk. 
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coming to look for a loan. I came the first time, they didn’t mind me. I came the 
second time, they didn’t mind me. The third time, I said, I won’t come again, 
you should take it.” (Brakwa, male, insured)  
The expectation to qualify for a loan by purchasing micro life insurance appears to be a 
shared (mis)understanding across all focus groups. On the one hand, it seems that sales 
agents have commonly tried to convince potential clients to purchase the insurance with 
the promise that access to loans would become easier, given that the clients’ reputation at 
the rural bank would grow through regular premium payments. On the other hand, it is 
possible to arrange a partial withdrawal with GLICO after three years – at the earliest – if 
clients initially choose the pension plan. Apparently, this option is often sold, or 
misunderstood, as being a type of loan. 
5.4.2.2 Functional value: costs 
In line with previous contributions on client value (Sánchez et al. 2006; Sweeney and 
Soutar 2001), costs are identified as one functional value dimension, which captures both 
monetary as well as non-monetary costs. The focus group participants mainly emphasize 
the most obvious type of costs, which is the monthly premium contributions. The 
regularity of the monthly premium contributions represents a large burden for them, as it 
does not take the irregular money inflow of self-employed people and extraordinary and 
emergency expenses into account.  
“They said we should buy books,[…]so when it happens like that, it puts 
pressure on me. This job too, if you go and cut the plantain, the person who 
will buy it is the one who gives you the price […], so everything you will get, it 
means, you will have to use to help the child. So, because of that, the money I 
have to give, I have to pay in at the rural bank, so that at the end of the month, 
this one [GLICO] will also deduct theirs, which is twenty one thousand and 
some pesewas, I stopped because I was in difficulty.“ (Brakwa, male, insured)  
Furthermore, the men in Brakwa point out that premium payments for micro life insurance 
come at the expense of short-term savings. As premium payments are deducted from 
policyholders’ savings accounts at the rural bank, the respective amounts are no longer 
accessible for immediate use. Moreover, the pension plan of the Anidaso policy appears 
unattractive to them because they would have to wait a long period of time until they have 
accumulated a meaningful amount for consumption. They would like to have easy and fast 
access to the premiums paid as well as to their accumulated pension plan contributions 
when they are in need. This implies that several participants regard the Anidaso policy as a 
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savings product, rather than as insurance. In contrast to this, the women in Brakwa identify 
premium contributions as a necessity and express a belief that everybody should work hard 
to have the necessary monthly amount available in the savings account.  
Several participants across all groups emphasize the cost advantage of the micro life 
insurance in comparison to loans, because insurance does not carry interest. 
“I didn’t know they had that Anidaso thing here, so when I was bringing my 
child from the hospital and paid my debt, those that had to bear interest, they 
bore it, and those that didn’t bear, didn’t, when I paid all, I got to know that, as 
a human being when you are there, something can happen to you unexpectedly 
and you will need help.“ (Nyakrom, female, insured) 
Such comparisons with alternative risk management options, especially loans and savings 
instruments, are a typical way of judging the value of micro life insurance.  
Besides purely monetary costs, the focus group participants also discuss transaction costs, 
which, if high, are claimed to reduce the value of micro life insurance. The participants 
foresee transaction costs when they have to go to the rural bank to purchase the Anidaso 
policy or to clarify issues, such as the premium deductions or the application procedure, 
especially if they have to go several times. In this regard, micro life insurance is commonly 
compared to the alternative option of taking (informal) loans. Informal loans are viewed as 
even more costly in terms of the time and effort it takes to receive them, often referred to 
by the expression of “going round”. This is illustrated in the following dialogue between 
two participants in the context of dealing with illness. 
1st Person: “It would have helped me but I went round to look for a loan, but if 
I had joined you could have given me a loan. In case my child fell ill. I would 
have known that I there is hope that it could be treated.“  
2nd Person: “You have really worried yourself, you have really worried 
yourself.“ 
[…] 
1st Person:“ I wasn’t getting money, I wasn’t getting money“. 
2nd Person:  “Sell the things you are selling well. If you do that, the Anidaso 
group will help you so in the event of a disaster you won’t have to go to a 
friend in search of a loan.“  
(Brakwa, females, non-insured and insured) 
 
142 
 
What the participants think about the costs of the micro life insurance is often influenced 
by the experiences of peers with the same or other insurances. One of the women in 
Nyakrom, for example, intially assumed high fees associated with claiming a death benefit 
from the micro life insurance, before changing her mind following the account of a friend: 
“There is a woman I attend the same church with. She was saving with such a 
group. It was quite long, when the husband passed away, he himself told the 
children and the wife that he had insured himself so he had a little money, but 
Dad, the amount of money the children spent before getting that little money 
their father had left them.“ (Nyakrom, female, insured) 
Similar to Sweeney and Soutar's (Ibid.) empirical findings, the statements of the focus 
group participants rarely indicate a simple weighting of (monetary) costs against overall 
benefits in the sense of value-for-money as applied in some unidimensional approaches. 
5.4.2.3 Functional value: quality 
The service quality of the micro life insurance turns out to be a key dimension of client 
value.  The codes that describe quality in the trancripts can be well categorised into the five 
quality attributes (tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance and empathy) identified 
in the SERVQUAL model by Parasuraman et al. (1988). In this model, tangibles are the 
physical facilities, equipment, and appearance of personnel of the service provider. 
Reliability describes the ability to perform the promised service dependably and 
accurately. Responsiveness is understood as the willingness of employees to help clients 
and provide prompt service. Assurance implies that employees are knowledgeable, friendly 
and able to inspire trust and confidence among clients. And finally, empathy is approached 
as the caring and individualized attention that the service provider offers its clients. There 
is a clear concentration of statements on empathy, reliability and assurance related to micro 
life insurance (see Table 30). The other attributes - responsiveness and tangibles - are less 
prominently mentioned across the focus group discussions. This is not only substantiated 
by the number of statements and length of discussion, but also by the diversity of items 
grouped under these attributes.88  
88 Possibly, this is a sign that responsiveness and tangibles are less relevant aspects of service quality in the 
setting of microinsurance. Yet, due to the qualitative approach, fundamental conclusions about the relevance 
of the SERVQUAL quality attributes in the microinsurance industry cannot be drawn. In fact, the five 
separate service quality attributes as conceptualised in SERVQUAL have not remained without criticism 
(Brady and Cronin Jr 2001; Carman 1990; Cronin Jr and Taylor 1992). The adequacy and relevance of these 
quality attributes in the setting of microinsurance appears to be a highly relevant issue for future research. 
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With regard to empathy, the main items discussed across all groups are the provision of 
information by the insurance provider, and the individualized attention of sales agents 
towards the clients’ needs. This involves keeping the clients informed in a language they 
can understand and explaining the insurance product in every detail, not only at the time 
when the contract is concluded, but also later when questions come up. While all 
participants seem to consider these items as very important in their value assessment, there 
are both positive and negative evaluations of the Anidaso policy. 
“The young man who came to collect, […] he opened the way for us and gave 
us the information for us to join. When he explained it, it meant progress, we 
had to do it.“ (Brakwa, female, insured) 
“They should educate us paaa!, so we would know, because even what we are 
doing, we have not completely understood it.“ (Nyakrom, female, insured) 
The relevance that participants place on information provision is closely connected with 
perceptions of their own educational background.  
“My brothers, what I know is that, we ourselves, because we are farmers and 
our education didn’t really go forward, even when we come here, they can’t 
explain it to us well, I mean Anidaso is the only thing that, when it came, they 
were able to explain to us that if we join, it will help us in the future.“ (Brakwa, 
male, insured) 
Participants across all groups comment on the access to the Anidaso policy. They 
positively evaluate the micro life insurance both in terms of availability and eligibility, 
especially compared with other types of insurance (for example, SSNIT) that are perceived 
as reserved for workers in the formal sector. However, participants raise concerns about 
how to reach the sales agents if there are questions or if clients would like to assert a claim. 
In the Brakwa male group, one of the insured participants repeatedly claims that clients are 
not able to reach a sales agent or responsible staff at GLICO in the case of a problem. This 
perception is based on several negative experiences he has made since he contracted the 
insurance. For example, his policy document has been withheld by a sales agent, even 
though he has been paying premiums for a long period of time and has repeatedly tried to 
obtain it in order to to be able to assert claims.  
“I went there, they spoke at length and I took some of their manager’s 
numbers, but they said I shouldn’t call them but I should see [sales agent]. I 
collected [sales agent]’s number and he told me to take my certificate there. I 
took it there, when I was going I took everything else that was needed. Since 
then I haven’t heard anything, I board a car to his place, that he should just 
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give me the thing, when I go, he says it is at Cape [Cape Coast], when I go, he 
says it is in Accra. In fact it was worrying me, so I went back to the manager 
and told him that, the way they said it here, I think the mind has changed, so 
how would I lay hands on my certificate.“ (Brakwa, male, insured) 
One additional issue brought up by a man in Nyakrom with regard to empathy is the form 
of payment, which should be easy and adapted to the needs of the target group of low-
income people working in the informal sector. 
In terms of reliability, the men in Brakwa, but also other focus group participants, often 
discuss the issue of keeping service promises that are given to clients. In the majority of 
comments, the Anidaso policy is negatively evaluated in this regard.  
“In the beginning when they started and said it, a lot of people put their trust 
in them, but what they said, it didn’t happen like that. The bank, the company, 
if they are doing something and you join, then they leave you hanging. When it 
happens like that it is not good.“ (Brakwa, male, insured) 
Other reliability items that are mentioned are the delivery of prompt payout (in the case of 
a claim), the correct deduction of premiums, and the delivery of policy documents. The 
latter is a repeated issue especially in the Brakwa male group. Several participants of this 
group draw the conclusion that they should not purchase the Anidaso policy, as it does not 
seem to them to be a reliable mechanism. 
“It is what they are saying, that is what some of them are saying, those who 
went in are not seeing anything. Me on my part, I won’t put it [my money] 
there.” (Brakwa, male, non-insured) 
The key item that the focus group participants emphasize in terms of assurance is trust in 
the future benefits of the micro life insurance in terms of death-related payouts, the payout 
of the accumulated savings, or other (wrongly) perceived payouts. Across the groups, the 
participants discuss this item a lot and reveal both high and low trust, which seems to 
depend on the length and depth of their relationship with the rural bank and the sales agent. 
Other items that the participants in some of the groups regard as valuable are that the sales 
agents and the rural bank always operate with the clients’ conscious permission, for 
example when deducting premiums from client’s savings accounts or when registering 
clients, and that sales agents are credible and give trustable information. These items are 
often negatively evaluated with regard to the Anidaso policy. There have obviously been 
incidents where the sales agents processed insurance application forms without clients 
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fully understanding the implications of this and without their conscious consent to deduct 
the respective premiums from their accounts. 
“I didn’t know the young man was deducting from the money I had saved, […] 
so until the time he brought my policy to me, when I asked him that, […] He 
told me that my money at the bank was what he was deducting. Then I asked 
him that: have I told you to deduct it?“ (Nyakrom, female, insured) 
In terms of responsiveness and tangibles, there are only few items discussed, mostly 
revealed in only one of the groups. Related to negative personal experiences in the Brakwa 
male group, participants talk about the possibility to exit the Anidaso policy and withdraw 
their premium and pension plan contributions. One woman in Brakwa and one woman in 
Nyakrom consider the prompt and easy delivery of a payout after a claim and the 
immediate coverage of the policy valuable, respectively. Tangibles generally seem to be of 
least interest to the participants. Only the women in Brakwa make reference to the 
presence of an office and the existence of a policy document, and one woman in Nyakrom 
values the name of the policy. 
5.4.2.4 Emotional value  
As emphasized by the multidimensional models of client value, affections play a large role 
in perceiving value in goods and services (Sánchez-Fernandez and Iniesta-Bonillo 2007). 
This is confirmed in the focus group discussions where both positive and negative 
emotions turn out to be very important for judging the value of micro life insurance.  
The most common emotional value attribute associated with the Anidaso policy (but also 
other types of insurance) is a sense of security that is conveyed by being insured. More 
specifically, participants associate being insured with the feeling of hope that they will be 
compensated for future losses. They believe that insurance will result in a positive outcome 
when they experience difficulties or shocks and hence in an ultimate improvement of their 
general livelihood. Another feeling commonly expressed in this regard is “peace of 
mind”89.  
This refers to reduced worries about the future prior to an insured event and relief 
afterwards. 
89 The code “peace of mind” evolved as an In Vivo code derived directly from the respective (translated) 
expressions of the participants. 
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“Now, you see that, this insurance I have, and you don’t, now when I look at 
my life, I am more relaxed than those who don’t have it.“ (Brakwa, female, 
insured) 
In addition, one woman in Brakwa feels supported by the micro life insurance in her ability 
to self-control and prevent spending all her money on immediate consumption. This 
feeling is also expressed by several participants when talking about formal and informal 
savings options. However, in three out of the four groups participants feel confused with 
regard to the functioning and outcomes of micro life insurance, which negatively 
contributes to the sense of security. In two groups, participants feel worried. 
A second attribute of emotional value is a status of good mood. In two out of the four 
groups, participants mention feelings of happiness or joy that go along with having micro 
life insurance, or that they feel strong, in the sense of being prepared for shocks, and proud 
or even superior to others who are not insured. The third identified emotional value 
attribute is wish satisfaction. This is only found in the Brakwa male group and purely 
consists of negative emotions. These mainly include the feelings of disappointment and 
dissatisfaction with the insurance provider.  
There is a tendency of (especially negative) emotional value assessments to coincide with 
contributions on the quality dimension. For example, when evaluating the level and type of 
information provided by the insurance provider (empathy), participants express feelings of 
confusion, and jealousy - men feel that women receive more information - at the same 
time. Similarly, when the participants talk about the delivery of service after a claim 
(reliability) or the approachability of the insurance provider (empathy), they 
simultaneously express anger or disappointment as the micro life insurance supposedly 
does not meet their expectations on these aspects. In fact, many of the quality items that 
describe reliability and assurance are connected with the issue of trust. Trust may not 
actually be clearly distinguished from an emotion and is closely related to the sense of 
security identified above. In line with the SERVQUAL approach, however, the issue of 
trust is only captured under the respective quality items. The following statement illustrates 
that, when participants do not rate the approachability of the insurance provider as well as 
the credibility of the service (assurance) very high, it can lead to unfavourable emotions, 
such as worry.    
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“We are a bit scared that in the future if you are in difficulty, they will throw 
you up and down and you don’t know whom to go to.“ (Nyakrom, female, 
insured)  
In some cases, participants also reveal positive feelings in relation to key quality attributes, 
as demonstrated by the following statement.  
“If you are insured, you can go to the young man that brother. This is what has 
happened to me. Even if it doesn’t go well for him to give you your money, he 
can sympathize with you for you to have hope and be assured so even the 
problem, or the plenty worries will be reduced a bit.“ (Brakwa female, 
insured)  
The participant indicates that the sales agent provides individualized attention to the need 
of clients, even if not necessarily in the form of a financial payout. Of particular value to 
the participant in this scenario is the emotional support that may be given to her during the 
(potential) encounter with the sales agent.  
Furthermore, participants react strongly to other participants’ value assessments when they 
refer to emotional value. Typically, they imitate the shared positive or negative attitude of 
others. They even recognize this spill-over effect themselves and point out that potential 
clients in their communities are likely to react to the experiences of already insured clients 
by devaluating or appreciating the micro life insurance accordingly.  
“He will not join the thing, then he has seen that, this thing, some brother of 
his has gone to join and it has not helped him. Just like our brother here is 
saying that [pointing to other participant] even his child, this illness he had, if 
it wasn’t by God’s grace that he sold his things, like the child, the illness will 
have killed him, you see, so something like that, if someone sees something like 
that, then his mind begins to waver for fear of joining.“ (Brakwa, male, 
insured)  
5.4.2.5 Social value 
As orginally indicated by Sheth et al. (1991), many goods and sevices are consumed 
because of the social image they evoke or because they allow for identification with a 
particular social group. There is very little of such behaviour in the setting of the micro life 
insurance that is studied here, which does not necessarily mean that it is not present. The 
main social value item highlighted across all groups is the perceived possibility to help the 
remaining family, especially the children, by leaving a bequest. One woman in Brakwa 
mentions the desire that all of the professional group members should become insured in 
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order to equalize the group and share a common ground. Similarly, especially in the 
Nyakrom male group, participants perceive the Anidaso policy as a way to demonstrate to 
others in the community the supportive and progressive nature of solidarity principles 
within the community.90  
5.5 Discussion: Formation of value perceptions 
This section discusses the relevance of expectations and experiences for the formation of 
value perceptions. Subsequently, it investigates the context factors that help to explain why 
the focus group participants formed the value perceptions they did. The findings are 
represented by the conceptual model in Figure 5. 
5.5.1 Expectations and experiences 
As mentioned above, the value perceived by the focus group participants in micro life 
insurance is mostly based on visions and expectations, rather than on prior experiences. 
Therefore,  a substantial share of the identified value dimensions may be regarded as 
expected value, as opposed to received value (Flint and Woodruff 2001; Woodruff 1997).  
It is important to note that insurance is generally very difficult to evaluate, as it contains 
only few so-called search properties but many credence and experience properties 
(Parasuraman et al. 1985; Zeithaml et al. 2009). In contrast to search properties, which can 
be examined prior to purchasing a good or service, experience properties are best evaluated 
after a good or service has been purchased and consumed. Credence properties, however, 
are impossible to understand and assess with certainty even after consumption.91 
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that value perceptions vis-à-vis insurance can never be 
fully based on experiences and objective information. Instead, part of the value perceptions 
will always be based on expectations, simply because insurance is hard to assess. 
 
90 It appears that they refer to the power of groups but it remains unclear what exactly they mean.  
91 This would, for instance, refer to the adequate level of premiums or insurance payouts that are hardly 
possible to assess without substantial actuarial knowledge.    
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Figure 5: Context factors and client value of micro life insurance 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration  
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There is a tendency among the focus group participants to perceive low value in micro life 
insurance in the emotional, quality and cost dimensions of value (often in combination) 
when these are based on service experiences. In fact, these are the only perceptions of 
value that clients could have based on experiences and consequently could have compared 
the experiences with their prior expectations. This is because these dimensions are situated 
in the service process domain (Lemmink et al. 1998), which comprises all interactions with 
the insurance provider, starting with attending an information session. On the contrary, the 
consumption outcome dimension and, to a lesser extent, the social value are by and large 
assessed on the basis of expectations, as these dimensions are part of the service outcome 
domain (Ibid.). An assessment of this requires more experiences with the micro life 
insurance, most importantly to have asserted a claim. As exemplified in some of the 
quotations above, the majority of these latter evaluations are positive. Yet, the expected 
value attributes are often incorrect and/or very vaguely specified, for example when 
participants assume that the Anidaso policy will provide benefits not only in the case of 
death, but also in the case of any other hazardous event.  
While the analysis does not allow for a longitudinal view on the process of value formation 
and its determinants – and hence it’s changing nature over time – it demonstrates that the 
interaction of expectations and experiences appears to be of great relevance for the value 
judgements of the focus group participants. When they have made experiences with the 
micro life insurance, these experiences seem to have induced re-evaluations, and 
sometimes to have formed new expectations, of the value perceived. For example, the 
experience that sales agents pay little individualized attention to clients leads to an 
understanding that other aspects of micro life insurance will also be performed badly, 
which, in turn, makes clients consider exiting the contract. This is in line with the 
expectancy-disconfirmation paradigm outlined in the marketing literature (Oh 1999; Oliver 
1980; Woodruff 1997). This paradigm describes that expectations of the value of a good or 
service are formed before the first experience with this good or service is made, and the 
expectations are either confirmed or disconfirmed with later experiences. This process 
influences both the post-purchase attitudes and perceptions of clients and their future 
purchase decisions. The results further suggest that this interaction between expectations 
and experiences strongly feeds back into the relationship with the insurance provider as 
well as the influence of peers (shown by the arrow from experiences to the interaction 
context factor in Figure 5), as further substantiated below. 
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5.5.2 Personal background, risk management framework, and interaction 
The results of this study reveal three major context factors that shape client value in micro 
life insurance, as shown in Figure 5. These factors are the personal background, the 
prevailing risk management framework, and the interaction of clients with the insurance 
provider as well as their peers. They may or may not be specific to the empirical setting of 
the focus group discussions in southern Ghana. Further research is needed to find out 
whether these factors are equally important in other local settings and for other types of 
microinsurance. 
First, client value is interrelated with the personal background of clients. This refers mostly 
to the personal knowledge about insurance.92 The majority of evaluative statements in the 
focus groups relating to the Anidaso policy are based on very imprecise and sometimes 
erroneous knowledge about the specific details of the insurance coverage. Many 
participants openly state that they have limited education in general and have difficulties to 
understand explanations given by the insurance provider. Others mention that they simply 
have had too limited opportunities to accumulate knowledge about the funtioning of 
insurance in general or the micro life insurance in particular. While the general concept of 
insurance offering a benefit in the case of damage seems to be understood by many focus 
group participants, there is often uncertainty about the specific benefits included, the exact 
procedures behind insurance, and the way that one obtains coverage, as also found in other 
focus group discussions on microinsurance (Thornton et al. 2010). Such a lack of 
knowledge has important consequences for the perceptions of the value of micro life 
insurance. In our empirical case, there is evidence that people project either their wishful 
thinking or their unfounded negative ideas onto insurance.  
Second, client value of micro life insurance is shaped by the existing risk management 
framework. This is particularly true for the perceived insurance benefits. The focus group 
participants judge whether the Anidaso policy would provide valuable benefits in the 
context of the shocks that they or others in their community typically experience. The main 
shocks and difficulties that are mentioned are illness, death and funerals, children’s 
education (which is a concern especially to the women in Brakwa), and weather-related 
92 The value perceived in the micro life insurance seems to be related to other personal characteristics as well. 
For example, personal beliefs, such as considering self-reliance a better behaviour as compared to reliance on 
others in times of hardship, appear to be relevant. However, the exact role of such personal characteristics for 
the perceived value in micro life insurance remains inconclusive in the data at hand.   
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housing damage. In this context, the participants express the personal financial needs that 
result from such shocks. Most prominantly, they emphasize their need for finance to fund 
their children’s education, medical treatments, and funerals. These specific financial needs 
account for many of the unrealistic expected benefits in the sense of wishful thinking. 
Furthermore, the value of micro life insurance is typically assessed in comparison with 
other types of insurance or alternative risk management options. Particularly, this applies 
to evaluations of the costs of micro life insurance, the empathy, and emotional value 
attributes. This comparative behaviour is in line with the argument of McCord et al. 
(2012b: 2) that (potential) microinsurance clients “weigh the perceived value of insurance 
against the value of other available strategies for coping with the risk, such as liquidating 
savings or assets, or informal risk-sharing with families or communities”. The focus group 
participants view other types of insurance, such as the SSNIT or private commercial 
insurance, as inaccessible and too expensive for them. This leads to high value perceived in 
micro life insurance. In contrast, the NHIS is mostly positively evaluated throughout the 
discussions and regarded as beneficial, easily accessible and thus valuable. Possibly, this is 
because the NHIS is explicitly targeted at the entire population and hence covers a large 
share of low-income people through which they feel included and appreciated. 
Interestingly, this does not lead to low value perceived in micro life insurance. The 
participants seem to transfer their experiences with and expectations from NHIS to the 
micro life insurance. It is possible that this even extends to the concrete insurance benefits, 
because the focus group participants frequently expect medical expenses to be covered by 
the Anidaso policy. Comparisons with alternative risk management options induce either 
high (in the case of informal loans or depletion of assets) or low (in the case of savings) 
value perceived in micro life insurance.  
Third, client value is based on the interaction of the focus group participants with the 
insurance provider as well as with their peers. One way of interaction with the provider 
comes in the form of marketing efforts and the delivery of information, for example in the 
group meetings of professional associations. The information conveyed here is very 
relevant for clients’ judgment of the value of micro life insurance, because of the inherent 
difficulty to assess insurance as well as clients’ limited knowledge on financial matters 
outlined above. Much of the insufficient knowledge about the exact terms and conditions 
of the micro life insurance seems to result from incorrect information given by the sales 
agents. The reason for this may be that these are ill informed themselves due to a lack of 
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training by GLICO. Another reason, which should not be underestimated, seems to be an 
adverse incentive structure. Sales agents receive a bonus for each sold insurance policy, 
but not for subsequent customer services. Furthermore, considerable deficits in 
management practices of the insurance provider became evident during the field work, 
which contribute to erroneous expectations as well as confusion among the focus group 
participants. For instance, the debiting of premiums is not transparent for clients and the 
delivery of their policy documents is not always reliable, resulting in frequent insecurities 
about their actual insurance status.  
Another interaction factor that influences value perceptions is the relationship that clients 
have with the insurance provider, especially the rural bank and the sales agents. For 
example, the focus group participants express positive or negative evaluations of trust in 
future benefits (assurance), service delivery (reliability) or attention provision (empathy) 
when they have had previous positive or negative encounters, respectively, with the rural 
bank. It is also evident that participants emphasize the importance to personally know the 
insurance sales agent. When their expectations on the insurance product and related 
services are not fulfilled, they often express personal disappointment by the particular sales 
agent in charge.93 The discussions indicate that it is not uncommon that clients seek out 
sales agents at their homes. This relational aspect is rarely addressed by the literature on 
client value, even though the relationship between clients and provider might have a large 
effect on the overall client value (Ravald and Grönroos 1996). This is because maintaining 
a positive relationship may increase tolerance of clients towards occasionally low 
performance and encourage trust and loyalty of clients, subsequently increasing client 
value.    
Many value assessments in the focus group discussions are associated with the influence of 
peers. This peer influence takes place internally within the focus groups, but also 
externally in terms of what people have heard about the micro life insurance and other 
types of insurance in their communities. With regard to the internal peer influence, the 
insured participants in the Brakwa female group, for example, repeatedly attempt to 
convince their non-insured peers about the value of the micro life insurance. This 
behaviour even turns into a form of pressure on the non-insured participants to purchase 
the Anidaso policy as soon as possible. In the opposite way, the one participant in the 
93 It is likely that the importance of the personal relationships between clients and bank staff as well as 
insurance sales agents is also related to the fact that many of them come from and reside in the same towns. 
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Brakwa male group whose expectations were strongly disappointed passes on his negative 
perceptions to other participants as well. As shown by Swenson et al. (1992), participants 
may learn as a result of their participation in focus group discussions and, in some cases, 
take action based on this learning experience. This implies that focus group discussions 
help convey information – in this case, both with regard to the Anidaso policy as well as to 
other types of insurance – and sometimes take on the form of interventions. Given that 
microinsurance, including the Anidaso policy, is often sold by approaching existing 
groups, this can provide good indications of real-life scenarios in the distribution of 
insurance products. In addition, this allows us to derive some indications about the way 
knowledge on microinsurance is generated and influenced by social networks. It was 
almost certain that bringing together insured and non-insured participants in the focus 
groups would not only stimulate debates on the value of micro life insurance, but also 
‘provoke an orientation to action’ (Kleiber 2004: 97). Since the non-insured group 
participants have less experience with insurance, they are drawn towards the viewpoints of 
the insured. Along these lines, in both Brakwa groups the non-insured participants follow 
the evaluation tendency – negative or positive – revealed by their insured counterparts, 
whom they seem to respect as some kind of experts on the matter.  
With regard to the external peer influence, both positive and negative value perceptions are 
based on the experiences and narratives of people with insurance in the participants’ 
community. In many cases, participants relate to the specific encounters of relatives and/or 
friends with insurance and some participants link such stories to their own value judgments 
and their decision to purchase (or not) the Anidaso policy. The fact that other people’s 
experience with insurance is important for the formation of one’s own perception is 
substantiated by the narratives of how participants came to know about available types of 
insurance. It appears that hearsay is a very common way of learning about insurance.94 
These findings are in line with earlier research on microinsurance, which shows that many 
households that buy microinsurance do so on the advice of others or know others who have 
already claimed insurance benefits (Giné et al. 2008; Morsink and Geurts 2011).95 In 
Ghana, Jehu-Appiah et al. (2011) find that peer pressure has a significant and cumulative 
94 TV programs as a source of information are also mentioned. There are several TV and radio programs in 
Ghana that aim at providing financial literacy to the public.  
95 This phenomenon is not specific to microinsurance. In their seminal work, Kunreuther et al. (1978), for 
example, find that in the United States one of the main distinctions between people who purchased disaster 
insurance and those who did not is that the former had acquaintance with others who had also taken out such 
insurance. 
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effect on individuals’ perceptions of the quality, costs, and benefits of insurance within a 
community. In their empirical setting, this results in a negative effect of peer influence on 
consequent enrolment into the National Health Insurance Scheme. A previous negative 
experience with insurance (staff, claims procedures, and so on) shared among peers can 
thus substantially alter another person’s perceived value of it, resulting in a negation of any 
contact with the provider and a disinterest in information about the specific insurance 
product. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the perceived client value of a micro life insurance product in 
southern Ghana. The analysis was based on data obtained from focus group discussions 
and included the views of both existing and potential clients. This allowed us to observe a 
broad set of perceptions that emerge before and after people purchase insurance products. 
The chapter drew a first conceptual sketch of the dimensions that constitute client value. It 
became evident that earlier contributions on client value in the marketing literature, which 
typically investigated value in industrialised countries, provide a useful guide to study 
client value in microinsurance in developing countries. As in many models of client value, 
value was found to be a multidimensional concept. The chapter also investigated how and 
why focus group participants form the value perceptions they do.   
The analysis showed that, in the setting of micro life insurance, clients base their 
perceptions of value on five dimensions, namely quality, costs, consumption outcome (all 
three are forms of functional value), emotional value, and social value. Among these, the 
focus group participants place high emphasis on the dimensions of quality, consumption 
outcome, and emotional value. In terms of quality, they mainly judge whether or not the 
insurance provider performs its services dependably and accurately (reliability), inspires 
trust and confidence among them (assurance), and provides caring and individualised 
attention (empathy). With regard to the consumption outcome, they perceive value in a 
range of insurance benefits that they expect to receive. Emotional value is mostly 
expressed by a sense of security (“peace of mind”) induced by insurance coverage. It is 
important to mention that these aspects of client value may not be the most important to the 
focus group participants, but instead the most controversial. Future research that applies 
quantitative methodologies, such as in Lemmink et al. (1998), de Ruyter et al. (1997), 
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Sweeney and Soutar (2001) and Sánchez et al. (2006), is needed to investigate the relative 
importance of different dimensions and their attributes. Furthermore, beyond the rather 
narrow empirical setting of this study (two small towns in Ghana), research in different 
empirical settings could develop the proposed conceptual model of client value further. 
The value perceived in micro life insurance was shown to be shaped by the gap between 
expectations of and experiences in combination with a number of contextual factors. On 
the one hand, large discrepancies between expectations and experiences reduce the value 
perceived in the insurance considerably. For example, the focus group participants have 
unrealistic expectations of insurance benefits, anticipating payouts for a large variety of 
damages that are not covered in the policy. For the time being, these expectations mostly 
lead to a high perceived value of micro life insurance. However, as soon as people’s 
understandings are altered through engagement with the realities of the inusrance product, 
perceived value is promptly adjusted downwards. 
On the other hand, perceptions of high or low value depend on a range of contextual 
factors.  Three factors turn out to be of central relevance. First, the focus group participants 
have insufficient knowledge about insurance and financial matters in general. They often 
base their value judgments on very imprecise and sometimes erroneous information about 
the insurance policy, which leads to idealistically positive as well as overly negative 
judgments. Second, the focus group participants typically value micro life insurance in 
comparison with other types of insurance or alternative ways of coping with risk. For 
example, they appreciate the greater accessibility of micro life insurance relative to the 
SSNIT or conventional life insurance. Micro life insurance is often seen as less valuable 
than savings options, but is viewed as a more dignified way of coping with the risk of 
death than loans, especially when the latter are informal and depend on the goodwill of 
others. Third, peer influence plays a large role in the sense that positive and negative value 
perceptions are conveyed to the focus group participants by experiences and expectations 
expressed by fellow participants or other community members.  
Finally, there are several implications of the findings for insurance providers. As far as the 
main findings from the focus group discussions are reflective of general judgments of 
microinsurance and perceptions of its value, insurance providers could be well advised to 
pay more attention to the provision of (correct) information so that there is no room for 
false expectations to evolve on the side of the clients. The obvious danger is that those 
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clients whose expectations are not met are left perceiving low value in microinsurance 
products. However, arguably the more significant implication is multiplication of such 
negative perceptions through peer networks. This is potentially of high relevance in 
developing countries where people do not have much access to provider information about 
specific insurance products but, instead, rely on peers as their main source of knowledge. 
Ultimately, it is of crucial importance that insurance providers understand the clients’ 
perspective and invest in a long-term relationship by offering attentive and ongoing 
customer service (instead of rewarding sales agents on the basis of contract conclusions 
alone). Utilizing the multiplicative effect of peer influence in a positive way requires the 
maintaining of good relationships with existing clients in order to reduce the risk of losing 
large numbers of potential clients.  
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5.7 Appendix 
Table 30: Code sheet of perceived value in the micro life insurance scheme 
Value dimensions 
Attributes 
Items 
Brakwa 
Female 
Brakwa 
Male 
Nyakrom 
Female 
Nyakrom 
Male 
Total Negative 
evaluations 
Functional value: consumption outcome 
help in future 27 3 5 9 44 2 
access to loan/other payout 5 3 0 1 9 3 
death payout 4 1 0 0 5 0 
facilitates savings 2 2 4 1 9 2 
finance education 9 0 0 0 9 0 
finance fire/other construction damage 3 0 0 0 3 0 
finance hospitalisation 1 0 1 0 2 0 
finance medical treatment 5 1 3 3 12 1 
help to progress 2 0 0 5 7 0 
help to repay loans  2 0 1 0 3 0 
pension 1 3 0 4 8 0 
Functional value: costs 
      Price 
      interest 0 0 0 1 1 1 
price_operation fees 0 0 1 0 1 1 
price_premiums 1 4 0 5 10 6 
price_premiums_reduce savings 0 5 0 0 5 5 
Transaction costs 
      running around/cumbersome walks 1 2 1 0 4 4 
waiting time 0 2 0 0 2 2 
Value for money (net benefit) 0 3 1 0 4 3 
Functional value: quality 
      Empathy 
      access_eligibility/availability 2 2 1 4 9 0 
access_reaching staff 3 1 1 0 5 4 
easy and fast access to contributions 0 3 0 0 3 3 
form of (re)payment 0 0 0 1 1 1 
information provision  6 8 7 1 22 10 
providing attention 0 6 2 1 9 4 
Table continues on the next page 
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Reliability 
      payout delivery (claim) 1 4 1 0 6 5 
policy documents delivery 3 3 0 0 6 3 
premium deductions 1 1 0 0 2 1 
service promises 1 14 2 0 17 16 
Assurance       
client permission 0 1 2 0 3 3 
credible sales agent 1 1 0 0 2 1 
trust in future benefit 3 6 4 1 14 7 
trustable information 0 1 1 0 2 2 
Responsiveness 
      enter/exit membership 0 1 0 0 1 1 
prompt and easy service delivery 1 0 0 0 1 0 
immediate coverage 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Tangibles 
      brand name 0 1 0 1 2 0 
office 1 0 0 0 1 1 
policy document 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Emotional value 
      Sense of security 
      hope  8 7 5 4 24 0 
peace of mind 8 1 1 1 11 0 
self-control 1 0 0 0 1 0 
worry 0 1 1 0 2 2 
confusion  1 1 1 0 3 3 
Good mood       
feeling strong 1 0 0 1 2 0 
happiness/joy/feeling good 1 0 0 3 4 0 
Wish satisfaction       
disappointment 0 8 0 0 8 8 
dissatisfaction/anger 0 4 0 0 4 4 
jealousy 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Social value 
      bequest to children/family 3 1 1 5 10 0 
mutual help 0 0 0 1 1 0 
solidarity demonstration 2 0 0 4 6 0 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on coding of transcripts. 
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Figure 6: Value dimensions of micro life insurance 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on coding of transcripts. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Im Zuge der rasanten Verbreitung von Mikrokrediten und Mikrosparprodukten werden seit 
ungefähr einem Jahrzehnt auch Mikroversicherungen an einkommensschwache Haushalte 
in Entwicklungsländern verkauft. Mikroversicherungen stellen für diese Haushalte eine 
Möglichkeit dar, mit den Folgen von Tod, Krankheit, Alter, wetterbedingten Ernteausfällen 
und anderen Risiken besser umzugehen. Staatliche Sozialversicherungssysteme sind in der 
Regel nur schwach ausgeprägt und überwiegend den Beschäftigten des formalen Sektors 
vorbehalten. Die Mehrheit der Haushalte ist jedoch in landwirtschaftlichen und 
kleinunternehmerischen Aktivitäten des informellen Sektors tätig. Diesen stehen häufig 
keine adäquaten Strategien im Umgang mit Risiken zur Verfügung, so dass ihr Konsum 
nur unvollständig gegen Einkommensschwankungen abgesichert ist. 
Risikovermeidungsstrategien und mangelnde Absicherung von Risiken werden als eine der 
Hauptursachen für anhaltende Armut in Entwicklungsländern betrachtet. In diesem 
Zusammenhang verspricht Mikroversicherung hohe Wohlfahrtsgewinne für die 
einkommensschwache Bevölkerung. Jedoch ist bisher nur unzureichend bekannt, unter 
welchen Bedingungen Haushalte und Individuen sich dafür entscheiden, 
Mikroversicherungen zu kaufen und welchen Wert sie in dieser Form der formalen 
Versicherung sehen. In dieser Arbeit werden sowohl quantitative als auch qualitative 
Analysemethoden – basierend auf eigenen Haushaltsumfragen und 
Fokusgruppendiskussionen – verwendet, um die Aufnahmebedingungen von 
Mikroversicherung und die Nutzung anderer Finanzdienstleistungen zur Risikoabsicherung 
und –Bewältigung im Fallbeispiel Ghana zu untersuchen. Bei der untersuchten Form von 
Mikroversicherung handelt es sich um Todesfallversicherung mit einem Sparanteil 
(Universal Life). Die Arbeit kommt zu drei Kernergebnissen.  
Erstens zeigt sich, dass die realisierte Nachfrage nach Mikrolebensversicherung nicht 
vollständig den Vorhersagen klassischer Versicherungstheorien folgt. Über die 
Standarddeterminanten der Versicherungsfrage hinaus spielen Faktoren informeller 
Vertrauensbildung und die subjektive Risikoeinschätzung eine entscheidende Rolle. Dies 
begründet sich hauptsächlich in bestehenden Informationsasymmetrien und einer geringen 
Erfahrung mit dem Versicherungsprodukt und dem Versicherer. Ferner steht die Nutzung 
von Mikrolebensversicherung in einer sich verstärkenden Beziehung zu anderen formalen 
Finanzdienstleistungen, die in den ländlichen und semi-urbanen Untersuchungsgebieten in  
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Ghana angeboten werden. Gleichzeitig stellt sie kein Substitut für informelle 
Finanzdienstleistungen dar. Angesichts der Bandbreite verschiedener Risiken, denen die 
lokale Bevölkerung ausgesetzt ist, verlieren universellere Strategien, wie informelle 
Unterstützungsnetzwerke, gegenüber Mikroversicherung nicht ihre Bedeutung.  
Zweitens wird deutlich, dass der Wert (Client Value), den die Zielgruppe der 
Mikroversicherung in dieser sieht, nicht allein auf Kosten- und Nutzenerwägungen basiert. 
Vielmehr spielen auch die Einschätzungen von Service Qualität, emotionalen- und sozialen 
Aspekten eine Rolle. Starke Diskrepanzen zwischen erwarteten und erfahrenen Kosten und 
Leistungen führen zu einer Abwertung der Mikroversicherung. Darüber hinaus wird der 
Kundenwert stark von Faktoren wie (geringen) Finanz- und Versicherungskenntnissen, der 
Beeinflussung durch die soziale Gruppe und dem Vergleich mit alternativen 
Risikomanagementstrategien beeinflusst.  
Drittens bestehen genderspezifische Muster in der realisierten Nachfrage nach 
Mikrolebensversicherung und anderen Finanzdienstleistungen. Diese hängen mit dem 
Haushaltstyp und regional unterschiedliche soziokulturellen Bedingungen zusammen. 
Haushalte, die von alleinstehenden Frauen geführt werden, kaufen 
Mikrolebensversicherung mit einer geringeren Wahrscheinlichkeit, als andere Haushalte, 
was auf eine Genderdiskriminierung des Marktes hindeuten könnte. Im Gegensatz dazu 
zeigt sich jedoch, dass innerhalb von Paarhaushalten eher die Frau eine 
Mikrolebensversicherung kauft, als der Mann. Dies ist insbesondere der Fall in Regionen, 
die von einer matrilinearen Gesellschaft (die ethnische Gruppe der Akan) dominiert 
werden und in denen Ehemänner eine geringere Kontrolle über Haushaltsentscheidungen 
besitzen, als in patrilinearen Gesellschaften. Darüber hinaus zeigen Ergebnisse auf der 
individuellen Ebene innerhalb von Haushalten, dass die Verhandlungsstärke (bargaining 
power) von Ehefrauen die Aufnahme von Mikrolebensversicherung durch den Ehemann 
kaum beeinflusst. Vielmehr kaufen Ehefrauen mit wachsender Machtposition innerhalb des 
Haushalts mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit selbst eine Mikrolebensversicherung. Diese 
Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass innerhalb von Haushalten unterschiedliche Präferenzen 
über die Absicherung von Tod und die Lebenshaltung im Alter besteht. In diesem 
Zusammenhang besteht eine zukünftige Forschungsaufgabe darin, die Möglichkeit 
unkooperativen Verhaltens im Hinblick auf (Mikro-) Versicherungsentscheidungen 
innerhalb von Haushalten empirisch zu überprüfen. 
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